

THE
ANDOVER REVIEW:
A RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY.

VOL. XV.—APRIL, 1891.—No. LXXXVIII.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF PLATO.

MOST men, most great men, are the natural and inevitable product of their antecedents and surroundings. They can be accounted for, and we feel that when we know little of their biography we lose a valuable portion of history. But in our spiritual astronomy the greatest men are what comets used to be, entirely exceptional and abnormal. Who can account for Homer, in the dim twilight of civilization, his conceptions of life, manners, and usages showing an almost savage condition of society, yet his epics the cynosure of the ages? Who can account for Shakespeare? Least of all those who have sought out the vestiges of him in his birthplace, seen the squalidness of his native home, and thence tracked his errant footsteps which can have led him into the purlieus of liberal culture only when his transcendent genius had won his citizenship there. Who can account for Raphael? The very term *pre-Raphaelite* denotes not preparation, but contrast, and his tutor's pictures explain nothing in him except faults in his earlier that disappear in his later works. The few greatest men that make epochs in their several departments, the fixed stars that have no secular parallax, but hold their unchanged place in midheaven while other luminaries shine for a time, and then grow pale and vanish, have in mind and soul no earthly parents or kindred. What is called their biography teaches us very little about them, and sometimes, as in the case of Shakespeare, is so utterly incomensurate with the man himself as to suggest doubts of the genuineness of his works. We there-

fore need regret the meagreness of our knowledge about Plato less than if he were less of a man.

But it may be asked, Does not Socrates account for Plato? Not by any means. On the other hand, it is to a very great degree Plato that accounts for Socrates. Socrates was, indeed, a great man in his way, and had Xenophon alone transmitted his memory, it would have been for the veneration of all time. Yet there is no reason for supposing that he transcended Xenophon's report and portrait of him; while Plato's Socrates is not only much more than Xenophon's, but in many respects of a different type.

I may illustrate what seems to me the difference between Socrates and Plato, by the analogy of physical science. In this, observation must precede theory. Facts must be known before they can be classed under the laws that govern them, and the observer, however keen and profound his vision, holds a lower place intellectually than the theorist — perhaps incapable of accurate observation — who marshals facts in their due order and their mutual relations. Equally in moral and spiritual truth fact must precede theory. There are in this department two orders of mind. There are the practically wise men, who discern intuitively what ought to be believed and done, and who might at first thought seem worth more to the world than the philosophers, yet are really on a lower plane; and then there are those who can so reason up to these truths, and so reason from them, as to extend and elevate them from modes of human thought and action into eternal laws and principles. Highest among the ancients in the former class was Socrates; in the latter, unsurpassed in all time, was Plato.

In comparing the two we need to take into account the forces that really shape and govern human life and character. Socrates was a moral teacher, who made as few mistakes as a pre-Christian or non-Christian moralist ever made, and who succeeded in a marvelous degree in obtaining the consent of those who heard him to his views of right and duty. I do not, however, find that he produced any extensive moral reformation. Alcibiades was, perhaps, as much under his influence as any one; but he was not made permanently better.

A clear knowledge of the right is of very small ethical value. In our time every well-educated youth knows the right as well as any sage or saint; yet how many there are who recognize it only by consciously violating it! What is needed more than knowledge

is motive force, enabling power, that which can coerce the will ; and that this power must come from above is no less a philosophical verity than a truth of religious experience. It is not what men fully know, but what they can know only in part, yet can press on ever into the fuller knowledge of it,—that which excites aspiration and longing,—that which one sees, yet, to borrow St. Paul's metaphor, sees but dimly, as if reflected from a metallic mirror,—it is this region of supersensual truth, with its penumbra of mystery, that attracts generous souls into its sphere, that lifts them above greed and lust, that makes them spurn the earthly elements of life and character, that gives them to breathe in its own purer, healthier atmosphere, and at the same time imparts tension and vigor to the extensor muscles of the active powers, is a tonic to the will, and gives law to word and deed. This is the office of philosophy, implied in its very name,—not knowledge or wisdom, but the love of wisdom, denoting not the self-conceit of the finder, but the humility of the earnest seeker.

In this service Plato had predecessors,—some, like Pythagoras, who left a long line of living light behind them. But their influence was nearly spent when Plato appeared, while his lasts till now. Clement of Alexandria and other Christian fathers reckoned him, along with the Hebrew prophets, among the precursors of the Divine Teacher, of whom none would have been more ready than Plato to say, "He must increase, but I must decrease." In the Alexandrian school of the infant church, in the revival of learning, and in later times, among the profoundest thinkers of their respective epochs, "Christian Platonist" has been almost the only title in which the word *Christian* has not lost dignity and worth by association with any term qualifying it or qualified by it.

Plato's philosophy, like whatever else can claim to be called philosophy, has the unknown for its realm,—a realm which grows with knowledge; for the broader the regions of the known, the more extensive are their confines, where thought can range, imagination soar, and theory find unbounded scope. Pre-Christian philosophy called on its disciples to remain ever in the empyrean,—to look down with contempt on the varying fortunes, the paltry aims, the mean ambitions, the brief pleasures of human life; and scorn of sublunary things was the source and sum of the virtues. Christianity is philosophy, not above life, but in life,—not despising, but transfiguring things earthly, finding in them types, foreshadowings, foreshinings, prophecies of the realm transcending experience

and knowledge, and equally transcending the broader vision and the more penetrating insight of faith; for Christianity opens to philosophy a larger realm than it reveals, inasmuch as to the finite mind the unknown must always grow faster than the known. It is, therefore, only by philosophy that religion expands and exalts the souls under its nurture. Mere hard-and-fast dogma about the truths of religion is not to be despised; for though it has among those who never go beyond it not a few bigots, prigs, and hypocrites, it keeps many souls of limited capacity and culture loyal to duty, and furnishes the chart and compass for many a life-voyage by the shoals and eddies of time into the clear waters of eternity. But the highest office, the noblest work, of Christianity is filled and wrought by the divine philosophy to which it opens a boundless range for reverent quest, for tentative theory, for adoring contemplation, in the God whose very self-revelations are self-hidings, in the Saviour, the mystery of whose divine humanity seems least penetrable to those who know Him most and love Him best, in the eternal life, whose possibilities of growth and strength, of duty and service, of attainment and fruition, tax and exceed the widest scope of fancy, the loftiest flight of hope and aspiration.

I speak of this highest Christian type of philosophy in connection with Plato, because he no more truly lived when he was surrounded by pupils in the Academy than when, early in the seventeenth century, in the English University of Cambridge, he was again at the head of a school of disciples who saw in him the only valid interpreter of the Divine Word that had appeared before that "Word became flesh and dwelt among men." Of this school, not to mention lesser lights which, earlier or later, would not have been reckoned among the lesser, it may be enough to name Ralph Cudworth, whose treatise on the "Eternal and Immutable Morality" is still the feeding ground for ethical philosophers worthy of the name, and provided most abundantly the antidote, before the bane grew rife, for the morals of the utilitarian and positivist schools; Henry Moore, of whom it may be said more truly than of any other writer whom I know, that his philosophy is poetry, his poems divine philosophy, uniting even in single verses profound thought, ardent devotion, and imaginative power of the highest order; and John Smith, whose fame, had it not been smothered by his name, would have been fresh to-day, the only really great writer of the sixty-five John Smiths commemorated in Allibone's "Dictionary of Authors," whose "Dis-

courses" read as if the bees that alighted on his great master's lips had instilled the honey of Hymettus into his own heart and soul, as strong, too, as they are sweet,—to borrow, in its genuine meaning, a figure of Holy Writ left unintelligible in our common version, "apples of gold in baskets of silver."

After this long, I trust not overlong preface, I will now give in brief what little is known or believed as to Plato's personal history. He was probably born in 428 b. c., the year in which Pericles died, in Athens, or, as some authorities say, in the neighboring island of Ægina. His father and mother were said to be own cousins,—a kindred from which, if not misreported, a birth with a robust bodily constitution as well as a great mind and soul is certainly exceptional. His father Ariston traced his descent from Codrus, king of Athens, who was a descendant in the fifth generation from Neleus, king of Pylos, who was said to be the son of Poseidon,—a genealogy in which the name of Codrus alone could have any interest for us, and not even his, when we consider that the story of his magnanimity and patriotism is semi-mythical, and that there were about twenty generations between him and Plato. It means much more to those who regard genius as a heritage, that Plato's mother, Perictione, though not descended from Solon, was a member of the family which in the preceding century had given birth to that philosopher, legislator, and statesman.

Many of the greatest names of classic antiquity were given not in infancy by parents, but in more mature years by a public, smaller or larger, that assumed the office of godfather. Our philosopher in his childhood was Aristocles, so called for his grandfather. Plato is allied to the adjective *πλατύς*, which means *broad*, and young Aristocles was called Plato, as the common tradition runs, on account of the breadth of his shoulders, or, as those say who prefer to find in the name of his boyhood the prophecy of his eminence, from the breadth of his intellect, as manifest in the fluent wealth of his utterance. Both of these endowments undoubtedly had their part in making his name illustrious; for no little breadth of back and shoulders was demanded for the fluent speech uttered and written from a fountain which the flow of fourscore years could not reduce below its summit-level.

Retrospective myths are apt to form themselves about the infancy of men who attain preëminent honor; and it is by no means improbable that the story of the swarm of bees that rested on the infant philosopher's lips as he slept under a myrtle-tree

was a posthumous invention. Yet I once knew of a similar event happening to twin brothers, who, though then promising little boys, and left unharmed by the bees, have not distinguished themselves in any way.

Plato had in his youth what was then regarded as a liberal education,—a thorough gymnastic training, and instruction under the best masters in grammar, music, mathematics, the art of poetry, and the Pythagorean philosophy. In his boyhood he wrote tragedies, and tried his hand at lyric and epic poetry, with what success we know not; but he probably was not unwise in making a holocaust of his verse when he devoted himself to philosophy. Had his example in that respect been largely followed in more recent times, how many fair reputations might have been saved, which have been wrecked on the way from the press to the paper-mill! Plato is said to have sought also in his youth the athletic honors of the Isthmian games; but his crown, if won, has left no record.

His must have been a busy life, with brief rest or recreation, yet with no specific life-work in view, when, in his twenty-first year, his father placed him under the charge and tuition of Socrates, who is related on the previous night to have dreamed that he held in his bosom a young swan, who, when his feathers were grown, spread his wings, and rose with a bold flight and a song of surpassing sweetness into the upper heavens,—a dream which on the succeeding day he regarded as verified in his new pupil. For the ensuing nine years Plato was constantly with Socrates, listening earnestly to his teaching, beholding with unceasing admiration the simplicity, integrity, and beneficence of his daily conduct, and drinking in the hope full of immortality which made the last hours of the sage seem not death, but the passing into life. It was probably before this time that Plato had served as a soldier, as he is reported to have done in three campaigns. We have no details of his military service, which must have been for short periods, and probably not of his own choice, but by conscription, to which every citizen between the ages of eighteen and sixty was liable. As a friend of Socrates, Plato may have been in danger, and this is assigned as his reason for going to Megara, with his fellow-disciple from that city, Eucleides or Euclid,—not the mathematician, but the founder of a school of philosophy that took its name from his and its birthplace.

It must have been about this time that Plato visited Magna Graecia in Italy, where the Pythagorean philosophy still had its

seat, and Egypt, revered less for what it then was than as the fountain of knowledge, science, and philosophy whence Greece had first filled her springs. He is said, also, though on insufficient authority, to have traveled in Palestine, Persia, and Babylonia in quest of knowledge. There are, however, few traces of his travels in his writings; for the fruits thus gathered in various climates were not so much garnered for later use, as digested and assimilated.

After his more distant journeys, Plato went to Sicily, where he was received at first with favor by the elder Dionysius, and is reported to have made a strong, though brief impression on him in behalf of human freedom and merciful government. But the monarch soon quarreled with him. When on one occasion Dionysius quoted to him verses which may be rendered, —

“At tyrants’ courts the man who enters free
Is all the same as were he born a slave,”

Plato rejoined, —

“At tyrants’ courts the man who enters free,
Whate’er he does, can ne’er become a slave.”

About Plato’s return from Sicily a story is told in so many different forms that it must contain a kernel of fact, namely, that Dionysius sent him home in the same vessel with the Lacedæmonian ambassador Pollis, who promised to sell him as a slave. He was so sold in Ægina, and was bought by a Cyrenian, who at once emancipated him and sent him to Athens. Dionysius, affecting innocence of the plot of which Plato was the victim, wrote to him, begging him to say no ill of him to his pupils and hearers in the Academy, and Plato replied: “We are so busy in the Academy that we have no time to talk about Dionysius.”

On his return, Plato, being now forty years of age, began to teach philosophy, principally in a gymnasium that had been the property of one Academus, whence the name, applied to several successive schools of philosophy that professed a more or less close allegiance to Plato as founder and head, and in these later centuries to a wide diversity of institutions of science and learning. He taught gratuitously, and in great part, in the way which had the sanction of Socrates, that of vivid and earnest dialogue or conversation, though on the more abstruse subjects it would appear that he delivered continuous lectures.

It was after an interval of more than twenty years that Plato revisited Sicily. The younger Dionysius had succeeded his

father, who had kept him in retirement, almost in confinement, in which condition he had acquired a love for philosophy and for liberal studies, and at the same time had formed tastes and habits at once luxurious and grossly vicious. Dion, his near kinsman and, as long as he was permitted to be so, his good genius, persuaded him to send for Plato, hoping by his aid to reform both the tyrant and the state. Dionysius received Plato with such honors as would have been rendered to royalty, and held a public religious festival, with sacrifices to the gods in gratitude for his advent. Plato at the outset induced the tyrant to dismiss the ten thousand foreigners who had been his guard, and to bring his army and navy down to a reasonable peace-standard, also to lighten many of the burdens that had been laid upon the people by his father, and to establish equity in the administration of the law. But corrupt courtiers soon regained their influence, and though the tyrant professed the utmost reverence and affection for his guest, and was unwilling to part with him, Plato insisted on taking his leave, refusing splendid parting gifts, and accepting only a few books, probably the works of some of the renowned Syracusan physicists and philosophers, which in those slow days had not yet reached Athens.

On his way home Plato took a route by Olympia, to attend the games, and there a story is told of him, probably the oldest of its kind, the like of which has been told of not a few eminent men since. He met at Olympia several distinguished strangers, sat or reclined at the same table with them, spent whole days with them, and they liked him so well that they begged him to be their companion on their journey to Athens, where he secured lodgings for them. On their arrival their first inquiry was where they should find the great philosopher whose fame had been foremost among their reasons for this journey. Plato then, in the common phrase, made himself known to them, which, in fact, was precisely what he had been doing at Olympia and on the road.

Several years later Plato went to Sicily for the third time. His friend Dion had been banished, and had been living in retirement with him in Athens, but had every possible reason to desire restoration to his native soil. Dionysius wrote to Plato, urging him to revisit Sicily, promising to do all that he could wish for Dion, and threatening, in case of his refusal, to confiscate Dion's property, and to take such measures as would render his return impossible. The philosopher was received by the tyrant with every demonstration of gladness; but the promises that had been made

to him were gradually withdrawn. Dion's property was sold, and his wife was compelled to marry another man. Meanwhile Plato, though splendidly lodged, was in virtual imprisonment, not without danger of life, and was finally suffered to depart only through the interposition of Archytas, of Tarentum, who added to his merited fame as a mathematician and philosopher equal reputation and controlling influence as a statesman and a military commander. On his way home Plato again stopped to see the Olympian games, and there met Dion, who, against his friend's earnest remonstrance, yet moved more by indignation at the maltreatment of Plato than by his own injuries, organized an expedition against the tyrant, and succeeded in dethroning him and effecting an entire revolution in the state. But Dion, coming to the head of affairs, showed that it was easier to govern others than to govern himself, and, after having betrayed his moral unfitness for supreme power, was assassinated.

Dion's friends then wrote to Plato, imploring his counsel as to the form of government. He replied, deprecating equally despotism and pure democracy, and speaking of what we call limited monarchy, that is, government by kings who are themselves subject to the laws, as the best of political organisms. He advised the creation of three kings, not, as I suppose, because he thought three better than one, but because there were three aspirants and probable claimants to the throne, the sons, respectively, of Dion just slain, of the Dionysius whom he had put to flight and who afterward held again a brief tenure of sovereignty, and of the elder Dionysius. He recommended the choice of a senate with full legislative powers, and of thirty-five custodians of the laws, who were to exercise judicial functions without interference by the kings, and who in questions of peace or war were to serve as an advisory council. Syracuse can hardly have begun to profit by his advice. At that point its history becomes somewhat obscure, and is rendered so by a series of revolutions and assassinations too rapid to be easily traced.

Plato, though he kept aloof from the politics of Athens, which must have seemed to him corrupt beyond the reach of remedy, seems to have acquired extended reputation for political sagacity and wisdom. The Cyrenians sent deputies to him, begging him to prepare a code of laws for them. He declined, on the ground of their greed of gain and their engrossment in the pursuit and enjoyment of wealth, saying that so rich a people could not be kept amenable to law. The people of Megalopolis made a similar

application, which he declined, on account of their temper and habits, as averse to political and social equality. Like requests from other states are said to have met with a more ready compliance.

As for Plato's personal character, it is certain that from the commencement of his intimacy with Socrates he led not only a pure and sober life, but one which in early manhood had much of the gravity of advanced years, and for that very reason retained in old age a large measure of the freshness and vivacity of youth. Previously to his twenty-first year his industry was so great, and his studies so many and arduous, that there can have been but a narrow margin for the frivolities, still less for the vices, of youth. His earliest biographers say of him that, as a youth, he was modest and quiet, and was never known to indulge even in excessive laughter.

Bright sayings of Plato were treasured up, the brightest of which may account for the preservation of the others. When asked whether there were any sayings of his which, like those of great men before him, would be handed down to posterity, he replied: "Let me first acquire a distinguished name, and there will be no lack of such treasured words." Among these it is related that, when he reproved some one for gambling with dice, and the person whom he rebuked expressed surprise at his taking notice of so small a concern, he answered: "Habit is never a small concern." The next two anecdotes are told in illustration of his self-command and scrupulous justice. He said one day to a friend who called on him: "Whip this slave for me, I beg you. I cannot; for I am angry with him." On another occasion he said to a servant: "You would surely get a whipping if I were not angry." He commonly walked; but once, having mounted a horse, he alighted immediately, saying: "If I ride I shall be as proud as my horse is." He proposed a remedy for excessive drinking, saying that if an intoxicated man could only see himself in a mirror, he would never again transgress the bounds of temperance,—a suggestion that might be of some worth to our legislature, if, having already forbidden screens in drinking shops, that their inmates may be exposed to public view, they were to order such apartments to be surrounded with mirrored walls, that their customers might see themselves as others see them.

Of incidents in Plato's life other than those that I have named, we have no authentic record, and some of the traditions that have come from doubtful sources are not entirely consistent with the

best authorities. He is said to have enjoyed uninterrupted health, and to have suspended his lectures for more than forty successive years only during his second and third visits to Sicily. His voice was feeble, but mellifluous, and to the last he never failed of earnest hearers and devoted disciples.

To cite but a few among his more distinguished disciples, I will name Speusippus, his nephew and immediate successor, who first laid intense emphasis on the science of classification, without which knowledge can never outgrow its infancy; Xenocrates, who succeeded Speusippus in the Academy, whose character commanded respect and reverence, while he was rather his master's expositor and continuator than a man of original genius; Aristotle, the founder of the new school of philosophy that divided with Plato the empire of the scholastic world for many centuries, and of whom Plato said that he needed reins and bits, as did Xenocrates the spur; and Theophrastus, the most accomplished physicst of his time, though best known by his delineations of various moral, or rather immoral, traits and habits, which he terms *χαρακτῆρες*, or *characters*. Demosthenes, too, regarded Plato as his master. When he was promised safety if he would submit to Antipater, king of Macedonia, he exclaimed: "God forbid that, after having heard Xenocrates and Plato discourse on the immortality of the soul, I should prefer a life of shame to an honorable death." Plato had also several women among his disciples, and we may learn from them that the measures in our own time called—miscalled, as I think—dress reform are not as new as they purport to be. Those women dressed like men, saying that manly attire alone befitted a philosopher. Of the female disciples we have the names of Lasthenia and Axiothea, *Arcades ambo*, who came from the Peloponnesus toward the close of the great master's life, and remained in his school under the tuition of Speusippus.

Plato had, of course, the usual lot of genius in those who envied and maligned him, and the lot of other Athenian philosophers, as of his great master, in having been held up to ridicule by comic poets, whose bold and reckless shafts were aimed at every shining mark. But he survived both calumny and ridicule, and died at the age of eighty-four, suddenly, while writing, or, as some authorities say, at a marriage feast.

As for the times of Plato, they had of political interest little that was either happy or hopeful. Athens had passed the meridian of her glory. The Peloponnesian war, the sovereignty of the thirty tyrants, the ascendancy of successive demagogues,

hardly one of whom had so much as the show or pretense of patriotism or civic virtue of any kind, the rapid gravitation of the state toward Macedonian supremacy, sum up the history of Athens for the fourscore years of the philosopher's life. I enter into no historical detail, because we have no trace of his political activity, or of his having ever borne any public office.

What was of more importance to a man of retired and contemplative habits, he inherited, in those moribund days of the Grecian states, all the greatest memories of living Greece, — a history which he came too late to help in making. The foremost names in Greek literature were almost all earlier than his own. Æschylus died nearly thirty years before he was born; Herodotus and Thucydides, in his childhood; Euripides and Sophocles, in his early manhood. Xenophon was by a few years his senior. Aristophanes died, and Demosthenes was born, midway in his life.

As to antecedent philosophers, Plato was indebted chiefly to Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Socrates. From Pythagoras he derived his love of numbers and of mathematical science, and it was in that love that he placed over the vestibule of the Academy the inscription, "Let no one who is not versed in geometry enter here." From Pythagoras he derived also his belief in the transmigration of souls. Plato's physical philosophy was evidently shaped from the cosmogony of Heraclitus, and closely resembles it, yet with this essential difference, that, while Heraclitus, if a theist, was a pantheist, his only God being the elemental fire of which the worlds were made, with Plato, though the divine essence sometimes seems only semi-detached from nature, it yet is sufficiently detached to be the object of reverence, gratitude, and worship. How much Plato owed to Socrates no one can know now, perhaps no one ever knew. But there can be no doubt that the maxims, and what he regarded as the established truths, of moral science, came to him from his master, though, in my belief, for the poetico-philosophic form in which we have them we are indebted almost or quite entirely to the disciple.

There is one important portion of Plato's heritage from the earlier time of which he speaks with a scorn and an intensity of disapproval which at first thought seem unspeakably strange, namely, the poetry, which we are wont to regard as the best and the most enduring legacy of Greece to the world and the ages. In the third Book of the Republic, he tolerates in his ideal state no poets, and speaks of Homer and his whole tribe as having exerted a demoralizing influence. This is the more astonishing when we

consider that the philosopher, as such, is a poet, — a *maker*, that his very office is to construct from his own highest thoughts and aspirations an edifice in the realm of the unknown, and that among the real poets of Greece, if there be one who could contest the palm with Homer, or sit on Parnassus beside him, it is Plato. But Plato was in the right. We have a parallel case, only not nearly so strong, in our own English literature. In sweep and meridian height of imagination, in awful grandeur, in oases of majestic sweetness and beauty, in full command of the entire gamut of epic song, the *Paradise Lost* is as transcendent in poetic power as it is unique in its theme, and in all coming time it will be read, as we read it now, only with healthful amazement and harmless delight. But who can estimate its baleful influence in the past? It has furnished the popular mind with its appalling and terrific demonology. It has kept alive superstitions that have thrown a veil over the face of heaven. It has made the belief of large portions of the English-speaking world not pure theism, but a dualism, with two antagonistic gods striving for the mastery, and with the scales of victory almost equally balanced. Even now, though these notions have faded before growing intelligence, if one were to take men and women of middle or advanced age and of average culture, as he might meet them, he would find that fully half of them suppose that Satan is expressly named in the Hebrew Scriptures as the tempter in man's first transgression. Now I can conceive that a wise man, a century ago, might have urged a plea by no means feeble or groundless, for treating the *Paradise Lost* as Plato would have dealt with the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. These Homeric poems, and the other classic poets that have their scope in the mythical region, would do us great harm, if there were any danger of our believing them. In Plato's time there was that danger. The more enlightened men recognized the myths as fables; the more ignorant believed the stories about the gods that the poets told; and there were a large proportion of the people in an intermediate state, half believing, half skeptical, to whom those stories were the whole of religion, and whose alternative and often alternating condition was a harmful belief, or an equally harmful unbelief springing from contempt for the only gods they knew.

The two grounds on which Plato inveighs against the poets are, first, the utter falseness of their theology; and, secondly, the gross immorality commended by divine examples to believing souls that could not account as vile the vindictive and lustful

crimes ascribed to Zeus, the omnipotent, and to his Olympian colleagues. Though I have no fear of Homer, and my sole fear is of the growing indisposition to read him and to study the only tongue that could have worthily voiced his stories of gods and heroes, I heartily wish that the Third Book of Plato's Republic could be read with what the old divines used to call a "practical application," by those classical teachers who drag their pupils through such unmitigated vileness in a Greek or Latin author as in English they would throw into the fire, and still more, by such guardians and monitors of our boys and girls, young men and women, and such curators of our public libraries as give no thought and take no care as to the moral character of the books which they suffer to be read or are not unwilling to put into circulation.

Were there space, I might say much of the Greece, the Athens, in which a Plato could have for nearly half a century receptive, appreciative, earnest, enthusiastic hearers and disciples, and the picture would be one of violent contrasts,—of brilliant lights and sombre shadows, which remain unchanged on the canvas, while the intermediate tints have faded out.

In one very important particular Athenian society resembled the society of our Southern States before the civil war. The slaves were the only working class. Such few free men as labored were mere pariahs, of a lower caste even than the slaves. The proportion of the slave population to the free was incredibly large, at some periods no less than twenty to one. At the same time the fertility of the soil and the simplicity of the modes of living left for the free people few occupations or cares appertaining to family or subsistence. A culture in some respects of a high order was almost inevitable,—a culture which at once cherished the arts of design and was cherished by them. The drama, cheap in its rude appointments, unequaled in its representation of the grand and awful in and far beyond the possibilities of human experience, had its crowded audiences, and exerted a vast educational power in enlarging mental receptivity and bringing the popular mind into relation with high and profound themes of thought. Of those who could sit or stand with suspended breath through a trilogy of *Æschylus* or *Euripides*, which, beginning at or before sunrise, occupied the solid portion of the day, there must have been large numbers who found themselves not out of place in the quietness of the Academy and under the fascinating wordfall from Plato's lips.

The Athenians were readers, too. A public library was founded in the city a century before Plato's time. Rich men owned highly educated slaves whom they employed as copyists; there were many private collections of books; and there was at least one bookstore, perhaps more.

But, on the other hand, Plato's Athens abounded in all the inevitable vices of a slaveholding population, without the modifying, not to say redeeming influences of an adulterated Christianity, which made American slaveholders less bad than they would otherwise have been. The Athenians, taken collectively, were brutally sensual, fickle, untrustworthy, destitute of the sentiment of loyalty, incapable equally of wisely exercising public trusts and of quietly submitting to legal restraint, careless of human life, indifferent to human suffering, implacable enemies, treacherous friends. They had no homes worthy of the name; for they treated women as inferior beings. Their wives and mothers, we have reason to believe, were generally virtuous, but of no marked influence in society; while the women who had a name and place outside of their own houses were for the most part such as might have "left their country for their country's good."

As I said at the outset, the greatest men are not to be accounted for. The Athens of his time does not begin to account for Plato. His credulous admirers, therefore, pretended that Phœbus, not Ariston, was his father. Does not their myth enfold the truth, comprehending him and all the greatest luminaries of every age, that they owe their spiritual parentage, not immediately, but immediately, to the God of Light?

A. P. Peabody.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

REVELATION, INSPIRATION, AND AUTHORITY.

WE live in a transition age. Old methods of thought are passing away; new methods of thought are taking their place. The change is natural. It has been going on in all past history; it will go on in all future history. The new does not cut loose from the old; the present roots itself deeply in the past. The whole is organic, and continuity is a prime law of the organism.

The process brings with it a certain degree of restlessness and uncertainty regarding the ultimate grounds of knowledge and

action in morality and religion, and thus for the time being tends to unsettle belief and weaken personal conviction of truth and duty. If this state of things exists for any length of time, a spirit of indifference and unconcern for all truth relating to the higher things of life takes possession of men. No temper of mind is so hard to deal with, no mental attitude so difficult to approach and overcome, so well-nigh impossible to reach with truth; even though the truth is of most vital importance, as this spirit of indifference. A determined and persistent opposer, an out-and-out skeptic, can be more easily touched and won to the truth than the man who "cares for none of these things." This spirit of indifference and unconcern as regards morals and religion—religion certainly, if not to so great an extent as regards morals—is widely prevalent and clearly manifest at the present day. Its immediate causes are perhaps numerous and more or less complex; but beneath and back of them all is the ultimate cause,—the feeling, more or less defined, that in religion and morals there is no absolute authoritative truth, or, if such truth exists and is within our reach, it fails to vindicate its authority to our consciousness. As the practical efficiency of truth in life depends upon this vindication of its authority as truth to all over whom it claims this authority, the question ultimately resolves itself into that of the nature and ground of the authority of truth, whatever its source or realm, or whatever the method or means by which it becomes known to men. A discussion of the nature and ground of the authority of truth, especially as related to revelation and inspiration, is, then, both important and timely. The discussion cannot be exhaustive, but merely suggestive. It aims simply to exhibit in outline the philosophical principles involved in the actual facts of experience in these matters, and, by showing that the nature and ground of the authority of truth is precisely the same in principle in all departments of human thought and action, to furnish a solid basis for belief in revelation and its authority upon philosophic and psychologic grounds that will not be shaken with every shifting phase of the historical argument concerning the date, authorship, etc., of the Scripture books in which any particular portion of revelation is recorded. The method is the exhibition and specific application of the general principles of knowledge, which, rightly understood, furnish solid standing-ground amid the uncertainties and restlessness inseparably incident to the progressive investigation and acquisition of truth. When this is accom-

plished, the historical argument as regards Scripture or other similar source of truth is properly in place, to be taken account of, by no means to be ignored, and never to be dispensed with. But the historical has its ultimate ground in the philosophical.

The subject is vitally important, not only from the point of view of the philosophy of religion, but from that of practical life and work. In fact, these two are indissolubly bound together and cannot be separated. The rank and file of the ministry to-day, or at least too large a part of them, are utterly at sea on this fundamentally important question. They are preaching and working upon authority, rather than upon reasoned conviction. In the depths of their souls, if at all awake to the realities of the hour, to the thoughts that are seething in the hearts of men, they know or feel — and their congregations more or less clearly sense this knowledge or feeling — that the dogmatic foundation upon which they rest is, to say the least, considerably shaken and very insecure. Many of them have never thought the question out to the end, and for themselves wrought out and won an answer. They have accepted, in all honesty too, as honesty goes,¹ what has been taught them, and taught them in all honesty, no doubt. Many of them are hardly aware of the existence of the problem, and yet its recognition is the most rational ultimate, and sometimes doubtless immediate, explanation of the meagre success of their labors. If perchance awake to it, they have either not dared or for other reason refrained from thinking it through and out. Perhaps in the pressure of immediate duties they have supposed that the question would settle itself, or drop out of sight, or in some way cease to trouble them or their hearers. Not so. The question will not down unanswered. The more attempts are made to down it or silence it by appeals to authority, the more persistently it is up again, appearing at every turn of thought or work. There is but one solution of the difficulty, namely, to think it out to the end, bravely, honestly, reverently, carefully. "The wounds of reason can only be healed by reason," and reason is competent to the task.

Knowledge is the intellectual resultant or product of the action and reaction of the mind upon the material of knowledge within and without. It involves both the particular and the universal, and these in organic, inseparable union. In the individual and in society, knowledge is always a progressive process and result, in-

¹ No reflection upon motive is intended by the phrase, but merely a suggestion that our ordinary conception of honesty is not deep enough.

volving a constant *becoming* of the subject or knowing agent, and a constantly increasing assimilation of the object or material of knowledge. This process goes on, and progressively satisfactory results are attained and manifest in direct proportion as it is throughout pervaded and ruled by the truth spirit. This genuinely scientific or philosophic spirit and temper of mind — the moral element in all intellectual activity, absolutely essential to any abiding and worthful results — exhibits three phases: A supreme regard for facts and love of truth, insuring and promoting openness, receptivity, and impartiality of mind in investigation and discussion, and a readiness to revise any and all views, or to abandon the old and accept the new, as occasion requires. Patient and persistent effort in the search for truth, and in its interpretation, systemization, and application, increasingly avoiding hasty and superficial generalization from insufficient or imperfectly understood data or principles, and finding no labor too difficult, protracted, or disagreeable which is requisite to the attainment of its goal. Instant and complete subjection or obedience to truth as soon as known as an indispensable condition of further progress in its knowledge, involving of course the rejection of everything contrary thereto; the activity of mind which progressively corrects any excess of subjectivity, preserves the true relation between the subject or knowing agent and the object or the materials of knowledge, whose mutual activity makes any knowledge whatever possible and actual, and gives valid assurance of a continuous approximation towards, and an eventual realization of, absolute truth.¹ Science and philosophy, in spirit, method, and results, are, when true to their ideal, essentially ethical. As man is a unity of forces and functions, no one of which acts in absolute independence and isolation, knowledge, though primarily intellectual, is yet inseparably related to and bound up with all the other powers and functions of the spirit. It is absolutely dependent upon their coöperation for the successful performance of its own peculiar function in the total spiritual life of man. The *authority* of knowledge rests upon and consists in its character as real, its intrinsic worth as rationally consistent and practically efficient. The experience of all men accords with this principle, whether they consciously recognize it as such or not.

¹ The above is simply an exposition of the philosophical principle involved in the words of Christ in John vii. 16, 17. Compare the fine sermon of Frederic W. Robertson, "Obedience the Organ of Spiritual Knowledge :" *Sermons*, Harper's ed., pp. 300 seq.

They gain their knowledge by the action and reaction of their minds upon the material at hand, or by effort discoverable. They increase their knowledge by a continuance of the same process and in accord with the same principles. They consider their knowledge approximately absolute and authoritative in direct proportion as it is rationally consistent and practically available, efficient, adequate. Knowledge, too, like everything else of worth, is "not a gift, but an achievement." It must be wrought out by each man for himself, not in isolation, it is true, but in coöperation with all the other forces involved. These, however, while indispensable, cannot accomplish the desired end apart from the personal effort of him who would know. Books, teachers, and all other auxiliaries, personal and impersonal, are only aids. The essential work each must do for himself, or the result fails to appear.

What is true of knowledge in general is precisely true of that special form or sphere of it known as revelation, and attained with the aid of inspiration. The same principles obtain here as elsewhere throughout the realm. The idea of revelation, as of knowledge, is twofold: as a process, it is the unveiling of that which is hidden, the unknown becoming known; as a result, it is the knowledge or truth thus attained. Like knowledge in general, its possibility lies in the facts of the existence of truth to be revealed; of some one to reveal it, and the means of so doing; and of some one to whom it may be and is revealed with capacity for such revelation. The method, as universally in knowledge, is the mutual activity of subject and object. In this process the subject is constantly *becoming*, that is, developing in power and capacity, insight and grasp; while the object is constantly assimilated by the subject in clearer and larger measure, that is, revelation objective, and thus only the material of revelation is becoming revelation subjective, or known truth. The sphere of revelation, taking the term in the broad sense in which it is commensurate with all knowledge of truth attained by man, includes both nature and man in all their varied range of activity, in their mutual relations to each other and to God. In the more limited sense, as restricted to moral and spiritual forces and truths, revelation has chiefly and particularly to do with man individual and collective—history—culminating in Jesus Christ, the ideal man, the central figure of history, the supreme and final revelation of God to man. In all this activity of man, individual and collective, God is manifesting himself to all peoples in different ways and in different measures (*Hebrews i. 1 seq.*), preparing for the final and supreme

revelation in his Son. Each people, according to its capacity and opportunity, develops some phase of the revelation, fulfilling its part of the allotted and necessary work in bringing about the complete whole. Each people is selected for its particular work as best qualified for and capable thereof. Each particular work is ultimately for the benefit of all. The record of the revelation to the Jews, or to the race as a whole in and by them, is the Scriptures.

The question as to the principle,—selection on the ground of fitness of any particular people for any particular work,—usually heretofore considered as peculiar in the case of the Jews and the Scriptures, is by the modern comparative method in religious philosophy shown to be general, and to apply equally to all. The principle rests ultimately in the wisdom and righteousness of God, not in arbitrary will, and is essentially the same as that which man exhibits in the accomplishment of his plans and purposes. The perfect being can neither think nor act arbitrarily. He must, by virtue of his own nature as perfect, choose the intrinsically best of all possible ways, taking account of all the facts and forces involved in the entire evolutionary process. There are natural and metaphysical limitations of possibility even to an infinite being, and the evolutionary process will manifest itself as wholly rational only when complete. God, in confining himself within the limits existing in the nature of things and by himself established, manifests his perfect character and his respect for the universe, including man, which He has brought into being, and for himself as its source.

This point — the absolute inviolability of law, and the uniform observance of law on the part of perfect intelligence — is of supreme importance. Perfect intelligence always conforms to the laws of such intelligence. This we should strenuously and with the utmost possible clearness always and everywhere maintain. Much of the opposition against revelation and revealed religion arises from the idea, false it is true, but nevertheless, alas! urged in the past, and too much so now, by Christians, that there is something arbitrary, irregular, disorderly, contrary to eternal principles of mind and morals, either in the subject itself or in the way in which it is brought to us. It is our business, as far as possible, to correct and remove this false conception. And we can do it best by setting forth the true in as clear a light as possible. Truth is the best and only ultimately successful apologetics.

Revelation is, then, a continuously progressive process and re-

sult according to the work of God in revealing, and the zeal and fidelity of man in making God's work his own by study and practical application of truth so fast as he attains it. Revelation implies the continuous working of God, as well as man, in all ages, those preceding Christ's advent, as well as those succeeding the same, and in the history of all peoples as well as in that of the Jews. The Holy Spirit is as near to men now as in the apostolic age. The promise to *lead* into all truth is not limited to the apostles and their times, but is true as a general principle for all time, and of the interpretation as well as of the text to be interpreted. The light from history and experience is vastly greater in our day than in any previous age, not excepting even that of the apostles. Theology has been and now is too deistic. "God is not dead." Revelation is as possible and actual now as ever. New conceptions and applications of truth are virtually new truth.

Among the means by which man attains a knowledge of truth is that called inspiration. The term has been used with varied breadth of meaning. Strictly defined, inspiration is the personal influence of God upon the psychical nature of man in its totality, exercised, of course, strictly in accord with the laws of psychic action, by and in consequence of which man is quickened in his perceptive power and in insight into and grasp of truth, and thus his power increased to record and transmit such truth to others. Inspiration holds precisely the same place in this specific field of moral and religious truth as the teacher or other personal stimulus in that of knowledge in general. The precise nature and method of operation of personal influence is yet very largely unknown territory. It is a problem of psychology whose progressively satisfactory solution depends upon the extent and character of our psychologic knowledge. This knowledge, constantly extending and deepening, promises sooner or later far greater accuracy and adequacy in our definition and exposition of personal influence. Meanwhile it is of vital importance so to conceive the subject that our conception shall contain no irrational elements, and be capable of such modification as increasing light shall show to be necessary.

In a very true and valid sense, inspiration is involved in all perception, insight, knowledge. The universe having its ultimate ground in God, and being throughout but a varied expression of his energy in forms more or less independent and individual, some impersonal, some personal, but none in severalty from their source, it is no mere assumption, but rather a rational necessity,

to affirm his constant energizing in and through them all for the accomplishment of universally and even individually worthful ends. This activity varies in character and amount according to the purposes in mind and the necessities of the case. The insight of the great men of science, of history, of polities, of literature, of philosophy, and of the leaders in the practical application of truth to life, is as justly ascribed in part to this personal influence of God quickening their perceptive powers, as that of the men who have manifested the like in the sphere of religion.

But the activity of inspiration, in the sense of the personal influence of God upon the psychic nature of man, is more extendedly manifested in the realm of truth relating to holy character and the means of obtaining it. This is due to the superior relative importance and necessity of this truth to life, although it is still true that its attainment is dependent upon and coincident with the possession of a certain amount of personal and general intelligence and capacity for such truth, and with a corresponding development of the same. Great souls are needed to reveal great truths. The manifest characteristics of the truth attained under these conditions imply corresponding qualities in the influence exerted and the being exerting it; in brief, it points back necessarily to the Holy Spirit as its inspirer and source. But the principles involved are the same as in all other parts of the realm of truth. As in the case of the teacher, there are certain limitations that cannot, at once at least, be overcome. If the teacher is perfect in knowledge,¹ character, and teaching power, he is of necessity limited in the exercise of these qualities by the nature, condition, and activity of the pupil, and by the universal laws of psychic action. In no case can these limitations arbitrarily be ignored or transcended without defeating his purposes and vitally impairing the reality and worth of the attained result. So far as they express the essential conditions, the constitutive principles, of the psychic nature, they cannot be transcended at all. So far as capable of transcendence, the process still under law demands time and labor on the part of all concerned. God, just as any teacher, may, for example, communicate to a man facts and truths whose significance he does not understand, and the man may record them, and the record be preserved. But neither the mere giving nor the preservation of the gift insures intelligent and real reception and mastery. In such case there is no revelation,

¹ "The highest infallibility in the teacher doth not prevent the possibility or the danger of mistaking in the hearers." — *STILLINGFLEET, Works*, IV. ii.

but simply the materials of revelation. Revelation, strictly so called, begins when man begins to apprehend the significance of the material, and is limited by the extent of this apprehension. Furthermore, this material, as such, has to be passed upon and tested by all the criteria known to us. And anything claiming to be revelation must be tested and justified by comparison with all admitted revelation, and in the light of our entire knowledge in this realm,—the method in all other human knowledge. The old conception of revelation embodied in an inspired book as complete, infallible, therefore sufficient and final, is not then true. It is still objective, the material of revelation rather than the revelation itself. The real revelation must be wrought out of this material by each one for himself, and begins when the communicated facts or truths begin to be apprehended in their real significance, and progresses in direct proportion to this apprehension. A great scientist may state facts and principles which he understands in the clearest possible manner, but only as the hearer attains for himself the same point of view, and directly proportionate to his success in so doing, is there for him any revelation in the knowledge or statement of the scientist. Precisely the same is it in morals and religion. The old conception of a complete statutory revelation is false both psychologically and philosophically, and fails utterly to accomplish the practical purpose of furnishing an absolutely infallible and final authority for which it was designed. Such infallibility, indeed, is the demand of indolence or timidity, unworthy of mankind, and, worse than that, implies a fatal distrust in the power of reason to attain truth. The conception is furthermore self-contradictory, since it denies the power of reason to attain and test truth, while asserting and depending upon the same reason to vindicate the historicity of the book it regards as infallible and authoritative. It is, therefore, worse than wasted energy to defend and promulgate such a conception.

Any given writer's statement of the truth attained by him may include more truth than he himself realizes or is aware of. He makes the statement as the best expression of his thought attainable at the time. Afterwards, perhaps in his own life, and certainly in that of others, the expression may be found to contain and to express accurately and adequately more than the original writer was aware of at the time he made it. This experience is quite a common one, and has an important bearing upon the question of accounting for the appearance at any given period of

truth so much above the age and so different, and upon the question of prophecy. It must be remembered, too, that in every age there are men of simple, unprejudiced minds, but of large power and capacity and profound insight, whose grasp of truth is far beyond that of any of their contemporaries in depth and comprehensiveness, and whose thought often waits for centuries before it is fully understood and operative.

The result of man's action under inspiration is, then, simply the preservation of such truth as is attained, subject to the necessary limitations in the premises, personal and other, and needs to be, and actually is, supplemented and corrected as man grows in power of apprehension of truth. This is the real process, the actual fact, of human experience, whether in the individual or the race; true, also, in the case of Christ himself during his earthly existence in the time of his humiliation (Luke ii. 40, 52). The objective revelation must become subjective to each man upon his own effort. In each and every case the individual attains his results through his own efforts coöperating with the forces and energies about him. The process is here, as always, synergistic. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as monergistic activity. Each man or age has as much revelation as it can take, and its responsibility is limited by its light.

If this be a true statement of the facts and principles in the case, in what does the authority of revelation in general, and of the Scripture form of it in particular, rest, and how does it vindicate itself to man? The answer may be very brief. The *authority* of revelation, Scripture or other, rests in its intrinsic excellence and worth as truth inherently rational and practical. This its character becomes self-evident upon study and practice, and this self-evidence is its vindication. It is a constantly progressive process, continually approximating the final goal,—perfect apprehension of absolute truth.

This statement accords with the facts of Scripture and of life. A fair estimate of the Scripture record, both in its specific utterance as well as in its grand undertone, shows that it makes no claim to be a perfect apprehension of absolute truth, or a perfect record of the same. There is simply progressive approximation to such a goal. Since this goal is not reached, the claim to authority beyond the intrinsic worth of the revelation, at any given stage, is void. To use a reported expression of Dr. Francis Wayland's, it is "worth only what it is worth." In the Scriptures, later and more perfectly conceived truth supersedes the earlier.

The New Testament completes and supersedes the Old in many things. Nothing but a mechanical and arbitrary view of the entire subject gives any warrant for the ordinary time-limit at the close of the apostolic age. The process is continued in the life and thought of the church, as recorded in its history and in the development of Christian doctrine, as well as in the life of humanity as a whole. The end is not yet.

The only claim to authority, possible or actual, lies then in the self-evidencing excellence and worth of truth itself, whatever the stage of revelation at which it manifests itself. This becomes manifest to every man for himself as he studies, reflects upon, and practices the truth he knows. So the objective truth becomes subjective, and so only.¹ There is always objective truth to be known by the individual man, and it is his constant duty to make it his own. The human mind honest and earnest is ultimately able to discern truth as such, else all knowledge is impossible, and moral responsibility likewise.

The Christian religion and the true philosophy of religion claim that Jesus Christ is the supreme and final revelation of God to men,—the personal embodiment of absolute truth. The claim is continually and increasingly justified in the experience of men. He is the ideal, absolute, perfect; no higher is conceivable. The more men know of Him, the higher their culture, if truly such, humble, reverent, honest, thoroughgoing, the more they find satisfaction and rest in Him as the ideal. The more his principles are applied in practical life, the more they evidence themselves as ideal and practical truth of the highest order. History furnishes constantly increasing evidence of the truth of this statement. Christ's life and teaching are more and more seen to rest upon and exhibit sound psychology, true philosophy, ideal ethics, and an increasingly proved adequacy to the problems assigned for solution, and vindicate themselves accordingly to the rational, moral, and practical consciousness of mankind.

The attainment of the absolute conception or idea of Christ is a gradual approximation, by reflection upon all the data given in the New Testament, and the ideals of the race in its best litera-

¹ If any one objects that the truth so claimed is variant and often contradictory, and therefore we must have an authoritative statutory revelation, the reply is, an authoritative revelation, to attain its object as ordinarily understood, requires an authoritative infallible interpretation, which no reasonable and well-informed person can for a moment maintain that we have. This point is discussed later.

ture, and the practical working of the same in history, in view of and together with the norms of the reason, the ideas of truth, right, perfection, the good, the absolute. We have also the various approximate realizations of the Christ-idea in history. The combination of all these data into one whole may be suggestively illustrated by composite photography. A large number of photographs are taken, one upon another; the result is an approximately ideal face.

This reflective combination and interpretation of all the data each man makes for himself according to his capacity, opportunity, and interest in the matter. There is an ideal objective Christ, the living embodiment of absolute truth; but each one's idea of Him is approximately absolute, according to his capacity for apprehending and his use of data, powers, and opportunities. The idea of Christ is, then, gradually attained. Our conception to-day is, or may be, truer and more complete than when the Apostles lived. We have their ideas, and their working in history and life since their time, with better critical and constructive methods.

Jesus Christ, as the absolute ideal, "the Way, the Truth, the Life," continuously and increasingly evidences himself as worthy the place and position He claims to hold both to the theoretic and practical reason of man. Hence He is absolute authority, the infallible teacher, guide, Saviour.

Inspiration, then, does not give authority to truth. Truth is its own authority. Inspiration is merely an aid to men in discovering and apprehending truth, and particularly truth relating to character and life. Inspiration properly applies only to persons; it cannot possibly affect the quality of truth.

So far as the practical efficacy of Scripture truth is concerned, it matters little or nothing whether it is inspired or not. Inspiration gives it no authority beyond what it has in itself, and would have, whether inspired or not. Truth is authoritative so soon as it is recognized as truth. This recognition implies some apprehension of its significance, without which such recognition is impossible. An isolated fact or truth is meaningless, and as such neither fact nor truth. An inspired book, "signed, sealed, and delivered," — supposing this to be possible and actually the case, a supposition which it is impossible to prove, — would require interpretation, and this depends upon the knowledge and power of the interpreter; so that, unless we maintain an inspired interpretation of the inspired book, either in the form of an infallible church or otherwise, inspiration does not secure absolutely satis-

factory apprehension of truth on the part of men, nor give it its authority. And the widely variant and oftentimes flatly contradictory interpretations set forth by the so-called infallible church, or by the numerous other interpreters of an infallible book, sufficiently prove, when thoroughly examined, the impossibility, under existing conditions, of securing to men the possession of absolute truth in any such way or by any such means. Neither Protestant bibliolatry nor Roman Catholic ecclesioluty¹ reaches infallibility, or truth in an absolute and final form without any admixture of error or incompleteness. The fact is, God has not chosen to reveal truth upon this plan. The history of thought, whether in the Scriptures or elsewhere, with or without the aid of inspiration, shows that man attains truth by progressive approximation according as he develops in power of apprehending it, and labors patiently and persistently toward this end. Inspiration, then, may give us the book, or, speaking more generally, the truth, but the book or the truth must itself vindicate its authority. Even to the original subject, the authority of the truth revealed must in the last analysis consist in its self-evident excellence, quality, worth. There is no other. It must evidence itself. "If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not" (John x. 37); "If I say truth, why do ye not believe me?" (John viii. 46), said Christ, resting his claims wholly upon the intrinsically worthy quality of his works and words. Inspiration and authority have, therefore, no necessary relation, that is, the fact of inspiration proved cannot and does not make authoritative the communicated truth.

But some one may say: In rejecting the ecclesioluty of the Roman Catholic and the bibliolatry of the Protestant, and in making Christ himself the infallible and absolute authority, you have simply substituted one authority for another, and gained nothing. Our reply is: We have gained a great deal, for we now have an authority which stands all possible and proper tests, and continually and increasingly vindicates himself as such to the mind; a thing which neither of the other so-called authorities always does. And whenever they do so vindicate themselves it is, as in his case, upon the ground of perceived intrinsic excellence and worth. It is true that our idea of the absolute Christ is

¹ These terms are used because they are brief and comprehensive, and express with definiteness and accuracy the essence of the two main positions regarding authority. No imputation or reflection whatever upon the motives of those holding the respective views is intended.

relative and approximate only, approaching nearer the absolute ideal in proportion to our spiritual growth, insight, grasp, etc. But this is the case in all our knowledge, scientific and practical, as well as in theology and religion, and is inevitable as the normal condition of a finite progressive being. The ideal of such a being is necessarily a changing one, continually advancing if he is faithful in the use of his powers and opportunities, and the data at his disposal, and continually growing in depth and purity. The ideal at any given stage is necessarily the final authority at that stage, a principle which has been true and the basis of judgment throughout the entire history of revelation. The pledge of the ultimate attainment by man of the absolute ideal in his own thought and life rests in the fact that he is not wholly finite, but has in his essential nature infinite¹ elements indissolubly binding him to the infinite and absolute, and forming the ground and possibility of any knowledge whatever of the infinite and absolute, as well as of all progress therein. Further reason lies in the progress² already made in this direction, a fact of history and experience familiar enough to the student of the history and philosophy of ethics and religion, and sufficiently evident to any intelligent person, if periods far enough apart are taken for comparison. This progress is already very considerable, and is constantly increasing. The fact, too, that human nature is all of a piece, and that the individual and history, or the life of collective humanity, are indissolubly bound together and mutually interpretative, that is, are an organic whole, is sufficient warrant that, given time and experience enough, all who so desire will attain all the essentials of this revelation. It is not reasonable to suppose that there will ever be absolute uniformity, hard-and-fast identity of experience in details. But the individual will exist in the unity of the collective life, preserving his proper individuality, and sharing, in common with all the rest, in all that belongs to the

¹ Ecclesiastes iii. 11, He hath set eternity in their heart.

² Some of the evidence is difficult to state clearly so as to reach all classes of minds. But some also is plain to any one who will give the slightest attention to the subject. For example : the estimate put upon man as such, and the consequent change in the treatment of the humbler, less well-endowed and circumstanced classes, criminals, etc., all of which is due to the truer conception of the nature and worth of man as seen in the face of Jesus Christ. We may also add the increasing patience and forbearance under great irritation with those who severely wrong us, arising from and nourished by a truer estimate of their worth, and supported by the hope of thus inducing them to realize that worth, and by effort on our own part towards this end. All this, and much more that might be mentioned, is a reflex of a truer idea of Christ.

organic whole. This is sufficient reply to the objection that the view here presented results in atomism in belief and conduct, and destroys all possibility of realizing at length the unity of the absolute and ideal truth and life. It is true, as was said above, that the individual apprehension of truth is for the individual at the time final and authoritative. It is not possible that it should be otherwise. But all the time the principles of unity exist and are at work, and are certain at length to manifest themselves, and that, too, increasingly. The fact is, the pure individual — the atom — is a mere abstraction of crass metaphysics ; it has no real existence. Philosophy that is thoroughgoing reveals the fact of the real community, and at bottom the identity in nature, of the finite and infinite, their difference being not of kind, but simply of degree in faculty and function. This fact it is which gives certain assurance of the ultimate attainment of the absolute ideal. This is the meaning of 1 John iii. 2, 3. It is this principle which makes the Incarnation possible ; and the fact of the Incarnation, and of the attainment of the absolute ideal in his own personal experience by Christ, is proof that it may at length be attained by us. The fact that we see no greater approximation than is as yet evident is no argument against its ultimate realization. We are not half awake as yet to our exalted privilege.

There is no room, then, for agnosticism, — “ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth” (2 Tim. iii. 7). Agnosticism strictly means that knowledge is impossible. Resting upon shallow thinking, and wrongly interpreting the variant results of human thought and inquiry, the theory strikes at the roots of our knowledge of the infinite, and claims to have destroyed it and all possibility of its future reappearance and growth. But a profounder and truer philosophy proves the claim false, and limited but real and increasing knowledge says : Knowledge is possible and progressive, that is, a universe exists, inherently rational, which we may and do know with ever-increasing fullness and completeness ; therefore hope on, labor on, and push forward the bounds of knowledge — *limina scientiae* — as rapidly and as thoroughly as possible. The real significance of Lessing’s famous “Search for truth, rather than its possession,” is not that the attainment of truth is impossible, but rather that the human mind, having in its very constitution infinite elements and a capacity for an infinite ideal, can never rest satisfied with any present attainment or form of expression as final, but must continue to strive

after the perfect truth as embodied in the infinite. In the words of Augustine, "Thou hast made us for Thyself, O Lord, and our heart is restless till it rests in Thee."

We place the final and absolute authority in Jesus Christ because He is the absolutely perfect ideal and archetypal being. But why a personal ideal and authority? Why not the self-evident principles of truth apart from any personality? Because truth exists only in connection with mind, or as an expression or embodiment thereof. The universe itself, indeed, in its ultimate ground and essence, is thought and will, its expression and manifestation, that is, has its basis in personality. There is no truth independent of mind, outside of thought, consciousness. It may be beyond my thought, my consciousness, as much of it is, but not beyond thought and consciousness *per se*. Here lies the real significance, the heart and core, of the ontological argument for the existence of the Infinite and Absolute, that is, God, and the possibility of knowledge of Him. Furthermore, truth realized in personal character is certainly superior to truth in abstract form. And this both as visible, or capable of being so, and as motive. Character is the most worthful and abiding thing in the universe, and the greatest force therein. The deepest in us demands personality as well as truth. The ultimate cry of every soul is, "Oh, that I knew where I might find Him!" (Job xxiii. 3). Truth actually realized in character is easily seen, and people in general are far more susceptible to motive centring in a person. Perhaps, also, it is true in the last analysis that none are really moved by purely abstract truth. It is certain that nearly all, if not all, are more easily and profoundly moved by truth in personal form. And Christ is the personal realization of absolute truth.

With regard to the relation between the historical Christ and the absolute Christ in our thought, it must be stated that the historical, as conceived by the writers or redacteurs of Scripture, forms, and must form, the basis of the ideal. Men did not and could not think out with complete clearness and thoroughly consistent detail such an ideal character as is therein portrayed, apart from the actual appearance of the same among them. Sufficient impression was made upon those with whom Christ associated in his earthly life to enable them to catch and retain and preserve the essentials of the portrait, even though there were features therein that escaped their vision, and lines too delicate for their powers of apprehension and interpretation. Here, as else-

where, facts and their interpretation, theory, go together and mutually work upon each other in the attainment of the result. But no theory is possible save upon the basis of some fact observed and meditated upon till it gives up its secret and reveals its significance.

This means that the Scripture records, when critically substantiated, are historically valid, though it is impossible to show that they are throughout equally trustworthy or significant, and unnecessary to hold any special theory about them in parts or as a whole. We are to take all on its merits, and accept the results of thoroughly earnest, honest, painstaking, and competent inquiry. There is "more truth and light yet to breake forth out of" God's "holy Word,"¹ in a much deeper and broader sense than John Robinson meant, even from the personal Logos, Jesus Christ.

The view here maintained is radically and fundamentally different from that which is ordinarily current among so-called orthodox theologians and the rank and file of the clergy and laity. In theory at least, it is maintained that, when a man is satisfied that a given truth comes from God, or that God has spoken, he at once acknowledges the authority of the utterance, whether it appeals to and awakens any response in his nature or not. But this is not a true statement of the case, and besides it fails to take into account the ground for considering the utterance one of God. The fact is, the decision of this question is the prior one, and depends upon the idea one has of God, the quality of the so-called truth, or that which claims to be such, and the thoroughness with which all the criteria, philosophic and practical, are applied; that is, the ultimate decision is that the authority rests in the quality of the truth itself, and in the person, because he is what he is in intelligence and character. History and philosophy are both essential to the ascertainment of truth. But the ultimate criterion is philosophical, not historical. History itself rests upon philosophy. That anything happens does not make it ideal or binding. The origin of a principle or truth is not its justification, a common fallacy in much of the investigation of the present day. The study of origins is of priceless value. But the ultimate criteria of absolute worth are philosophic and ethical.

The view here set forth is of value, not only in the realm of theology and the philosophy of religion, but also in that of the religious life. In fact, its influence in the religious life is of far greater moment. It is to be remembered that these realms are

¹ Dexter, *Congregationalism*, p. 404.

organically related as parts of one whole, and that in fact no separation between them is possible. A philosophical theory or supposed *insight* into facts and truths, *θεοπία*, — for that is strictly the meaning of the word “theory,” — bears fruit immediately or at length in life. Let, then, the teacher or preacher of truth set forth its nature and relation to life in the clearest and most forcible manner possible, trusting it to make its own way and vindicate its own authority. Then it will rule, never otherwise. This is in fact what happens everywhere in life where the knowledge is real and actually authoritative and controlling. It is the method of Jesus Christ, who, whenever He referred to book or other authority, always did so because his hearers acknowledged it as such, or thought they did ; and his reference in all cases approves only what is intrinsically excellent and worthful, as is perfectly evident to a careful and thoroughgoing observer.

Unless the popular mind is intrinsically incapable of apprehending profound truths, even when clearly presented and properly illustrated and enforced, it would seem every way preferable to maintain, so far as possible, scientific exactness in the presentation of real truth. Such procedure conduces to clearness of thought, and to economy of energy in the furtherance of truth and its application to life. The use of popular conceptions constantly ministers to confusion of thought, and necessitates great waste of energy afterwards in counteracting and obliterating the error and other mischievous and pernicious results that necessarily follow in its train. It seems at least the wiser not to say the more righteous course for every public teacher honestly to shoulder the responsibilities of his position, to spare himself no travail of thought necessary to gain for himself, and effectively to set before others, clear conceptions of truth. Only in this way can he help them to a really genuine and worthful moral and religious life and character.

In conclusion, let not the argument of this paper be misunderstood. Its purpose is construction, not destruction. It aims to exhibit the true psychologic and philosophic basis of revelation and its authority, by setting forth the actual experience of men in these things. Its polemic, if so it must be considered, is not against revelation or its authority, but against a false conception thereof. If the view here set forth is erroneous, let the error be exposed. If it be true, let us accept it and act accordingly.

Alfred G. Langley.

NEWPORT, R. I.

THE POETRY OF ALFRED AUSTIN.

"CONTEMPORARY popularity," said one of the keenest of American critics long ago, "is a matter of accident not always proportioned to desert." The judgment pronounced upon an author's works by the readers of his time may be a correct one, but whether a later generation of readers will confirm the earlier verdict depends upon circumstances quite other than those which swayed the minds of the author's contemporaries. English readers, who take their dime novelists more seriously than Americans do their own writers of the same class, have given their Rider Haggards and Hugh Conways a far more conspicuous position in the world of letters than we should think of assigning to our Mrs. Southworths and Sylvanus Cobbs, but only very devoted adherents of these two English writers, like Mr. Lang and Mr. Comyns Carr, for instance, would be likely to assert that the fame of Messrs. Haggard and Conway was proportioned to desert. Once the world adored the lines of the late Mr. Tupper, and laughed at those of Mr. Coventry Patmore. Now we are beginning to see that Mr. Patmore is really a poet, though by no means a great one, and we have found out that Mr. Tupper never was a poet, great or small. The judgments once passed upon these two men were purely accidental ones, by no means dependent upon the merit of the performances of either.

At the present time Mr. Lewis Morris is a poet very much read in England, his "Epic of Hades" having some time ago passed through twenty-five editions. Fluently prolix, he pleases many readers, because, while seeming to address himself to their intellectual faculties, he in reality makes only the smallest demand upon the exercise of such powers. The quality of his poetic inspiration reaches his admirers in a very much strained condition; but if there are those who like water-gruel poetry, we need not complain, unless they insist that we shall join them in gathering laurels to adorn the brow of the water-gruel poet. In America the poetry of Mr. Lewis Morris is by no means so well known as in England, but three American editions of "The Epic of Hades" show that it is not without readers.

The American popularity (or want of it) of the lesser English poets of our time is a curious matter for contemplation; and by the lesser poets I mean (speaking only of men just here) such writers as Dobson, Gosse, Lang, Lewis Morris, Edwin Arnold,

Alfred Austin, Dowden, Todhunter, Payne, with others that might be mentioned. The three last named are hardly known to us at all as poets, and Austin very slightly. Edwin Arnold, having once taken popular fancy with the half tinsel, half real splendors of "The Light of Asia," still keeps a respectful but reluctant clientage, who buy but do not read his numberless Indian poems. Lewis Morris, here as in England, is distinctly the poet of the commonplace. The remaining three owe their American reputations mainly to a revival conducted by them of certain French forms of verse, and to their skill in handling these seductive measures of ballad, rondeau, triolet, sestina, etc. Not but that each one of the three has made good his title to the name of poet by more enduring works than these, but it was their successful posturing in old French attitudes which gained our attention, as it gained the favor of the English public. It is impossible not to like the verse of Dobson, Lang, and Gosse; it is always graceful, not seldom scholarly, and, if Dobson is more especially considered, it is often infused with real feeling. The feeling may not be a very deep one, but it is real as far as it goes. But when all is said for the poetry of which Dobson and Lang offer us the best examples, it cannot be claimed that it is poetry which, so to speak, has a man behind it; that it is poetry which can stir other emotions than those of well-bred pleasure and delight in artistic and almost flawless workmanship. To say all this is not to complain; it is merely to admit the limitations of the poetry of the school of Dobson and Lang. The verse of Alfred Austin has not much in common with the type of English verse which is so popular at present in America, and which has so many native imitators. It is the work of a man who takes his art seriously. Still, to take one's art seriously is not enough to insure fine achievement in its practice. Beyond question, Mr. Tupper had serious views upon the mission of poetry, and so, doubtless, has Mr. Peacock, the Bard of Topeka; but the English writer never succeeded, and the American one has not yet, in producing verse worthy of being read by any human being with a proper sense of the value of time. An imagination of the most commonplace order in the one case, and dense ignorance of the requirements of verse in the other, are the respective obstacles which have hindered these two men from winning the fame they aimed to acquire.

The verse we are about to consider is of a very different character from the strains of Tupper or Peacock, being that of a man who is neither wanting in imagination nor a tyro in his profession.

It is some thirty years since Mr. Austin's first volume of verse appeared, "The Season: a Satire," a work which drew down upon it some severe criticism. To this criticism he replied in a poem, afterward suppressed, called "My Satire and its Censors," published in 1861. Since that time he has written extensively in verse and prose, and has been for some years the editor of "The National Review." His most ambitious poem is "The Human Tragedy," first published in 1876, and reissued in a revised and somewhat shortened form in 1889; and the best known of his longer efforts is his drama of "Savonarola," published in 1881.

It is as a lyrical poet, however, that he is most pleasing to the general reader, the three volumes entitled "Soliloquies in Song," "At the Gate of the Convent," and "Love's Widowhood," being collections of lyrics of varying merit, which have won, in some instances, a very extensive circulation. It is by the contents of these three books that another generation will know him, rather than by such dramas as "The Tower of Babel" (1874), "Leszko the Bastard: a Tale of Polish Grief" (1877), or any of his satires.

The most notable deficiency which is observable in his verse is the absence of the humorous sense. A poet who possesses keen perceptions of humor may or may not write witty poetry, but he never will be guilty of confusing the serious with the absurd. Major and minor poets alike are apt to fall into such an error if their sense of humor is not strong enough to act as a guide and restraint. Milton could gravely add, after describing the banquet of fruits which Eve had prepared for Adam and his angelic visitor when their conversation should be ended, "No fear lest dinner cool."

Mr. Austin, in what must be considered one of his weakest poems, "The Last Redoubt," stumbles into bathos for want of this restraining sense of humor; and it is not to be wondered at that he was taken sharply to task by reviewers for such lines as these: —

"Mehemet Ali came and saw
The riddled breast and the tender jaw."

But we must not judge of the quality of a work by its occasional imperfections, and it is only fair to say that this couplet is its author's worst. He has never sinned as grievously since these lines were written, the nearest approach to this being found in the "Hymn to Death," where he alludes to the "broadening salutation" of a smile.

In all of Alfred Austin's poetry, lyrical and dramatic, two motives stand prominently forth: love of *the country* as keen and minutely observant as Wordsworth's or Tennyson's, and love of *country* as intense as any Englishman's of our day. Chaucer could have found it easy to love this poet of the nineteenth century, who sings of countrysides in spring and summer with more of passionate persistence than any one else of our time; and Shakespeare, in the mood in which he wrote of "this royal throne of kings, this sceptred isle," might have recognized with approval the noble patriotism of such poems of Austin's as "Look Seaward, Sentinel," "On Returning to England," "Is Life Worth Living?" and the "Sonnets Written in Mid-Channel," could he have listened to them. These two notes are the ones oftenest sounded in the verse we are considering, and nothing is clearer in the whole of his work than the reality of his patriotism, the sincerity of his feeling for nature. He does not write *about* either sentiment. His descriptions of nature and the seasons, his bursts of patriotic ardor, are of the most genuine character. The poet is dominated by these two strong emotions, and writes as he is moved by them. Surely it is no adroitly simulated love of nature that can chant the praises of an English spring so perfectly as is done in the opening of "The Human Tragedy," but the real thing:—

"Rude Winter, violating neutral plain
Of March, through April's territory sallied,
Scoured with his snowy plume its fair domain,
Then, down encamping, made his daring valid.
Nor till May, mustering all her gallant train
Of phalanxed spears, Spring's cowering levies rallied,
Did the usurper from the realm of sleet
Fold his white tents, and shriek a wild retreat.

"Then, all at once, the land laughed into bloom,
Feeling its alien fetters were undone ;
Rushed into frolic ecstasies ; the plume
The courtly lilac tosses i' the sun,
Laburnum tassels dripping faint perfume,
Hawthorn and chestnut, showed, not one by one,
But all in rival pomp and joint array,
Blent with green leaves as long delayed as they.

"The dog-rose, simplest, sweetest of its kind,
Brocaded brake and hedgerow ere as yet,
In grassy hollow screened from sun and wind,
The primrose paled and perished. The violet

Closed not blue eyes, to early doom resigned,
Ere it beheld the clambering woodbine wet
With honey self-distilled, and knew that earth
Would, at its death, be sweet as at its birth.

“ And to its woodland grave with hasteful feet
Came the anemone, and o'er it flung,
In love but scarce in sorrow, such a sheet
Of pink-white petals as befits the young
Whose fair, false hopes the kindly gods defeat ;
While, following swift, the hyacinth upsprung
From the soft sod, and through the sylvan shells
Thrust his bold stalk, and shook his scented bells.

“ The cuckoo, babbling egotist, from tree
To tree as with short, restless wing he flew,
Called his own name, doubling the word for glee :
The stock-dove meditated, all day through,
Its one deep note of perched felicity ;
And the sweet bird to one sad memory true,
Finding the day for its laments too brief,
Charmed listening Night with its melodious grief.

“ No longer cowering by the fleecy screen
Of their warm dams, or bleating at the ills
Of unkind life and norland tempests' spleen,
Huddled the helpless lambs, but skipped like rills
Among the dykes and mounds of pastures green,
And orchards sunned by golden daffodils ;
Frisked like young Loves, in ever-shifting ring,
Round the old boles, flushed with the wine of Spring.

“ A subtle glory crept from mead to mead,
Till they were burnished saffron to behold ;
And, from their wintry byres and dark sheds freed,
The musing kine lay couched on cloth of gold.
Abetted by the Spring, the humblest weed
Wore its own coronal, and gayly bold
Waved jeweled sceptre. Stirred by some strange power,
The very walls seemed breaking into flower.”

To place beside this exquisite portrayal of an English spring, take these two small autumn pictures, both from “The Human Tragedy :”—

“ In the slant sunlight of the young October,
Dew-dashed lay meadow, upland, wood, and pool ;
Midtime delicious, when all hues are sober,
All sounds an undertone, all airs are cool :
When Nature seems awhile to pause and probe her,
Asking her heart if her eventful rule
Hath blest the earth she loveth, and to brace her
Against the wintry, darksome days that face her.”

The second of these pictures forms the closing stanza of the first act : —

“ Then Autumn fired the woods, and crimson glowed
 Fringed bole and feathered bough, and topmost spray,
 Which, as it fell in the shriveled foliage, showed
 Roofless and bare, that late shut out the day :
 While hurrying Winter’s drifting storm-showers flowed
 From hissing heavens, and slowly died away
 The color from drenched Nature’s face. And then ?
 Black trunks, and dirgeful winds, and dripping fen.”

Better still is the description of autumn with which the poem, “Love’s Widowhood,” opens, and which I quote as illustrating the poet’s fertility in finding new channels for expression in speaking of the same season : —

“ Now I, who oft have caroled of the Spring,
 Must chant of Autumn and the dirgeful days ;
 Of windless dawns enveiled in dewy haze,
 Of cloistered evenings when no sweet birds sing,
 But every note of joy hath trooped and taken wing.

“ But when I saw Her first, you scarce could say
 If it were Summer still, or Autumn yet.
 Rather it seemed as if the twain had met,
 And, Summer being loth to go away,
 Autumn retained its hand, and begged of it to stay.

“ The second bloom had come upon the rose,
 Not, as in June, exultingly content
 With its own loveliness, but meekly bent,
 Pondering how beauty saddens to the close
 And fair decay consumes each hectic flower that blows.

“ The traveler’s-joy still journeyed in the hedge,
 Nor yet to pallid gossamer had shrunk ;
 Green still the bracken round the beech-tree’s trunk ;
 But loosestrife seeded by the river ledge,
 And now and then a sigh came rippling through the hedge.

“ The white-cupped bindweed garlanded the lane,
 Trying to make-believe the year was young.
 Withal, hard by, where it too clomb and clung,
 The berried bryony began to wane,
 And the wayfaring tree showed many a russet stain.

“ There was a pensive patience in the air,
 As sweet as sad, when sadness doth but flow
 From generous grief, and not for selfish woe ;
 Such as can make the wrinkled forehead fair,
 And sheds a halo round love’s slowly silvering hair.”

To write like this may not be to write like a great poet, but it must be admitted that it is to write like a very delightful one. We do not, however, look for great displays of strength in the praises of spring, nor in pensive, meditative descriptions of autumn. What we have a right to expect from a poet is a faithful and at the same time sympathetic presentation of either theme, and this is just what Mr. Austin gives us. Indeed, he gives more; for his vernal and autumnal descriptions, the former of which may be counted by scores, are almost invariably characterized by melody and felicitous setting. The false rhymes, that are of occasional occurrence elsewhere in his work, are almost wholly absent from his verse when he is singing of the seasons, whose English laureate he most unquestionably is.

It is not only in his rhymed verse that nature is so fittingly portrayed, but in his blank verse as well, as, for instance, note this passage from "A Fragment :"—

"Deep thickets of green silence. For it was
A summer noon, and Summer was asleep,
And lent them welcome, but beheld them not;
Only themselves, and stillness, and the sweet
Shelter of interpenetrating boughs.
And bracken thick, and footfalls unreturned
From the deep, soft, dry sheddings of the pine."

Or this from "Savonarola :"—

"Sweet
As fresh-culled spray of dewy eglantine,
Whose blossom, pinky white, is half unclosed,
Half shut upon itself."

And this, again, from "The Tower of Babel:—" —

"Gardens of golden fruit that had not robbed
The glistening foliage of rich-scented bloom,
And tapering bunches of thick-clustering beads,
Which seemed to lock the sunshine in their veins,
Drooping from lissom, leafy-hidden stems,
Carlessly swung from happy bough to bough."

Too many of our modern poets, as previous writers have noted, take what may be called a morbid, unhappy interest in nature and the passage of the seasons. Spring is to them a mournful time because it is so soon over. In summer they are quick to read the prophecies of autumn's coming. In autumn they are sad because winter is near at hand, and in winter they are oppressed with woe because nature's resurrection is so far off. Nature is made to respond to all the sombre moods of mankind. Skies are more often gray than blue, according to their reports, and the

"Lisp of leaves and ripple of rain"

turns in their pages, without much regard to the time of year, to moaning and complaining, in order to harmonize with human unrest and disquiet. There is very little evidence of a similar attitude towards nature to be found in Mr. Austin's verse. His interest in and regard for nature is always instinctively healthy and natural. Even such a poem as the "Hymn to Death," which opens thus :—

"What is it haunts the summer air?
A sense of something lately passed away;
Something pleasant, something fair,
That was with us yesterday,
And is no longer there," —

even a poem on a theme like this, and opening in this pensive manner and with such lines as these that follow, not easily matched for pathos of blended regret and foreboding, —

"I shall ne'er
Find little feet upon the stair,
Feel little arms about my throat,
Hear little, gleeful voices float
Upon the wavelets of the summer air ;
That I again shall never share
The peace that lies upon an English lawn,
Watch the last lingering planet shining fair
Upon the unwrinkled forehead of the dawn," —

can rise above the plane of saddened feeling to the utterance of closing lines like these :—

"I will not ask to stay,—
Nay, rather start at once upon the way,
Cheered by the faith that at our mortal birth,
For some high reason beyond Reason's ken,
We are put out to nurse on this strange earth,
Until Death comes to take us home again."

I do not forget his "Farewell to Spring," which is conceived in a spirit foreign to his usual mood, and resembles the verse of some of his mournful contemporaries, but I am speaking of the prevailing tone of his nature poetry when I characterize it as cheerful and optimistic.

The poet's love of England is so closely interwoven with his love for nature that it is not easy to choose lines to illustrate the strength of the former sentiment which do not bear witness to the presence of the other. In this double enthusiasm for England and for nature he is more like Tennyson than any of his contemporaries. The laureate himself need not have been

ashamed to have penned the first of the "Sonnets Written in Mid-Channel :" —

" Now upon English soil I soon shall stand,
Homeward from climes that fancy deems more fair ;
And well I know that there will greet me there
No soft foam fawning upon smiling strand,
No scent of orange groves, no zephyrs bland,
But Amazonian March, with breast half bare
And sleety arrows whistling through the air,
Will be my welcome from that burly land.
Yet he who boasts his birthplace yonder lies,
Owns in his heart a mood akin to scorn
For sensuous slopes that bask beneath Southern skies,
Teeming with wine and prodigal of corn,
And, gazing through the mist with misty eyes,
Blesses the brave, bleak land where he was born."

The noble poem "Is Life Worth Living?" closes with a veritable trumpet-blast of patriotism : —

" Not care to live while English homes
Nestle in English trees,
And England's Trident Sceptre roams
Her territorial seas !
Not live while English songs are sung
Wherever blows the wind,
And England's laws and England's tongue
Enfranchise half mankind !
So long as in Pacific main,
Or on Atlantic strand,
Our kin transmit the parent strain,
And love the Mother Land ;
So long as in this ocean Realm
Victoria and her Line
Retain the heritage of the helm,
By loyalty divine ;
So long as flashes English steel
And English trumpets shrill, —
He is dead already who doth not feel
Life is worth living still."

Patriotism and admiration for another's fame are most happily blended in the following sonnet : —

TO LORD TENNYSON.

Poet ! in other lands, when Spring no more
Gleams o'er the grass, nor in the thicket side
Plays at being lost and laughs to be descried,
And blooms lie wilted on the orchard floor,
Then the sweet birds that from Ægean shore
Across Ausonian breakers hither hied,

Owne April's music in their breast hath died,
And croft and copse resound not as before,
But in this privileged Isle, this brave, this blest,
This deathless England, it seems always Spring.
Though graver wax the days, Song takes not wing,
In autumn boughs it builds another nest ;
Even from the snow we lift our hearts and sing,
And still your voice is heard above the rest.

In the "Defense of English Spring" the poet, after a rapturous description of springtide in his native land, recalls spring's coming as he has seen it in Italy, in the Ionian Isles, in Greece, or on the Danube, and closes by exclaiming :—

" But none of these, nor all, can match,
At least for him who loves to watch
The wild-flowers come, hear wild-birds sing,
The rapture of an English Spring.
With us it loiters more than where
It comes, it goes, half unaware ;
Makes winter short, makes summer long ;
In autumn half renews its song,
Nor even then doth hence depart,
But hibernates within my heart."

It is such lines as these which realize for us the truth of Mr. William Watson's assertion regarding the nature element in Mr. Austin's poetry, that nature "is a presence which interpenetrates his work, a power in secret league with his own faculties."

One of Mr. Austin's admirers, himself a poet, Mr. William Sharp, has pointed out that our poet rarely allows himself to describe the sea, or to use metaphors drawn from its varying aspects. When such occur, he adds, they "have rarely, if ever, the felicity of his pastoral images." But while Mr. Austin continues to be so truly and genuinely the poet of the country, it were idle to complain of his limitations in other directions.

But even with his love for England and for the countrysides of Kent and Surrey, whose praises he has sung so often, in spite of his being so saliently English, he cannot be styled insular or prejudiced. Mr. Watson says of him that "he has felt the spell of other countries with a keenness only possible in natures which present a wide surface to impressions. In 'The Human Tragedy' he has projected himself by imaginative sympathy into the very life and spirit of the land

'Where Milan's spires go up to heaven like prayer.'

. . . None have imbibed more deeply than he the spirit of Italy, or surrendered themselves with franker gusto to the intoxication

of southern air." Indeed, Mr. Austin himself assures us, in his essay "On the Position and Prospects of Poetry," "that, in writing of Italy, he writes of a country he knows as well, and cherishes almost as dearly, as his own."

Let no one, therefore, imagine that the poet's intense loyalty to England is but another name for insularity.

"The Human Tragedy" is without doubt the work by which the poet would wish to be judged, and the one which has received the most revision and retouching. It is a long poem in *ottava rima*, divided into four acts or cantos, the scene opening in 1857 in England, then changing to the Riviera with the beginning of the second act. In this act the movement of the story changes from Spiaggiaseura in the Riviera to Milan and Florence, and occupies the time between March, 1858, and May of 1859. The scenes of the next canto are placed at Capri and Mentana during the months of October and November of 1867, when Italian patriotism rushed to the standard of Garibaldi. Among its earlier stanzas occurs a description of Capri that is too beautiful not to be quoted here:—

"There is an isle, kissed by a smiling sea,
Where all sweet confluent meet : a thing of heaven,
A spent aérolite, that well may be
The missing sister of the starry Seven.
Celestial beauty nestles at its knee,
And in its lap is nought of earthly leaven.
Girdled and crowned with loveliness, its year
Is circling summer ; winter comes not near.

" 'Tis small, as things of beauty oftentimes are,
And in a morning round it you may row,
Nor need a tedious haste your bark debar
From gliding inward where the ripples flow
Into strange grots whose roof is azure spar,
Whose pavement liquid silver. Mild winds blow
Around your prow, and at your keel the foam,
Leaping and laughing, freshly wafts you home.

"They call the island Capri, — with a name
Dulling an airy dream."

The fourth act takes the reader to Rome and Paris during the months from August, 1870, to June of 1871. "The great events of European history are," to use the words of the author, "the woof of the story, as the personal fortunes of Olive, Godfrid, Olympia, Gilbert, and Miriam are the warp. Between them they weave and constitute the poem." The poet has something more in

view than the telling of a story ; he has a theory to unfold, which, in the essay already quoted from, he explains as follows : —

“ Man, in so far as he is noble and worthy, is always and inevitably at once the victim and the executioner of the Human Tragedy. Life, looked at largely, whether as regards the individual, as regards nations, or as regards the race, is tragic ; and tragic because the tragedy is due, not to man’s vices, but to his virtues. Were it due to his vices, the Human Tragedy would not be inevitable, since, by divesting himself of his vices, he could liberate himself from the tragedy. But his noblest passions, Sexual Love, Religious Sentiment, Patriotism, and Humanity, are the four principal agents, or protagonists, in evolving the solemn drama. Let men and women be as happy in their affections as they may,—and can it honestly be said that, for most persons, love’s sweetness is more than a bitter sweet ? — death separates them at last. Religious sentiment keeps myriads of human beings apart who would otherwise be very close to each other, and has engendered, and will again assuredly engender, some of the most sanguinary wars ever engaged in by man. Patriotism necessitates the protection and advancement of one’s own country against other countries, sometimes even by the sword. Finally, the Worship of Humanity, a creed much in favor in our day, has brought with it a war of classes bitterer even than that of nations.”

This is a brief statement of the theory of a poem of an epic breadth of design, — a design, indeed, so broad that, in the judgment of one critic already quoted, attention has been thereby directed from the “ admirable adjustment of its parts and the elaborate finish of its minor details.”

On a first reading, it must be admitted that the design of the whole is not so clearly apparent as might be desired. There are too many elements composing the poem, and too much action and change of scene, to admit of the poet’s scheme being readily grasped. The extreme beauty of many of the descriptions is another hindrance. The relation of parts to a whole is always liable to become confused in a reader’s mind when the mechanism of parts is absorbing his attention. On a second reading, the relations of things to the whole poem are much more apparent. But a long poem like this is not commonly read through twice. We turn to passages again and again which pleased our fancy at first, but we do not read a long poem again continuously. Herein and to this extent “ The Human Tragedy ” is a failure. Its theory is not quickly grasped by the general reader, who perceives that of

"Lucile" at once, and for that reason he re-reads "Lucile" and does not re-read "The Human Tragedy," although Mr. Austin's poem is worth a dozen Luciles.

But to have failed thus far is to have failed in good company. Seldom has any poet succeeded in making a great epic poem carry a theory of more or less complexity which can be seen at the first glance, so to speak, and maintain the reader's interest in it unwearyed from beginning to end. It may reasonably be doubted that if "The Idylls of the King" had all been published at once, the underlying theory of the whole great epic would have been recognized immediately, however its parts might have been admired.

"The Human Tragedy," I am impelled to believe, will never be popular in its entirety; its theory, which is true enough, is too far removed from the general perception for that. But it will have, I doubt not, an increasing interest for all lovers of musical verse who find delight in parts of a poem, even when the plan of the whole does not appeal to them strongly.

Before leaving this subject, I must direct the reader's attention to the superb description of the cathedral of Milan, and the service within it, as one of the finest passages in the whole poem. It occurs in the second canto, and occupies thirteen stanzas, beginning with the one hundred and eighth. Unlike some other writers, the poet's renunciation of the faith of Rome, in which he was reared, has not made him an unsympathetic observer of the symbolism and ritualism of that faith, as this noble passage, too long unfortunately to be quoted here, amply shows.

The most popular of Mr. Austin's poems is the drama, "Savonarola," which the author admits having written with the hope of its some time being presented upon the stage. In his preface to this poem the poet expresses a regret that the dramatic form should be used by writers who do not consult the necessary limitations of the theatre, and who manifestly intend that their works shall be read instead of being acted. In the drama of the study, he maintains that there is nothing dramatic but the name. Much that he says upon this point is well put and worthy of attention, but to a certain extent he contradicts his own theory by giving us in "Savonarola" a drama containing 3,834 lines,—a number only once exceeded by Shakespeare, whose "Hamlet" contains ninety-five lines more than Mr. Austin's "Savonarola." It is but fair to say, however, that "Hamlet" has 1,200 additional prose lines; and several of the historical dramas are as long or longer than "Savo-

narola," if prose lines are included. But a total of nearly 4,000 lines makes a play too long to be acted without considerable cutting, and Mr. Austin's intention to produce a play for acting purposes should have kept him from committing this error. Another objection which might be urged against this work as an acting drama is the great number of characters introduced, the *dramatis personæ* including between thirty and forty names, to say nothing of citizens, monks, and others who make a considerable addition to the force required for the presentation of the play.

But these are not vital objections. The drama could be materially shortened without interfering with the interest. For example, the two hundred and fifty lines of the opening scene might be omitted, and the play begun with the carnival procession at the outset of the second scene, which would be a manifest improvement from a dramatic point of view. The cutting elsewhere could be arranged so as to diminish somewhat the sum total of the *dramatis personæ*.

It may be pertinently asked whether the play, either with or without such modifications, is one adapted for successful stage representation. To this I answer, without much hesitation, that I think it is. The choice of the theme was, to begin with, a fortunate one. As Mr. Sharp observes, in speaking of it, "no dramatist could have found finer material to his hand than that wonderful epoch of Lorenzo the Magnificent and Savonarola the Friar." It is one thing, nevertheless, to have the best of material, and quite another to make the best use of it.

Mr. Austin, knowing well the requirements of the stage, has produced a play which, quite aside from its merit as a dramatic poem, is of no small value as an acting drama. Each act is properly fitted with a climax, there are few long speeches, the action is constant and varied, and the incidents admit of the most picturesque grouping. If represented with a careful attention to costume and historical details generally, and by a company of even excellence in the matter of performance, it would be well worth going to hear and see. George Eliot herself, careful student of mediæval Florence as she was, entered no more fully into the life of the days of Savonarola in her "*Romola*" than does the poet in his drama. Indeed, I am not prepared to say that the work of the poet does not proceed from a more thorough mastery of the theme than that of the novelist. Of course, the central figure is the Friar of San Marco himself, but around him are grouped the brilliant men of the period, Lorenzo the Magnificent,

Pico della Mirandola, Luigi Pulci, Valori, the leader of the Frateschi and the Piagnoni, Dolfo Spini, and many others, all of whom we meet in Florentine annals. The three feminine figures, Candida Donati, Letizia, and Anita, are imaginary personages. The time covered by the play is from the 8th of April, 1492, to the death of Savonarola, May 23, 1498, and the scene throughout is Florence. The language of the characters, with one exception, is imaginary, save on one or two occasions, and here the author shows not a little inventive skill. The exception is furnished by Savonarola himself, the speeches assigned him by the poet being the Friar's words as uttered in his sermons or other writings. Beside the political and religious events which form the greater part of the drama, there is a love story of no little pathos interwoven with the main theme, the actors in this subordinate drama being Lorenzo Tornabuoni, to whom Candida has been betrothed by Lorenzo de Medici, Candida, and Valori, whom she loves, and who loves her in return. Incidentally, too, appears the love of Letizia and Bertuccio, the poet. There is a fine scene between Tornabuoni and Bertuccio, where the latter describes his love for Letizia, and Tornabuoni, who finds Candida cold to him, listens with admiring envy.

In the third act there occurs a strongly conceived dialogue between Tornabuoni and Candida, in which the latter, knowing that the Seignory have decreed his arrest, urges him to seek safety by flight. While he delays, protesting his love for her, she exclaims: —

Oh, you throw
Your life away !

TORNABUONI.

What is my life to you ?
To you being nought, it nothing is to me.

CANDIDA.

It is so much to me I fain would save it.

TORNABUONI.

Then save it by the only way that serves,
For all else kills. . . .

CANDIDA.

What can I more ?
My life is mine to give, and I would give it
To save you, sir ; but for my love —

A later scene shows Candida pleading with Valori for the life

of Tornabuoni. Valori assures her that that is an affair of state, and that he fancied she had some personal petition to offer. Candida answers :—

What thing is not ?

How will you any sure distinction make
 Betwixt a public and a private woe ?
 What sword of execution is so fine
 That it can roll rebellion in the dust,
 Yet leave the rebel standing ? or what edge
 Of your discriminating justice cleave
 The traitor's neck, yet spare a space for love,
 Unterrified, to lock its loyal arms ?
 Hark ! while your ostentatious bells clang out
 That retribution hath been slaked with gore,
 The tear-drops widowed innocence secretes
 Upon some fireless hearthstone muffled fall.
 Oh, have him respited !

VALORI.

He has no wife,
 So will not leave a widow to bewail him.

CANDIDA.

And is a wife the only stay that can
 Make life reluctant to be yoked with death !
 Look ! he is flush like you, noble like you ;
 Like you he wears full summer in his face ;
 Youth dances unexhausted in his blood :
 Yet you, his peer, his fellow, ay, his twin
 In conscious satisfaction, thrust him out
 Into the dark and famine of the night,
 Just as the very banquet is prepared,
 And all life's lights are shining !

The scene increases in strength and interest till Valori, deeming that she loves his rival, declares :—

If it be that you love him, own that fault,
 And I will stand betwixt him and the block
 Though every throat in Florence yelled for blood,
 And every visage flashed a headsman's axe.

Candida is thus called upon to save Tornabuoni by swearing to a love for him that she does not feel, and giving a virtual denial of her love for Valori. While she hesitates, and Valori, in an impassioned speech, declares his readiness to save the man if she loves him, the preparations for the execution become visible through the open window :—

VALORI.

If from the scaffold now I pluck him back,
 Will you his rescued sensitiveness take

To the warm refuge of encircling arms ?
 Speak ! for the murderous seconds will not wait !
 Either the earth or yours must be his bed.
 Quick ! quick ! Pronounce !

CANDIDA.

Then he must die.

The fourth act closes with the deaths together of Valori and Candida. In some passages of great beauty Candida has described her garden, with its pinks and mignonette and clustering roses, and begged him to meet her there, which Valori has promised to do. Shortly after, he is attacked by the kinsmen of Tornabuoni and mortally wounded. Candida, approaching, receives a blow meant for him, and the lovers die almost at the same moment. The drama closes with the preparations for the execution of Savonarola.

From the extracts I have given of the underplot or minor action of the drama, it will not be difficult to conceive of the manner in which the larger theme is handled, a treatment in every way worthy of the subject. The characterization is strong, for the most part, and the central figure stands out in bold relief against the brilliant background of historical figures of renown. The blank verse is throughout compact and well managed, and includes many passages of notable excellence. I have said that it has been the most popular of Mr. Austin's works ; I am by no means sure that popular taste has not chosen his highest achievement for the object of its warmest approval.

The sonnet is a form much used by Mr. Austin, and almost always with admirable results. Not only does he succeed in his sonnets cast in the English mould which Shakespeare loved, but he is equally master of the more rigid requirements of the Italian form. Although the bent of his genius is essentially lyrical, the unelastic nature of the sonnet never seems to cramp him. The sonnet in his hands appears as if it were the natural garb for the thought. As examples of sonnets in the Shakespearean manner, let us look at the two following :—

A QUESTION.

Love, wilt thou love me still when wintry streak
 Steals on the tresses of autumnal brow ;
 When the pale rose hath perished in my cheek,
 And those are wrinkles that are dimples now ?
 Wilt thou, when this fond arm that here I twine
 Round thy dear neck to help thee in thy need,

Droops faint and feeble, and hath need of thine,
Be thou my prop, and not a broken reed ?
When thou canst only glean along the Past,
And garner in thy heart what Time doth leave,
Oh, wilt thou then to me, love, cling as fast
As nest of April to December eve ;
And, while my beauty dwindleth and decayeth,
Still warm thee by the embers of my gaze ?

AN ANSWER.

Come, let us go into the lane, love mine,
And mark and gather what the Autumn grows :
The creamy elder mellowed into wine,
The russet hip that was the pink-white rose ;
The amber woodbine into rubies turned,
The blackberry that was the bramble born ;
Nor let the seeded clematis be spurned,
Nor pearls, that now are corals, of the thorn.
Look ! what a lovely posy we have made
From the wild garden of the waning year.
So when, dear love, your summer is decayed,
Beauty more touching than is clustered here
Will linger in your life, and I shall cling
Closely as now, nor ask if it be Spring.

There is much to praise and little to condemn in this pair of sonnets turned so perfectly in Shakespeare's fashion, and I trust it is not altogether a fancy of my own which detects in the treatment of the subject some reflection of the master's style when writing of love that alters not when it finds alteration quite distinct from imitation. This form of the sonnet is presumably a favorite one with the poet, since it is used by him oftenest; but it is not because he is not as much at home in the stricter form, as we shall see in the sonnet entitled

WHEN ACORNS FALL.

When acorns fall and swallows troop for flight,
And hope matured slow mellows to regret,
And Autumn, pressed by Winter for his debt,
Drops leaf on leaf till she be beggared quite, —
Should then the crescent moon's unselfish light
Gleam up the sky, just as the sun doth set,
Her brightening gaze, though day and dark have met,
Prolongs the gloaming and retards the night ;
So, fair young life, new risen upon mine
Just as it owns the edict of decay
And Fancy's fires should pale and pass away,
My menaced glory takes a glow from thine,
And, in the deepening sundown of my day,
Thou with thy dawn delayest my decline.

Occasionally Mr. Austin varies slightly from the Italian manner by placing alternate rhymes in the second quatrain, as in the pair of sonnets called "Love's Blindness" and "Love's Wisdom;" but he is plainly less successful in these experiments, and we turn with more pleasure to such a poem as this, which obeys the strictest metrical requirements :—

A WINTRY PICTURE.

Now where the bare sky spans the landscape bare,
Up long brown fallows creeps the slow brown team,
Scattering the seed-corn that must sleep and dream
Till by Spring's carillon awakened there.
Ruffling the tangles of his thicket hair,
The stripling yokel steadies now the beam,
Now strides erect with cheeks that glow and gleam,
And whistles shrewdly to the spacious air.
Lured onward to the distance dim and blear,
The road crawls weary of the travelled miles ;
The kine stand cowering in unmoving files ;
The shrew-mouse rustles through the bracken sere ;
And, in the sculptured woodland's leafless aisles,
The robin chants the vespers of the year.

I have quoted these four sonnets, in addition to those brought forward earlier in this paper, in order to make clearly apparent the fact that a temperament essentially lyric need not necessarily find itself hampered in the confines of a form that is in some quarters thought to crush out all spontaneous utterance. In the extracts given from the author's longer as well as his shorter works, it can hardly be difficult for the reader to see that the poet under discussion is the possessor of a singing voice which is distinctively his own. There is very little evidence in Mr. Austin's lines of imitation, conscious or otherwise, of any other poet. Tennyson, Browning, and Swinburne, who have each influenced to an appreciable extent the verse of younger men, or even men of their own age at times, find no reflection in Mr. Austin's poetry, and, as I need not point out to any reader of "The Human Tragedy," his manner of telling a story in verse differs widely from that of William Morris. Originality is not so common a gift that the one who takes no other man for his model can long remain unknown. After the laureate, Swinburne, and the singer of "The Earthly Paradise," I think it may safely be said that no other English poet now living can be ranked higher than Alfred Austin, when the scope of his work is considered. Other poets may exhibit dexterous workmanship at times, and show single poems

than which nothing could seem more nearly perfect ; but when we consider the work of each as a whole, its extent and scope, we shall not find any one poet, except the three already named, whose achievements can be placed higher than Mr. Austin's. He has already an important following in England, and a small circle of admirers in America. To widen that circle, and to bring before many other readers of poetry the name and work of one of the most loyal lovers of England and of Nature, is the purpose of this necessarily imperfect and inadequate study of the verse of Alfred Austin. His own modest estimate of his powers may be traced in the sonnet which brings this paper to its close : —

GLEANERS OF FAME.

Hearken not, friend, for the resounding din
 That did the Poet's verses once acclaim :
 We are but gleaners in the field of fame,
 Whence the main harvest hath been gathered in.
 The sheaves of glory you are fain to win,
 Long since were stored round many a household name,
 The reapers of the Past, who timely came,
 And brought to end what none can now begin.
 Yet, in the stubbles of renown, 't is right
 To stop and gather the remaining ears,
 And carry homeward in the waning light
 What hath been left us by our happier peers ;
 So that, befall what may, we be not quite
 Famished of honor in the far-off years.

Oscar Fay Adams.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

BAZÁN'S RUSSIA.¹

No one can make an ingenuous and prolonged study of Russia without the feeling that in this study one beholds the development of a great nation ; slow as geologic ages are slow, its strata sedimentary, and their dip the product of volcanic fires.

No hurried expedition, even though it extend through the wilds of Siberia ; no surreptitious trip through its dungeons ; no wholesale listening to the tales of its prisoners, even though these be true, and deserving of the sympathy of the civilized world, — can tell us the whole story. Without historical perspective, it is im-

¹ *Russia, Its People and Its Literature.* By Emilia Pardo Bazán. Translated from the Spanish by Fanny Hale Gardiner. Chicago : A. C. McClurg & Co.

possible to form a just estimate of the true position of this portion of Asia set down in Europe, later in the genesis and evolution of its history by several centuries than the countries by which it is surrounded, and to which it is often unwisely contrasted.

That a woman, carefully reared in the privacy of a Spanish home amid the conservatism of wealth and social position, should produce, in her modest essays on "Russia, Its People and Literature," so profound a contribution to the world's knowledge of a country which hovers on the edge of Europe like an apparition from the Dark Ages, is in itself no insignificant exponent of the truth that "the world does move."

The author tells us that, "from motives of literary honesty," she has read nearly all the books on Russia which have been published in languages other than the Russian, and has conversed much with Russian writers and artists, and well-informed persons on Russian affairs. But the opinions of these persons have been contrary and confusing, and the great majority of the books have contributed little to a real understanding of the case. Her substantial obligation is to five books, of which the widely known work of Mackenzie Wallace is named first.

Madame Bazán tells us also, with a naïve frankness, that she has never traveled in Russia:—

"It is not just round the corner, and the women of my country, though not cowardly, are not accustomed to travel so intrepidly as, for example, the women of Great Britain."

Neither did she attempt to learn the Russian language:—

"It would have been easy for me to acquire a smattering of it, perhaps, enough to conceal my ignorance and to enable me to read some selections in poetry and prose; but not so easy to learn thoroughly a language which for accuracy, splendid coloring, and marvelous flexibility and harmony, can only be compared, in the opinion of philologists, to the ancient Greek. Of what use, then, a mere smattering which would be insufficient to give to my studies a positive character and an indisputable authority?"

These candid admissions may weaken the cause of the author at the outset; but the reader who, desiring a better understanding of Russia, lays aside the volume on this account, will lose what no other work extant can give,—a triumph of pure intellect devoted to a thorough study of Russia and its people, through interest awakened by its literature, and fed by all the streams which have filtered from the Russian into French, German, English, and Italian.

Mrs. Gardiner has fairly earned the gratitude of her American countrymen by her excellent translation of this remarkable work. No study of a foreign people has been entitled to rank with this since the "Germany" of Madame de Staél, whose disquisition was made after prolonged residence in the country, and especial intimacy with the literary *coterie* at Weimar, which then included the men who in modern times have given to Germany its literary fame.

Let us glance at what the crucible of Madame Bazán's thought has distilled from the unlike materials cast into her retort. Russian literature, she tells us, must attract our attention because of its intimate connection with the social, political, and historical problems which are occupying the mind of Europe to-day, and which are outcomes of the great revolutionary movement, unless it would be more correct to say that they inspired and directed that movement.

It is with the hope of dissipating the haze which hangs between Russia and the rest of the world that she undertakes the study of race, natural condition, and the social and political state of Russia, especially nihilism. It is not the purpose of the author to sacrifice on the altar of her theme the genius of all Europe. Yet she cannot remain blind to the present dissatisfactions of the older modern nations. France possesses at this moment the form of government for which she has so long and convulsively yearned, but she is doubtful of herself, and unsatisfied with her relation to other nations. Italy, though united and restored, cannot reanimate the ashes of her glorious past. England and Germany have seen their political dreams fulfilled, but the hour of change has sounded for the European-Saxon as for the Latin races, and they are declaiming their farewell message on the world's stage.

"There are two great peoples in the world which are not in the same situation as the Latin and Saxon nations of Europe,—two peoples which have not yet placed their stones in the world's historic edifice. They are the great transatlantic republic and the colossal Selavonic empire,—the United States and Russia."

Russia is in twilight, but it is the twilight of the dawn. This truth, felt, if but dimly understood, is the reason why so much thoughtful and serious attention is given to Russia by all foreigners.

There are at least twenty layers of human alluvium in European Russia, not counting the prehistoric migrations; yet from these various races has proceeded a homogeneous people, living in geo-

graphical and moral unity, and calling, with a tender familiarity, the Autoocrat of all the Russias by the name of Father.

Nature's hand has been from the first on the destiny of this great people, from the frozen wilderness of the north to the smiling harvest-fields of the south, but it has ever been with one unvarying and unique ideal before her.

Russia lacks the sunny smile of Pallas and Athene; she has no place in the great Catholic fraternity (a calamity, from our author's point of view); she lacks the brilliant heresies of the West, the intellectual impetus of mediæval scholarship; she has had no feudalism, no chivalry, no Gothic architecture, no troubadours, no knights. Her development does not present the gentle undulations of European history in which yesterday creates to-day, and to-day prepares for to-morrow. In the social order of Russia, primitive institutions coexist with products of our spick-and-span new sociology,—an ancient people and a society in embryo struggling to burst its bonds. This confusion engenders Russian dualism, the cause of her moral and political disturbances.

There are two bases of the national life,—the autoocracy and the agrarian commune. The autoocracy is the organic product of the soil and the race, paternal in its character, and inspiring the respect due to any spontaneous and genuine production. The important school of Russian thinkers known as Slavophiles—people enamored of their ancient land and its customs—insist that the only independent forces on which Russia can count are the people and the Czar,—the immense herd of peasants and the Autoocrat as their head. It is a fact that the Russian empire of to-day, in spite of official hierarchies, is a rural state in which the people sustain the Czar, now against the rich and mighty nobles and officials, now against the revolutionists. If turbulent magnates or sullen conspirators get rid of the person of the Czar, the principle remains inviolate. They may kill a hundred emperors, but Russia is Russia still, and at its head is the Czar of all the Russias.

Next to the Czar, the true Russian loves his *mir*. Half the arable land in the empire is subject to this system. The tendency to aggregate, either in agrarian municipalities or otherwise, is born in the blood and bred in the bone of the Slavs. The *mir* is a common possession of the land, which in the Russian village belongs to the municipality amongst whose members it is distributed periodically: each able-bodied individual receives what he needs, and is spared hunger and disgrace. This system, so much

lauded by "advanced" thinkers, is really a sociological fossil, preserved in Russia by suspension, or the slow development of the race. Common possession of the land is a primitive idea, as remote as the prehistoric ages, and gave way before individual interest and the modern idea of property.

The *mir* in Russia owes its vitality to the fact that it was produced naturally by the family, from which type the whole Russian state organization springs, from the Czar-Father to the child of the humblest serf or peasant. This patriarchal or tribal type of the family offers many advantages from the agrarian point of view, but it places the individual, and hence the true family, under immense disadvantages. The modern way of understanding property is the only way compatible with the independence and dignity of the individual. The laboring-man, under agrarian communism, theoretically considers himself a member of a coöperative agricultural society, but he is in reality a slave, subject to collective responsibilities and obligations.

The socialistic leaven lies in the peasants. In Russia the cities have no proportionate influence; that which demands the special attention of the governor or the revolutionist is the existence, needs, thoughts, of the innumerable peasant communities which are the foundation and the material of the empire. Of the peasant, the charity of his friends and the poetic imagination of Russian writers has made an ideal from which is distilled a poetic essence. From Turgenieff to Tolstoï the peasant is painted with a loving touch, while corruption, effeminacy, and vice characterize the upper classes. This is true in so far as the upper classes, mostly educated abroad, are thus only reflectors of the life of other nations, while the originality, the poetry, the epic element, is always with the masses.

The middle class has been constantly infused with the peasant element, and thus the cities, colleges, schools, universities, and theatres founded by the imperial power are the cradle of unrest. No barrier prevents the peasant from becoming a merchant, and the latter from becoming a noble. The nobility are descended chiefly, however, from the retinues of the early Muscovite czars, who were given wealth and lands on condition of military service, although feudalism as an institution never existed in Russia. The advance of culture has mainly proceeded from the nobility. The aristocracy, everywhere else the support of the throne, is in Russia a destroying element, while office-holders are justly painted in darkest colors, and the Russian clergy are wrapped in Byzantine lethargy.

Nihilism is not a mere Russian intellectual element, although the nihilist explosions are characteristic of the Slav empire. Turgenieff, in his novel "Fathers and Sons," applied the name *nihilists*, but the word is of French coinage. The reign of Nicholas I. was one of absolutism and oppression. He was not, however, essentially a tyrant, and saw when too late that his policy had been a failure. Under it, nevertheless, Russian thought sprang to new development, and a national literature began to flourish. To write a history of modern literature, particularly of the novel, is equivalent to writing the history of the revolution. This is the fruit in Russia of the seed of French materialism and infidelity imported by Katharine II., and later of Kantism and Hegelianism imbibed by Russian youth at German universities. These European ideas were soon amalgamated with the indigenous and Oriental fatalism of the Russian mind, forming a compound which had at first no political coloring. During the decade 1860-70, a fever for universal negation seized the youth of Russia, and after 1871 the echo of the Paris Commune crossed the Russian frontier, and the "nihilists" crystallized into a clandestine organization seven years later, which inaugurated an era of terror, assassination, and explosion. Nihilism has no definite creed, but embraces all negatives. Anarchists, federalists, cantonalists, covenantists, terrorists, are all grouped under the one banner, which bears for its motto *Nihil*. From the seminaries and schools, from the nobility and the literati, arose a host composed of young women hungering for the ideal, and young students poor in pocket and position, who gave themselves up to a Bohemian sort of life well calculated to set at nought society and the world in general.

Before political rights, Russian nihilism seeks natural rights; and the position of women, far more bitter and humiliating in Russia than in the rest of Europe, has through the new ideas become more free, intelligent, and respected. Many of the marriages of nihilists are purely austere and ideal, the bride's dower going into the common treasury; her person consecrated to the unknown divinity; and the nominal marriage bond allowing husband and wife each to go their own way, sometimes to distant provinces to disseminate their views, the relation being terminated at the pleasure of either party. Notwithstanding the fact that the Russian nihilist laughs at the supernatural, there is a deep underlying element of mysticism in his thought, and he talks about the martyrs to the cause with an inspired voice and an unction worthy of a religious dreamer. The thirst for martyrdom is common, but

the deity of the Russian nihilist is the sublimated peasant of Russian literature. So the cultivated nihilists go in search of the poor, the ignorant, and the humble. The sons of families belonging to the highest classes, alumni of the universities, leave fine clothes and books, dress like peasants, and mix with factory hands, so as to know them and to teach them; young ladies of fine education return from a foreign tour and accept situations as cooks in manufacturers' houses, so as to be able to study the labor question in their workshops.

The active nihilists are all young people, and this is the reason why they are not discouraged by the failures of their efforts. There is, in addition to the enthusiasm of youth, a sympathetic disinterestedness in nihilism, a strange mingling of mysticism and fanaticism with negation and pessimism.

All this and much more may be discovered by the attentive reader of modern Russian literature. Herzen, in his novel "Who is to Blame?" is the great precursor of nihilism. His aim was not to civilize, but to obliterate; to sweep away the past with one stroke was his perennial aspiration. Later novelists adopted the motto that to destroy is to create. Turgenieff's "Fathers and Sons" represented the man of the future as a materialist, and positivism followed. "Force and Matter" were for a time the Bible of Russian students.

The reign of terror in Russia has been short and tragic. When it fell upon the country, the frightened people imagined an army of terrorists, while in reality the offenses from 1878 to 1882—the mines under two capitals, the explosions at the station at Moscow and in the palace at St. Petersburg, the many assassinations, and the marvelous organization—were the work of a few dozens of men and women, enthusiastic students and young girls, ready to perform any service, and seemingly endowed with ubiquitousness, so rapid and unceasing were their journeys, and so varied the disguises, names, and stratagems of which they made use to bewilder and confound the police. The executive committee was scarcely more than a triumvirate, but assassination became a political factor, and at last touched the person of the Czar, just as he had convened a meeting for the consideration of reforms solicited by public opinion.

It is not easy to say whether the government was ill-advised in confronting the terrors of nihilism with the terrors of authority. One must put one's self in the place of a government so menaced and attacked. The methods of the special police and

the censorship of the press cannot be defended. The newspaper is bread to the soul of the Russian, but he is not free to read until he goes from home, and then, by force of dieting, he suffers from mental indigestion. Speculative nihilism is a moral infirmity congenital to the soul of the Russian; active and political nihilism is the fruit of the peculiar condition of the empire. Russia is in a state of transition, and is at present sufferingly stumbling along toward the future, with occasional fits of dementia and epilepsy; and good intentions count for nothing, whether the latent generosity of revolutionists, or of government and Czar.

Such, in fragmentary outline, is Madame Bazán's study of the situation in Russia. Though in her plan merely preliminary to her study of Russian literature, it will, we believe, prove of most vital and enduring interest to the public. She is a disciple of the realism which in art and literature has had its recent day. Pushkine is, in her vivid pages, the demigod of Russian verse; Lermontoff, the Russian Byron: the two were the great geniuses of Russian lyric poetry.

Gogol was the founder of Russian realism, and his novel, "Dead Souls," modeled on the "Quixote" of Cervantes, was the most profoundly human book that has ever been written in Russia. This admirer of absolutism and autocracy was, strangely enough, the one to precipitate Russian literature into its present mad whirl, the path of nihilism and the currents of revolutionism.

Turgenieff receives most elaborate treatment and highest praise. He alone, of all Russian writers, possessed exquisite artistic intuition. He stood in the gulf that separates the two halves of Russia, yet he maintained the equipoise which belongs to all true thinkers. His marvelous style shows its beauties even through the veil of translation. The effect produced by the reading of his works is a sweet and solemn symphony, and he is the best word-painter of landscape that ever wrote.

Dostoviéwsky, one of the four great Russian novelists, maintains this place, not because of his European reputation, but by reason of his unique influence in Russia. No writer, not even Gogol and Turgenieff, so closely approaches the mysterious dividing line, thin as a hair, which separates insanity and genius. Involved in a political conspiracy in the revolutionary atmosphere of 1848; long imprisoned in a dungeon; pardoned on a scaffold in the public square after he, with others, had been tied to posts and the soldier executioners were formed in line ready for the word

"Fire ;" setting out on his sad journey to Siberia with a fellow-sufferer who had lost his reason, laden with chains, — he slept for four years with a copy of the Gospels under his pillow, which he read incessantly, and taught his fellow-prisoners to read also. His book, "The Dead House," is Dantesque, and is the most profound study written in Europe of the penitentiary system and criminal physiology. The effect of his works is not wholesome, but he had, among his own countrymen, greater influence and popularity than Turgenieff. When the monument to Pushkine was unveiled in 1880, the popularity of Dostviëwsky was at its height : when he spoke, the people sobbed in sympathy ; they carried him in triumph ; the students assaulted the drawing-rooms that they might see him near by ; and at his death, in 1881, the multitude fought for the flowers that were strewn over his grave.

Tolstoï, last and greatest of the four leading Russian novelists, is the supreme artist of nihilism and pessimism, and at the same time the apostle of a Christian socialism newly derived from certain theories of the Gospels dear to the Middle Ages. He is the interpreter to the world of Russian mysticism. He is a great writer, a social fanatic, a mediæval mystic, and a novelist of realism *à la Zola*. His state of mind is a fine dementia which snaps the mainspring of the human will. He is like a fiery charger dashing on at full gallop, that leaps and plunges, and stays not, even on the edge of the precipice. Impulsive and enthusiastic, he does not trouble himself to be consistent. The sublime and compensatory message of the Son of Man has been for nineteen hundred years explained and defined by the loftiest minds in theology and philosophy, who have elucidated every real and profound phase of it as far as is compatible with human needs and laws ; but Tolstoï, extracting at pleasure that passage from the Sacred Book which most strikes his poetic imagination, deduces therefrom a social state impossible and superhuman. In the light of his theory of non-resistance he condemns revolution, yet he is forwarding it all the while by his own radical socialism ; and under the hallucination of his mysticism he is making shoes and drawing water with the hands which God gave him for weaving forms and designs of artistic beauty into the texture of his marvelous narratives.

Madame Bazán closes her remarkable book with characteristic caudor and modesty, and in a tone of exquisite sadness, which will be echoed most truly by those who have most profoundly studied and most carefully observed the Russian people and their country : —

"A few words of humble confession and I have done. I feel that there is a certain indecision and ambiguity running through these essays of mine. I could not quite condemn the revolution in Russia, nor could I altogether approve its doctrines and discoveries. . . . My vision has not been perfectly clear, therefore I have offered no conclusive judgments,—for conviction and affirmation can only proceed from the mind they have mastered."

"Russia is an enigma; let those solve it who can,—I could not. The Sphinx called to me; I looked into the depths of her eyes, I felt the sweet and bewildering attraction of the unknown, I questioned her, and like the German poet I wait, with but moderate hope, for the answer to come to me, borne by voices of the ocean of Time."

M. B. Norton.

CHICAGO, ILL.

MR. BELLAMY AND CHRISTIANITY.

SINCE "Looking Backward" did not so much create a new ideal of society as crystallize the thought and embody the desire of countless vague thinkers who hope that some form of Socialism is a panacea for the world's woes, the book may be taken as an epitome of a whole class of ideas, of which it is at present the most effective presentation. In the light of its philosophy, therefore, it behooves the Christian to consider the message and see if it is a new call to him. Methods are a secondary, not a first, consideration. If the underlying philosophy is a word of the Lord, methods may safely be left to time and experience. The question for us to decide is not whether nationalism is practicable, but whether the philosophy out of which it arises is Christian, because nationalism is only a method. For this purpose, Mr. Bellamy not only represents countless thinkers, but he seems to be their universally accepted prophet, and in considering his views we consider the whole class of theories. Is, then, this new theory, in whatever form it may be adopted, a new expression of Christian principles?

In a recent article Mr. Bellamy declares that the question for us to settle is, "Whether or not there has come to be between the intellect and conscience of men and the actual conditions of society and industry, such a degree of incongruity and opposition as to threaten the permanency of the existing order; and whether

there is enough ground for faith in God and man to justify a hope that the present order may be replaced by one distinctly nobler and more humane." He thus himself brings the question under the scrutiny at least of the religious idea. Certainly any reformer would admit that the present order must be "replaced by one distinctly nobler and more humane;" but Mr. Bellamy's suggestion that the *conscience* of man will no longer allow the present social condition, and his further question if *faith in God* is sufficient to justify the hope of an advance, implies that he would place this philosophy of development in the line of a providential order rather than confine it to the bare working out of law. He nowhere gives, however, any evidence that its relation to the religion of Jesus Christ much concerns him. He uses the words and life of that religious philosopher simply as striking illustrations, or as make-weights in an argument, but to him they are not apparently authoritative words or ideas. Religion has a message for him, but not Christianity. Not so the Church. She must make the philosophy of Jesus the test of all things.

In the article already quoted, Mr. Bellamy goes on to declare that conscience and faith really do now compel a new and distinctly nobler and more humane order, and then assumes that this new step in the world's progress is as follows. He holds it "absolutely beyond question that the next phase of industry and society, as based upon it, will be a plan of national coöperation, and that this plan cannot be permanently based upon any other principle than universal industrial service, with equality of national condition." Now methods are not our present concern; that is with the general proposition. Is it absolutely beyond question that the next phase of society, the new order, will rest on a basis of "equality of material conditions"? On the one hand, is this the next step in our social growth, according to the laws of its development; and, on the other hand (which is only another way of stating the same thing), is it the ideal of him who believes in God and man, as Mr. Bellamy and his friends so peremptorily assume?

It is the law of physical evolution that the strongest survive, and the weak disappear. This is the law of social evolution also. Hence any theory which contradicts this law contradicts the whole tendency of things, and cannot be true. Must, then, the weak go to the wall in a Christian state? The law seems to be universal, and any way of escape difficult to find. Mr. Bellamy can see but one way out, by so equalizing the environment

that all shall become strong, and there shall be no more weak,—a hope that might well tempt the ablest, but which requires, first of all, a faith that the desired effect will follow from the cause. Christianity gives a different answer to the problem. She declares that it is her very genius to redeem the weak, but that she does this, not by arbitrarily putting the weak on the same level with the strong, which, in the nature of things, cannot last, but by a new standard of values, a new test of weakness and strength. According to this standard we have come now in the development of humanity where material achievement is no longer the test of who are "the strong," but moral achievement. In the new world of the kingdom of heaven, the law still holds that the strong survive, but it is the morally strong, and the fundamental question for us is, What is the best environment for developing moral strength? Thus our contention with Mr. Bellamy appears to be twofold: in the definition of the strong, and in the process which produces the type which will survive. The modern theory is apparently somewhat confused at this point. In one quarter it seems to agree that moral strength is, indeed, the next step, and endeavors to create an environment which will produce moral strength, along the lines of its theory that to this end the environment must be perfect materially. In another quarter the modern theory believes that the ultimate result must be happiness, not moral strength, and to bring about happiness we must first improve the material conditions. Thus these two conflicting theories are merged into the one belief that in any case it is necessary the material conditions should be perfect. This is not Christianity. With those who believe that happiness is the end and purpose of life she joins issue at once. Her only concern is with the other class, and deals with the relation of material conditions to virtue; and her first question is, whether, in Jesus Christ's theory of life, happiness was necessary to moral progress. If Mr. Bellamy's philosophy is to be adopted by the Christian world, he must show that this was Jesus's idea. Christianity seeks to create moral strength by the improvement of *moral* conditions, not material, and she does not believe that her great founder ever taught that happiness was a necessary element in progress. Virtue and holiness she holds to be the purpose of man's being, his contribution to the long story of development, and these may be, and often are, born out of the very fact that the material conditions are not good.

But this modern philosophy declares that happiness is essential to growth in virtue. It postulates its theory that virtue is impos-

sible in bad surroundings. It is denied that this is another way of saying that good surroundings will create virtue, but only a claim that virtue — which is the voluntary choice of good instead of evil — cannot exist unless there is an opportunity to choose goodness. And therefore we are told, virtue is impossible unless you have removed the evil and made the choice of good inevitable! How does this follow? And what becomes of the voluntariness? The difficulty is with both the philosophy and the logic. It is apparent that virtue cannot exist unless there is an opportunity to choose goodness, but the real question is, is it *impossible* to choose goodness where the material conditions are entirely bad? The modern philanthropist says it is impossible, forgetting that in its own philosophy the creature grows as much by overcoming obstacles as by adaptation to circumstance. The Christian declares that it is not impossible, but that it is the essence of virtue to choose good in the midst of temptation to evil, that obstacles were ever the food of strength. And in illustrating the fact that a bad environment for the body is not thereby a bad environment for the soul, she points not only to her theories, but to the double proof of the experience and the ideals of the world, to show the contrary. Its saints have not been men whose virtue was born of prosperity or happiness. The childhood of the world believed this so strongly that it cultivated asceticism for its own sake. In mysteries, and ordeals, and chivalry alike, it submitted the candidates to tests of virtue, believing that only they who could endure hardness were worthy of crowns. The long roll of its martyrs testifies to its recognition of something higher than ease. Its saints, from Moses onward, have ever despised the treasures of Egypt, for a greater reward set before them, and the world-wide appreciation of Father Damien shows the same feeling regnant to-day. And in the humbler walks of daily living, has it proved true that our best men and women came always from that class whose wants are all provided for? Is not this whole movement a pretext against the sin of wealth and that comfort which comes in its train? Or, if environment be the only difficulty, what shall we say of that long list of modern criminals, who, with comfort on every hand, and surroundings which put every restriction on evil, yet found their environment no wall against temptation, the possession of enough no check on the fatal desire for more? Or how shall we praise those noble ones who in poverty were generous, in weakness strong, and who glorified homely duties and common life by sublime self-sacrifice!

Take the still more striking examples of humanity's ideals of virtue as seen in the founders of its religions. Buddha becomes a prophet only when he leaves the delights of the palace and seeks the great secret by the sacrifice of comfort and pleasure, and gains it in pain and suffering and struggle. Mahomet is a hero only when he lives the stern life of a pilgrim and a soldier, and the very weakness of his creed is its apotheosis of the pleasures of sense. Jesus was a peasant with nowhere to lay his head, teaching an absolute unregard for the environment. It is certainly a new idea in the world that virtue is the child of comfort, or in any real sense dependent upon it. Was not the old story of the Garden a protest against this theory? It can never be the Christian idea. It was in the very beginning of temptations that the suggestion came, to meet the needs of the world by multiplying bread, but "The word of the Lord" was Jesus Christ's solution of the problem which confronted Him far more darkly than it does us, since on Him lay the responsibility of solving it. Sorrow and trouble, darkness not light, pain and struggle, may be, often are, the necessary condition of moral growth. Even now we see through a glass darkly that the mystery of pain is but the pang of a new birth. It is a pagan order of things,—hardly even the philosophy of paganism,—that material conditions must be perfect to produce moral strength.

It is not true, therefore, that "he who *believes in God*" necessarily expects an equalization of material conditions." He who *does not believe in God* must look for this. But he who does believe in God looks for an improvement in moral conditions, which may or may not be an improvement in material conditions. Moreover, and further, it is in no sense the *equalization* of moral conditions which he who believes in the Christian's God looks for, because first and foremost the Christian's God is a father, and the essence of real fatherhood (whatever may be true of governmental paternalism) is *individual* treatment. For just as a real father will send an incorrigible boy away from the kindness of the family into the rigors of some school of reformation, for the sake of the boy himself, so a divine Father will not shrink from sending his children into want and sorrow and pain, if need be, that they may work out their own salvation, and the groaning world travail with virtue. How, then, shall he who believes in the fatherhood of God agree that man can grow virtuous only as a happy environment holds him thereto? How shall he allow that man is held in the grip of outward circumstances, the surroundings of

his life creating his virtue and responsible for his vice beyond any power of his own will? This is materialism, in its worst form. For it is not that crass and easily refuted doctrine, that the material surroundings being perfect man will be satisfied thereby and seek nothing further; but, as we have seen, it is the more subtle and dangerous theory, that the surroundings being perfect the man himself will become virtuous. This is a theory which appeals so strongly to much that is best in man, his faith in himself, his love for his fellow, that, like all the deeper temptations, it presents itself as an angel of light. But it is none the less materialism. He who believes that equality of material condition is necessary to the best growth of humanity is so far a pagan, believing with the old world in the supremacy of the material, and its controlling influence. The Christian ideal is of a different sort, and was expressed for us by Him who knew the mind of God, "Man's life consisteth not in the abundance of things which he possesseth."

Mr. Bellamy has yet to prove his theory, since it contradicts the law of social evolution. Either there is no such thing as a Christian acceptance of that law, or his ideal cannot be the next step in the development of the world's life. For, in the first place, according to Christian standards, the next step upward is not the universal reign of happiness, but must be the universal reign of holiness; and, in the second place, the reign of holiness cannot be brought about by means of happiness alone. The Christian student of progress cannot yet see his way to accept this new view of social evolution, and therefore Mr. Bellamy's method for promoting universal happiness does not much concern him. From whatever point of view we consider this new socialism, it does not concern Christianity, since its philosophy is anti-Christian, and its methods fall to the ground with its philosophy.

Anna L. Dawes.

PITTSFIELD, MASS.

THE FUNCTION OF PUBLIC PRAYER.

ONE of the solutions which have been suggested of the problem, How is the much-desired Christian unity to be brought about? is that it is to come through the general adoption of liturgical worship by all denominations of Christians. Many people, however, think that the differences between Christians are

of a more vital nature than mere preference regarding the manner of conducting public worship; and it is notable that in the propositions looking toward unity made by the bishops of that church, of which the distinguishing characteristic in the popular mind is its use of a Prayer Book, this matter of liturgy is entirely left out of account. Yet, however superficial may seem the question whether or not we shall use precomposed forms in public worship, we may be sure that if the attempt were made to-day to unite the churches in one which should have as its basis the use of a Book of Common Prayer, a majority of Protestant Christians would loudly cry out against it. It is true that many denominations are enriching their worship by the introduction of responsive readings, the repeating of the Lord's Prayer and Creed, and perhaps a collect or two; but this is merely by way of enrichment, and the central point of the part of Sunday morning service before the sermon is the so-called Pastoral Prayer. To the minds of the laity, at least, this prayer is essentially extempore. The fact that most of its language is phrased under the inspiration of the hour, and that it is the expression of the special needs of the moment, is, to the worshipers in the pews, its great merit. They would be loath, indeed, to part with it; and most of them believe that to have the service follow the words of a book, which they can hold in their hands and read with the minister, would be but to substitute a cold formalism for the glowing spirituality of the extempore prayer. This belief in the desirability of extempore prayer is firmly rooted in the hearts of a majority of the worshipers in "non-liturgical" churches. To determine, if possible, whether this feeling is well-founded, whether the choice between extempore and liturgical worship is a matter of mere taste, or whether a liturgy has other merits to claim its adoption, needs a consideration of the nature and purpose of public prayer; and such a consideration, with this end in view, is the intent of this paper.

When we read the Master's words: "Watch ye, therefore, and pray always," and the apostolic echoes of them, "Pray without ceasing," "Continuing instant in prayer," we are fain to wonder if such precepts to constant, ceaseless prayer are meant to be literally binding on us in every-day life. At first thought, we say that without doubt they are but a forcible, extreme injunction, emphasizing the helpfulness of frequent supplication,—asking for divine aid at each turn; and that, perhaps, they look to the ideal state where our employment shall be to mingle praise with con-

stant petition for every need at God's throne. For our common idea of prayer embodies the thought of supplication, and perhaps that alone. We hardly think of prayer save as petition, — the asking for the supply of our needs, forgiveness of our sins, and increase of divine grace. To pray to a fellow human being is to ask a favor, usually with the implication that the one to whom we pray is higher in authority than we who supplicate ; and the same thought colors our conception of prayer to God. A thought of somewhat broader significance is that which recognizes silent prayer,— as the old hymn has it, —

“the soul's sincere desire,
Uttered or unexpressed.”

In this is the recognition of the fact that the converse of the soul with God needs not the medium of words ; our supplications, therefore, are not necessarily to be phrased. Prayer, then, spoken or unspoken, is, in our ordinary conception of it, the desire of the heart laid before God ; and upon such an idea of it is founded all discussion regarding the use of prayer in public or private, extempore or liturgical.

But there is a larger significance than this to prayer as Christ taught and made use of it. In the prayers of the Master, of which we have the recorded expressions, there is a notably small proportion of supplication as compared with praise, glorification, and even, in the prayer in John xvii., some recalling of his own work and the purpose of his life, as if the words of prayer were the words of solemn meditation, which included, though by no means necessarily, petition and supplication. The few sentences of the Lord's Prayer illustrate the same fact. Three only of them can be called personal supplication ; the rest is glorification and doxology.

These facts about Christ's prayers at least suggest to us that prayer, as He enjoined and employed it, is to be ceaseless part of our life, of which words are but the transitory expression. We ought to come to the better understanding of the real meaning of prayer by eliminating from our thought of it two false conceptions, — one regarding God's nature, and the other concerning our own attitude before Him. We may speak of these separately.

1. The true thought of prayer implies a right conception of the God to whom we pray. The pagan bows to a localized and materialized deity. Perhaps the Jehovah of the Old Testament was hardly more in popular conception than this, — not materialized, indeed, but still localized and essentially individualized, — *the*

King of kings. We scarcely rise above this in our every-day Christian faith. Even apart from an artificial theology which has placed God, as the Mighty Individual, at the head of the universe, whom the humble worshiper approaches only through the grades of a priestly hierarchy, the human heart finds it hard to conceive of the true immanence of God. We realize his fatherhood over us as the limited fatherhood of individual over individual, rather than the perfect, universal fatherhood of the Divine Spirit over the human soul. Our experience of the present, the material, comes ever before us in our attempts to realize the spiritual. It is especially so in our thought of the Divine Being. Says Mr. John Fiske ("The Idea of God") : "If we could cross-question all the men and women we know, and still more, all the children, we should probably find that, even in this enlightened age, the conceptions of deity current throughout the civilized world contain much that is in the crudest sense anthropomorphic." With this idea in mind — a God in a visible, imagined form, more or less definite — we address our prayers to Him. They cannot fail to be in the nature of direct supplication and petition. Let this idea be banished ; think of God with the thought which is at once primitive and catholic in Christianity, and regards the Divine One as the Spirit of love and truth, not distant from the world, but immanent in it, — and there must follow a modification in the meaning of prayer as we see it. Prayer to — or, more properly, *with* — the Eternal Spirit who is the very life of the world must be a different thought from prayer to a distant being who, though the world's creator, is not its life.

2. But there is yet another correction which we must make, not in our idea of God, but in our spiritual attitude towards Him in prayer, before we reach the entire understanding of the meaning of prayer itself. *Self* in all forms must be banished from the thought of prayer. This is a larger and more inclusive proposition than may at first appear. To many minds, unconsciously, the thought of prayer is essentially selfish. We pray for what we desire. Our life, or a life dear to us, is in danger, and in the dreadful fear of death or loss, we lift the eye or fall on the knee to pray God to remove the peril. Christian custom, realizing the selfishness of such a thought, bids us insert the saving clause, "If it be thy will, O Lord," — a phrase borrowed from our Master's model prayer, in which, however, there is no self-centring petition. Yet, if we could ask every Christian who thus prays which is prayer, the supplication for help, or the active subjection of

self, the great majority would doubtless answer, "The supplication." In popular thought, the yielding to God's will is an accessory, possibly a result, of prayer; prayer itself being the presentation of our needs before Him. Examples on a larger scale of the same misconception of the meaning of prayer are such supplications as may often be offered in time of war, or those prayers touching the season, the weather, the harvest. Two nations at war feel with equal conviction the strength and right of their cause, and in that conviction the devout citizen of each prays for success to the God of battles. Each suppliant feels that God is able to decide the question. "Just and true are thy ways," he declares; and yet his thought of prayer is rather the supplication for the victory of his nation's arms than an utter yielding of the matter to divine judgment. The yielding may come, but it is as the humbling accessory; not, in the thought of the worshiper, prayer itself.

Thus it is that self clouds the meaning of prayer. The purpose of prayer is to suppress, not emphasize, self; and though the object which to finite judgment seems the most to be desired may be chosen as the means of expression of prayer, yet it is thus used merely because the human soul needs the help of definite thought, even of words, to interpret its spiritual state. If we are conscious of the individual wish above the personal consecration, the purpose of prayer is so far diverted. Our own wishes, pet desires, cherished hopes, as such, are to be eliminated from the pure conception of prayer.

If, then, we free our idea of prayer from these two false notions,—a humanized God and an emphasized Self,—we can come close to its true meaning. It is a communion with an ever-present God,—a communion from which all consciousness of self is absent. In other words, it is a harmony with God, a spiritual state, in which we regard the world and life from the divine side. The words of prayer, then, are not prayer; neither are thoughts and desires prayer; but they are the expression of prayer. More or less perfectly, these things serve as instruments to give definite expression to a spiritual condition. The genius of the artist is an ever-present condition in him. His sense of the beautiful in form, his passionate appreciation of color, his sensuousness of temperament, are a state of his inner nature which his pencil and palette and brush serve as instruments to express. These instruments may be present and put to work in the hand of an amateur, yet the picture they trace will not be in that case the

expression of artistic genius. The words, likewise, of praise or adoration or supplication may easily be spoken without the underlying spirit of prayer; but if prayer be present each one of them may serve equally well as its expression. It will thus appear that prayer, as Christ enjoined it, is this condition of the soul which is deeper than words or thoughts, and independent of them, employing them only when the soul, in the state of prayer, craves for expression. For expression of this state is necessary, oftentimes, to reveal the soul's condition to itself. The child in whom dwells the passion of music may first appreciate his divine endowment when he touches the keys of the instrument; the soul, from which it may be the divine face has been long hidden, first knows that it has the power to come into harmony with God when in some moment of utter trial it sends a thought or a wish Godward. The unuttered desire, the whispered petition, the loud-spoken praise, have alike for their purpose the expression of prayer.

It is the confusion of the expression with the reality which forces the question between extempore and liturgical prayer. In the discussion of this question men fail to go back of the mere expression,—the desire, the supplication. The pastor who has made an extempore prayer is commended because he has evidently phrased some deep feeling of his own heart, or by sympathy has touched some hidden desire of one of his hearers. Or, on the other hand, the Collects in the Prayer Book are commended because of their beauty and dignity of language. But the real point at issue is, Which sort best expresses the spirit of prayer in a congregation of worshipers? Call to mind the Sunday gathering in God's house. The faithful are met there together in the spirit of prayer. One and another of them, doubtless, has uttered a word or sent a thought to God,—some consecrated desire, or penitence, or unselfish petition, which, because it touches him individually, is a stimulus to rise to the condition of closer harmony with God. But each has now gathered with the others in God's house in *common* prayer. And the value of common prayer is that, by the fellowship of worship, we are not tempted to emphasize the self-centred thoughts and desires which may surround us in the closet. The individual is forgotten, and prayer dwells in the assembly. Of what sort shall be the spoken words which can best express the spirit of common prayer? Manifestly they should be words phrasing, it may be, adoration or petition, but from which the *individual* is eliminated. The worshiper should have his

thoughts turned neither towards himself nor the speaker. The worshiper is but one of the whole congregation ; the minister, but the mouthpiece of the whole. Here, evidently, the extempore prayer fails in fulfillment of its purpose. If it is entirely impromptu, it attracts attention to the speaker himself, in the mental effort to follow the words of it ; if it is noticeable or startling in its phraseology, it diverts the attention to its own form and manner ; if it descends to detail, it fixes the mind on trifling things : in all these cases it falls short of being the expression of true prayer. Or there is great danger lest in its manner of address to the Deity it bear to those who listen the false conception of God as a distant and individualized being, and thus misses the thought of the constant communion with Him which is the chief blessing of all, especially common prayer.

There are, no doubt, those souls in the ministry — it is to be feared they are rare — who are able in extempore prayer to sink their own personality, and place themselves merely as spokesmen to express the common spirit of devotion. And yet the prayers of these, helpful and uplifting though they may be, must always fail in one important feature — familiarity. The words of the Common Prayer, touching only the common needs of mankind, used again and again in the holy place, become to the worshiper the very alphabet of devotion. He associates them always with the purpose for which they are uttered, and when they are spoken in public worship there is no distracting effort of the mind to follow unfamiliar or unexpected phrases. They become to him simply the channel for the spirit of prayer to utter itself. This familiarity, also, is the safeguard of liturgical prayer ; for if the manner of expression is faulty, it is corrected by the mind, which forgets the words in the association, breathing only the spirit of the hour.

It is often urged in favor of extempore prayer in public worship that the minister is free to adapt his utterance to occasions which may arise to call for special intercession. A moment's recalling of the meaning of prayer as we have studied it will convince us of the danger of such liberty. It is apt to be sentiment rather than prayer which craves expression at such times, and the novelty of the utterance can easily become a means of distraction from the true purpose for which prayer is made. The occasion is rare indeed on which familiar forms, with such adaptations as may be provided, do not serve the purpose of common worship better than impromptu words can do.

When Jesus instituted the sacrament of his blood, his definite injunction was, "Do this, *as oft as ye drink it*, in remembrance of me." The devout follower of the Master, in full harmony with the spirit of this command, will consecrate each morsel of daily food and drink, and make a sacrament of every meal, in the remembrance of his Lord. And yet the church, for the greater edification of her children, observes as a special institution the sacrament, in which the thought of eating and drinking is forgotten, and the bread and wine, simplest and most familiar of elements, serve but to express to us the Christ's blessing and presence. Prayer is only a degree less sacramental. The word, the thought of supplication, are the outward sign of an inward, spiritual grace. Each time the word or thought of outward prayer is framed or uttered, it can be, in whatever turn or corner in life, our hourly sacrament; and yet the church has ordered public prayer where the word of prayer is to be nought but the outward sign of the common spirit of prayer. And like the bread and wine of the eucharist, the outward sign of common prayer fulfills best its office when it is familiar and simple, and when it savors not of the individual personality of priest or people. Of such nature is liturgical prayer, and because it thus seems better than other manner of spoken prayer to express the spirit of prayer in the congregation of Christ's flock, we may believe that the reunited church will offer its worship to God in the liturgies of the ages.

John McGaw Foster.

BANGOR, ME.

EDITORIAL.**THE SPIRIT OF EXPECTANCY.**

THE present age is in the attitude of looking forward. It stands in an unaccustomed glare, with hand shading the eye, peering into the future. On all lips are the questions, What is coming? What have we to hope, and what to fear? What will our children live to see? In the economic world, the social world, the political world, and the religious world, great changes are thought to be impending. The present period is most frequently characterized as transitional. Conditions, relations, beliefs, will not, we think, long remain as they are now. Even while we peer into the approaching decades, we are hurried on into new points of view, and are obliged to readjust the perspective of the changing prospect. We seem to live in the thought of the future more than in the power of the present. There have been periods of despair, of indifference, and of dread, when the future has kindled no lively interest, or has seemed impenetrable and gloomy, periods of avowed or of unconscious pessimism. There have been times of unintelligent hopefulness, destitute of deep insight and so of prophetic foresight, times of a childish optimism. At such times interest and energy centre in the present. Pessimism says, Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow shall be worse than to-day, and the day after we die. Optimism says, Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow shall be like to-day, and only after many days will our time of pleasure end. But whatever may have been true of former ages, the present age is surely one which is stirred with expectation not unmixed with uncertainty and apprehension, but, on the whole, hopeful and eager. There probably was never a time when thought has run out so definitely and broadly into the future. We speak of the coming education in higher branches of learning, meaning that certain methods which give the student more freedom than hitherto in the choice of studies, and invite him to original research, will take the place of the old methods. The coming method of business, some think, is to be combination on a vast scale, so that by and by the old maxim, "Competition is the life of trade," will be replaced in everybody's mouth by the maxim, "Combination is the life of trade." In the coming society, some think, there will be no poverty, but wealth, if not equally, will be equitably distributed. So all the way through,—the art which is to come, the science which is to come, the coming politics, the coming civilization. The educator, the artist, the statesman, the sociologist, the philanthropist, has been laid hold of by the enthusiasm of a new method, a new type, a higher, broader law, so that he gets his inspiration from the day which is dawning, and lives in a world not yet realized. His intellectual world, artistic world, social world, economic world, is not this present evil world, but a world which he sees coming, and which he not only expects, but by his effort will hasten.

This spirit of expectancy, as it answers to reflection upon itself, is a revelation of more than one encouraging fact. Compared with its own earlier forms, within present recollection, it is in a mood of deeper seriousness, and is expanding in directions which open towards a larger welfare of society. It is passing from the anticipation of an improved mechanism to the prevision of an improved life. The first five or six decades of this century were crowded with discovery of physical forces and invention of corresponding appliances. Facilities of communication and of production were multiplied so rapidly that surprise followed surprise in fast succession. Machine was taking the place of muscle. Pictures of the future corresponded. New discoveries and an almost incredible ingenuity would give still swifter communication by land and sea, till all the available forces of nature should be yoked to the chariot of man. But to-day expectation is in other directions. Let the mechanism be improved ever so much, the deeper question now pressing on all thoughtful minds is a question of the state of society, and of the classes that make society, and of the persons who make the classes. In the use of that improved mechanism which all the civilized nations have, we ask what type of personal character, and what class conditions, are developing in America, France, Russia? What will be the effect, not only of the outward machinery, but also of the pursuits, the literature, the art, the education, the government, the religion of modern life, on the personality and the mutual relations of men in the coming society? It is clear enough that a higher personal and social ideal is discerned. Details of prediction differ, but all prediction is converging toward one goal. Even those who would bring in the millennium through economic adjustment cannot stop with that, but talk also of the brotherhood of man, and perceive, some of them rather vaguely, that the betterment of circumstance can be gained only along with the betterment of the individual and of society within the improving circumstance.

The presence and power of this spirit of expectancy signify that much which seems to be in the future is already rooted, though not full grown, in the present. Men are saying, "Lo, here," and "Lo, there," when the kingdom is already among them, and because it is already among them. Principles are pretty well developed in some applications when prediction becomes confident as to their prevalence by and by. In fact, we are as much impressed by the changes which have occurred as by any we expect. How has it come about, this relaxation of customs which awhile ago were so rigid, this growing regard for the rights of private opinion on all subjects, this mingling of nationalities in place of a homogeneous population, this obliteration of social lines which not so long ago sharply divided the so-called upper and middle classes, this organization of laboring people in every kind of industry under a control more absolute than that of civil government, this growing interest of the people in economic principles, this increasing timidity of wealth, this change from charity to

self-help in the relief of poverty, this disposition to lift up the lowest by vast schemes of wise reform rather than by sporadic misdirected sympathy? The uncertainty of the future depends on the degree of resistance which self-interest may present to social progress, on the amount of moral inertia remaining, and on the rate of the advance, but not on the principles which have already wrought so great changes. Of how many results which still lie in the future, we all are saying that it is only a question of time. How long it will be before society is reshaped in certain respects cannot be foreseen, but, sooner or later, a given condition will be reached. The times and the seasons are not for us to know, but there is a power working in human thinking and being which will surely be felt both in nearer Jerusalem and also unto the uttermost parts of the earth.

This age is, therefore, anything but pessimistic. The characteristic of pessimism is that it sees no goal, and denies that there is any goal. There is movement, but not direction. There is change, but no progress. Repetition is the course of history. Rotation in a well-worn orbit is the history of all human effort. The burden of that noblest literary expression of pessimism, the Book of Ecclesiastes, is that there is no real progress. "That which hath been is that which shall be, and that which hath been done is that which shall be done, and there is no new thing under the sun. Is there a thing whereof men say, See, this is new? it hath been already in the ages which were before us." The spirit of expectation, the definiteness of social prophecy, the deeply rooted idea of progress, are at the farthest remove from anything like a philosophy of despair or indifference.

Within the last year Mr. Bryce has written two articles in which he compares the expectations of certain periods with the later results. One of the comparisons covered a century, the other the last thirty years. The first compared the expectations of the year 1789, in France and England especially, with the year 1889. The conclusion was, that several of the changes anticipated had occurred, but had not brought the expected improvement. The second article, entitled "An Age of Discontent," compares the year 1860 with the year 1890, and the same conclusion is reached. Mr. Bryce says that what is significant in the record of the last thirty years is the fact that our generation has been depressed, not so much by failure to attain the objects it strove for, as by the failure of these objects when attained — and some of them have been attained — to produce their expected results. The trees have thriven, but the fruits that were looked for have not ripened. But when the expectations of thirty years ago, of which he speaks, are defined, they are seen to have consisted chiefly in the removal of limitations, in emancipation from outward conditions of restriction. Four objects, Mr. Bryce says, which were chiefly desired, were political liberty; freedom of thought, speech, and worship; the right of every nation to constitute a separate political

community ; and international peace. He then shows to how large a degree these objects, especially the first three, have been realized in the countries of Europe. It is a marvelous progress to have been made in thirty years, even if the life of society has not been so greatly improved as was expected. But these changes have been an emancipation, chiefly political and partly social, and mere freedom in itself has little productive power. To overthrow bad institutions is not to create new institutions. To change political status is not to purify character and society. The task of political emancipation is more definite than that of social regeneration. It also must first be attempted. But the success which is attending it, although limited by the nature of the object, has been rapid and permanent, and, instead of creating discontent because society is not regenerated, should rather inspire confidence in respect to the greater tasks that remain. Mr. Bryce, therefore, concludes that the existing discontent is of a kind that looks forward, not backward. We are dissatisfied, not in comparison of the present with some golden age in the past which can never be restored, but in view of remaining evils and the higher needs of man in society. It is not, he says, because there is more poverty and suffering than at some former times, but that we have grown more sensitive, and the chords of sympathy vibrate to a lighter touch. But such deepening and broadening of sympathy is itself a sign of real progress as truly as the removal of all actual sources of evil would be. The lesson to be learned from the disappointment of former expectations is, that we should not now expect too much from improvement of outward circumstances. That type of expectation, which thirty years ago looked to political changes as the salvation of society, looks now to economic changes. And while advance may be expected by such changes, and while there is no improbability in their occurrence, there will be disappointment, a quarter or half century hence, if entire reliance for all that society needs rests on the right adjustment of economic conditions. Thirty years hence it will be seen that, in the closing decade of the nineteenth century, men were expecting improvement along economic lines, as thirty years earlier their hopes were directed to political reform. And if the expectations shall by that time have been realized, the verdict will be one of disappointment, unless there shall also have been hope and effort respecting character and the moral relations of men in society. But we have the advantage over 1789 or 1860 in knowing the problem better, and in looking for the elevation of society through moral and not only through material improvements. Wiser expectation means more satisfactory fulfillment.

The most interesting characteristic of the modern spirit of expectancy is its likeness to the Christian spirit, which is the spirit of prophecy. Christianity, when it is conscious of its power, is always prophetic. Jesus is the world's great prophet. There is more prediction in Christianity than in Judaism. The church has always lived in expectation.

At times the hope has been expectant of the triumph of good through some sudden display of God's power, especially through the speedy coming of Christ in visible glory, or the hope has located the triumph wholly in another world. But now the church is hopeful and confident of the regeneration of society. The age to come is seen again, somewhat as it was seen by the early believers, as a coming order of things on earth. The kingdom of heaven is a kingdom from heaven realized on earth. The church has always prayed that the kingdom may come, but now, as the Master taught, the petition finds its definite meaning in that which instantly follows: "Thy will be done in earth." The general and the particular petitions should never be separated. It is the present mission of Christianity so to broaden and intensify her own expectation of a regenerated society among the nations as to bring the spirit of expectancy which stirs the world into harmony with her own.

ON PREACHING CHRISTIANITY AS A GOSPEL.

Two preachers have held, for the past weeks, the spiritual attention of Boston, of those within and without the churches, who differ widely from one another in nearly all respects, but who are in striking agreement in their conception of Christianity as a gospel. The significance of their agreement at this point is intensified by their differences at so many other points.

Mr. Moody is a literalist. His interpretations of Scripture are literal to the last degree. We assume that he is a believer in verbal inspiration. Great emphasis is laid in all his utterances upon the exact words of the Bible. The scenes of the Biblical narrative are reproduced with a realism which declares at once the type of his imagination and the type of his faith.

Mr. Brooks is an idealist. No man amongst us has so clear and inspiring a sense of the possibilities of life. The human race, in his view, is not a failure, because Christ is in and of it, working with the energy of his eternal love in man's behalf. His argument for man, and with men, is Christ. Where Mr. Moody preaches the Bible as the Word by chapter and verse, Mr. Brooks preaches Christianity as the outcome and end of all Scripture. We doubt if either is specially concerned as a preacher with present questions of Biblical criticism, — Mr. Moody because of the entire absence of doubt in respect to the accepted structure of the Bible: Mr. Brooks because of an entire faith in the Christian result of all critical and historical investigations. The grounds of confidence in Christianity are quite different, but the confidence is sure and influential. Those who cannot accept some of Mr. Moody's interpretations of Scripture are made to feel the truth of the underlying reality. And those who may not accept all of Mr. Brooks's conclusions are made to feel equally that the power of his inspiration lies in his apprehension of the truth.

The sermons of Mr. Moody have not been so fully reported in the daily press that we are justified in making extracts from them. They are, however, the same in tenor and in substance with those with which the public are familiar. The title of Mr. Moody's early volume of sermons — "Glad Tidings" — fitly covers his subsequent preaching. His entrance upon evangelistic work marked a new era in the history of Evangelism. Previous Evangelists had alternated in their presentation of motive between the conception of the sovereignty of God coupled with the doctrine of the special gift of the Holy Spirit, and the conception of human responsibility declaring itself in the immediate and decisive act of the will. Here was the difference between the school of Dr. Nettleton and President Finney. Mr. Moody was a disciple of neither, but virtually established a new school by the commitment of himself so unreservedly to the conception of the love of God. "God *so* loved the world that He gave his only begotten Son that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish but have everlasting life." That was his message, his gospel; and it was new to the degree in which he abandoned himself to it. The safeguard to his preaching lay in its intensity. Preaching the mere goodness of God might have been weak and dangerous, but preaching the compassionate, suffering, long-suffering, sacrificing, agonizing love of God soon proved to be, not weakness, but power, — the power of God unto salvation. It was almost immediately seen that this use of motive was entirely compatible with the deepest and most solemn view of sin. And as it has now been tested by years in experience and outward result, we doubt if many Christians who have been observant of the effect of the method are disposed to go back in the presentation of motive from the gospel to the law.

Mr. Brooks's conception of God's relation to man is somewhat broader and more elevated. More stress is laid upon the coöperative element in salvation, upon the work of God in and with man, and the consequent result, not simply in deliverance or rescue, but in a perfected character, in oneness with God. Here is his message, with its clear and inspiring gospel : —

"The unit of power on the earth is not man and is not God. It is God and man, not two but one, not meeting accidentally, not running together in emergencies only to separate again when the emergency is over: it is God, and man belonging essentially together, God filling man, man opening his life by faith to be a part of God's, as the gulf opens itself and is part of the great ocean. . . . Oh, how the history of the world has lost this truth! Now with a faithless manhood which felt no need and claimed no presence of Divinity, the fight against misery and sin has been carried on. Now, thinking that God would do it all, and that man had no place in the great work, an impractical religion has stood by and waited for a miraculous cleansing of the earth which never came. Some day the perfect power, — God using an entirely obedient manhood, man

perfectly obedient and only asking to be used by God,—these two together, not two, but one, God in man and man in God, shall come, and then the world's salvation draweth nigh,—nay, is already here!"

In the remarkable series of Lenten sermons preached at St. Paul's on successive Monday noons to business men, Mr. Brooks confined himself entirely to the single passage from the Gospel of John, in which Jesus sets forth the doctrine of freedom through the truth (John viii. 31-36). The following extract must suffice to illustrate the fullness and the urgency with which he declares the all-sufficient power of God waiting upon man and working for him and with him, whether man is fully conscious of it or not:—

"And there is the real secret of the man's struggle with his sins. It is not simply the hatefulness of the sin, as we have said again and again, but it is the dim perception, the deep suspicion, the real knowledge at the heart of the man, that there is a richer and a sinless region in which it is really meant for him to dwell. Man stands separated from that life of God, as it were, by a great thick wall, and every effort to put away his sin, to make himself a nobler and a purer man, is simply his beating at the inside of that door which stands between him and the life of God which he knows that he ought to be living. It is like the prisoner hidden in his cave, who feels, through all the thick wall that shuts him out from it, the sunlight and the joyous life that is outside; who knows that his imprisonment is not his true condition, and so with every tool that his hands can grasp, and with his bleeding hands themselves, beats on the stone that he may find his way out. And the glory and the beauty of it is that, while he is beating upon the inside of the wall, there is also a noble power preying upon the outside of that wall. The life to which he ought to come is striving in its turn, upon its side, to break away the hindrance that is keeping him from the thing he ought to be, that is, keeping him from the life he ought to live. God, with his sunshine and lightning, with the great, majestic manifestations of himself, and with all the peaceful exhibitions of his life, is forever trying, upon his side of the wall, to break away the great barrier that separates the sinner's life from Him. Great is the power, great is the courage of the sinner, when through the thickness of the walls he feels that beating life of God, when he knows that he is not working alone, when he is sure that God is wanting him just as truly, far more truly, than he wants God. He bears himself to a nobler struggle with his enemy and a more determined effort to break down the resistance that stands between him and the higher life. Our figure is all imperfect, as all our figures are so imperfect, because it seems to be the man all by himself, working by himself, until he shall come forth into the life of God, as if God waited there to receive him when he came forth, the freed man, and as if the working of the freedom upon the sinner's side had not something also of the purpose of God within him. God is not merely in the sunshine; God is in the cavern of the man's sin. God is with the sinner wherever he can be. There is no soul so black in its sinfulness, so determined in its defiant obstinacy, that God has abandoned his throne room at the centre of the sinner's life; and every movement is the God movement, and every effort is the God force, with which man tries to break forth from his sin and come forth into the full sunlight of a life with God. Do you not think

how full of hope it is? Do you not see that when this great conception of the universe, which is Christ's conception, which beamed in every look that He shed upon the world, which was told in every word that He spoke, and which was in every movement of his hand,—do you not see how, when this great conception of the universe takes possession of a man, then all the struggle with his sin is changed, it becomes a strong struggle, a glorious struggle? He hears perpetually the voice of Christ, 'Be of good cheer. I have overcome the world. You shall overcome it by the same strength which overcame with Me.'"

And this extract, to show the conception of sin which follows from the conception of the work of God for man's redemption. No thought of sin is more awful than that of sin as it passes beyond the reach of man, and even of God:—

"Oh, this marvelous, this awful power that we have over other people's lives! Oh, the power of the sin that you have done years and years ago! It is awful to think of it. I think there is hardly anything more terrible to the human thought than this,—the picture of a man who, having sinned years and years ago in a way that involved other souls in his sin, and then, having repented of his sin, and undertaken another life, knows certainly that the power, the consequence, of that sin is going on outside of his reach, beyond even his ken and knowledge. He cannot touch it. You wronged a soul ten years ago. You taught a boy how to tell his first mercantile lie; you degraded the early standards of his youth. What has become of that boy to-day? You may have repented. He has passed out of your sight. He has gone years and years ago. Somewhere in this great, multitudinous mass of humanity he is sinning and sinning and reduplicating and extending the sin that you did. You touched the faith of some believing soul years ago with some miserable sneer of yours, with some cynical and skeptical disparagement of God and of the man who is the utterance of God upon the earth. You taught the soul that was enthusiastic to be full of skepticism and doubts. You wronged a woman years ago, and her life has gone out from your life, you cannot begin to tell where. You have repented of your sin. You have bowed yourself, it may be, in dust and ashes. You have entered upon a new life. You are pure to-day. But where is the skeptical soul? Where is the ruined woman whom you sent forth into the world out of the shadow of your sin years ago? You cannot touch that life. You cannot reach it. You do not know where it is. No steps of yours, quickened with all your earnestness, can pursue it. No contrition of yours can draw back its consequences. Remorse cannot force the bullet back again into the gun from which it once has gone forth. It makes life awful to the man who has ever sinned, who has ever wronged and hurt another life because of his sin, because no sin ever was done that did not hurt another life. I know the mercy of our God, that while He has put us into each other's power to a fearful extent, He never will let any soul absolutely go to everlasting ruin for another's sin; and so I dare to see the love of God pursuing that lost soul where you cannot pursue it. But that does not for one moment lift the shadow from your heart, or cease to make you tremble when you think of how your sin has outgrown itself and is running far, far away where you can never follow it."

We believe that the ministry at large has far too little sense of the present power of Christianity as a gospel. It is no longer commonplace when it rises to this height of reality. Christianity is more than a doctrine, more than ethics; infinitely more than the series of so-called scientific propositions under which the way of salvation is ostentatiously set forth in some quarters; it is glad tidings, if it can only be so apprehended; and as truly glad tidings to the nineteenth century, and to a Christianized community, as it was to those who first heard it from the lips of apostles, or to those who now hear it from the lips of the missionaries of the cross.

LETTERS AND LIFE.

This Department of the "Review" is under the editorial care of Professor
A. S. HARDY.

LIFE FROM A TOKYO POINT OF VIEW.

It is difficult to appreciate the wonderment with which Japan first saw Western civilization. We visit this Eastern people with interest, fascinated by the courtesy and gentleness of their manners, by the delicacy and suggestiveness of their art, by the quaint and picturesque in their social life. But they look upon the West with wonder, stupefied by our immense armies and navies, by the Titans of machinery which pant in our workshops, by the brilliant array of our arts and sciences, by the strange union of the complex and the ponderous, the subtle and the massive, which characterizes our civilization. Imagine all those devices of to-day which annihilate space, conquer time, economize labor, harness Nature, — imagine all the principles of chemistry, physics, mechanics, and mathematics which underlie these devices, brought suddenly to the eyes and within the reach of the Middle Ages, — and we get some idea of what is meant by what we call the opening of Japan to the world, but which is far more truly the opening of the world to Japan. For a few decades ago Japan was in her middle ages, not figuratively but literally; not only without press and wire, and rail and steam, and electricity, and all that constitutes the material scaffolding of modern society, but a completely feudal state, with the customs, habits, laws, superstitions, arts, political organization, of a twelfth century.

The wholesale adoption by the Japanese of Western civilization surprises us because we are apt to associate them, perhaps on account of their long seclusion, with their eastern neighbors, the Chinese, so indifferent to progress, content with the technical processes of the past, — a self-satisfied race of merchants, with little genius for industrialism. Far less reserved than the Chinese, by nature borrowers and imitators, apt in the arts and manufactures, distinctly patriotic and athirst for knowledge, the Japanese are at work in the line of their national traditions. It is the *rate*, rather

than the *fact*, of this transformation, which is astonishing. The superficial results have been largely accomplished,—an army, a navy, with arsenals and dockyards, a postal service, a railway system, steam communication by sea, and lighthouses, telephones, gas and electric lighting, a press, educational system, parliament, and bureaucracy. So far as these are concerned, Japan may well boast of doing in years what for Europe required centuries. But in achieving even these results she has encountered the difficulties which arise from ignorance and inexperience, with all their progeny of credulity, shallowness, over-haste, and rash judgment; the difficulties which beset the child who assumes that in donning a man's clothes he has become a man. And, having to struggle first with her inordinate appetite, she has now to wrestle with the secondary processes of digestion and reflection. To Europeanize Japan is no easy task; for Japan is not a little bowl which can be emptied into, and absorbed by, Christendom in a day. She has her past, with its fixed traditions; a national life which, however modified originally by contact with India and China, is the outgrowth of national needs; a political and social organization which, however quick to follow the national instincts of imitation, preserves all the inertia inseparable from a long and slow development. Having adopted, the graver question arises, how to assimilate. Statistics and facts which exhibit only the mechanical superposition of Europe upon a civilization alien to it in every particular, form the basis of many hasty predictions and false impressions. It is an easy matter to order silk-looms from Lyons, a pottery plant from Limoges, and electric engines from America. It is easy even to educate a body of mechanics to the use and care of modern machinery; but it is more difficult to create, in a people destitute of any inherited fund of mechanical genius, however skillful in securing small ends by simple means, that faculty of invention, so distinct from mere ingenuity, which in this age of competition is more essential to the success of the machine-shop than a technical knowledge of its details. How to improve is more important than how to "run." It is creditable to the energy of the government to have brought together within twenty-five years the *matériel* of a formidable navy; but it is impossible within that time to realize, from a race without a past of nautical enterprise, without foreign commerce, colonial possessions, or the wealth and industries necessary to the maintenance of a large naval force, the conditions essential to high naval efficiency. The difficulties of national education are immense. To send an embassy abroad, to investigate the school methods of Europe and America, to organize and set in operation a system of universal education for both sexes, is the least of them. Having transplanted the fully developed tree,—it is hardly too much to say, without roots,—the problem is to make it bear fruit. Consider on this point, says Professor Chamberlain,¹ what the situation is: —

¹ *Things Japanese.*

"All the nations of the West have, broadly speaking, a common past, a common fund of ideas, from which everything that they have and everything that they are springs naturally as part of a correlated whole,—one Roman Empire in the background, one Christian religion at the centre; one gradual emancipation, first from feudalism and next from absolutism, worked out or now in process of being worked out together; one art, one music, one kind of idiom, even though the words expressing it vary from land to land. Japan stands beyond this pale, because her past has been lived through under conditions altogether different. China is her Greece and Rome. Her language is not Aryan, as even Russia's is. Allusions familiar from one end of Christendom to the other require a whole chapter of commentary to make them at all intelligible to a Japanese student, who often has not, even then, any words corresponding to those which it is sought to translate. So well is this fact understood by Japanese educators that it has been customary of late years to impart most of the higher branches of knowledge through the medium of the English language. This, however, is an enormous additional weight hung around the student's neck. For a Japanese to be taught through the medium of English is infinitely harder than it would be for English lads to be taught through the medium of Latin, as Latin does not, after all, differ so very widely from English. It is, so to say, English in other words. But between English and Japanese the gulf fixed is so wide and gaping that the student's mind must be forever on the stretch. The simpler and more idiomatic the English, the more it taxes his powers of comprehension. It is difficult to see the way out of this *cul-de-sac*."

The situation is not stated in the current phrase "a nation born in a day," but, as Professor Chamberlain says, a nation burying its past, and endeavoring "to be somebody else and something else than what it has been and still partly is." What is true of education in general is true of all its branches. The *cul-de-sac* confronts one at every turn. It is not necessary for the modern artist to believe that St. Margaret set her foot on the head of Satan in order to depict such a subject with a loving and sympathetic pencil, for legends like this are the penumbral light of a sun which still rules his day. But if the Japanese artist, believing no longer that Kwannon rode the dragon, resorts to subjects drawn from a past which he is eager to bury, inspiration is withdrawn. And with foreign subjects he can have little real sympathy. Think of all that lies behind our art,—Greece, Rome, Christianity! At how many fountains of religion and national life it has drank! What a soil, therefore what a flower! Then consider this Japanese artist. Thirty years ago he was under the feudal system, giving his whole life lovingly, happily, to the production of some single masterpiece of carving, ivory, lacquer, or painting for his feudal lord. His master's bread was his. His conditions were those of the Middle Ages,—rivalry without competition. Suddenly his lord disappears, his pension vanishes, he must work for coin rather than honor. He is confronted with all the so-called "processes" which save what he has never been accustomed to economize, time and labor, which cheapen art and confuse the public taste. He is face to face with competition.

His standards are swept away. Spencer and Christianity are in the air. He has a foreign technique to master. Subjects with which he has no sympathy, and which therefore fail to stir his emotions or imagination, are offered him, — the nude human form, which he has seen without ever essaying to study or to copy. Eminently receptive, he is without conceptions. He cannot fulfill the condition laid down by Goethe, that he must be in touch with his time. His time is out of joint; for if great art often accompanies great transitions, these transitions, though violent, were natural.

The same *cul-de-sac* is encountered in the adoption of a legal code from the continent, — a code evolved from precedents which have no counterpart in Japanese national life, borrowed like a dress-coat, and destined for a long time to be associated with remnants of an earlier law and custom which cannot be discarded. All this is, perhaps, the condition of an ardently desired treaty revision, — of the entrance of Japan into the full comity of nations; yet it is difficult to conceive of a legal code as other than the reflection of a society, the outcome of a national experience.

There can be no doubt that Japan will persist in the path on which she has entered. It is impossible for her to return to her former solitude, and she has no desire to. But in destroying the old landmarks, and tearing up the roots of her own civilization, she is discovering that in that civilization are elements of obedience, reverence, courtesy, too good to be thrown away. In all the problems before her, that which assumes more and more prominence is the problem how to conserve Japan, and in no sphere of progress does this question raise difficulties more perplexing than in that of religion. Under the title of "The Future of Christianity in Japan," one of the most gifted of Japanese pastors, a graduate of the Doshisha, and friend of the late Mr. Neesima, contributes an article to "The Rikugo Zasshi," from which the "Japan Mail" takes the following extracts: —

"Our church has made great progress, and we are now experienced enough to select from European and American seeds those which are good and suitable. The day has come when we can take steps for the development of Japanese Christianity. . . . In certain essential points, neither time nor space can make any difference in the religion of Christ. But in other respects, in matters of every-day life and thought, the Christianity of Japan cannot but differ more or less from that of England or America. There will not only be some difference between the two, but Christianity may possibly make a new growth here and develop some finer qualities not discernible in the older stock. I once spoke to some friends in Europe and America thus: 'In sending out missionaries to the East, you are not conferring a benefit on Orientals alone; you are conferring a great benefit on your own churches also. If you wish to see Christianity triumphant in the West, you will have to send reinforcements from the East.' Christianity has attained its present stage of development in the Occident on the basis laid by Grecian literature and Roman jurisprudence. The Christianity which is about to spring up in the East must stand on the pedestal formed

out of the religion of Buddha and the Confucian philosophy. Our Christianity must appropriate to itself, in the course of its development, whatever truth and whatever good qualities may be found in the religion of India and the philosophy of China. . . . It is therefore our wish to develop a system of divinity which in its essential characteristics shall be purely Japanese, and to originate religious rites and ceremonies which shall be Japanese in character. . . . At first sight, the church in Japan may seem to rest on a firm basis; but the plain truth is, that our churches are virtually so many foreign colonies. . . . The thoughts and customs prevailing indicate a wholesale introduction of foreign thoughts and customs. It is a fine thing to select whatever is good and beautiful from foreign countries; but nothing deserves to be more severely condemned than to blindly follow in everything the recommendations of foreign denominations and their representatives. As a result of such a practice, various abuses and evils have sprung up within the church, and there is danger of our letting a golden opportunity like the present pass without courageously hoisting our own banners and fighting for victory on our own lines. Unless Christianity divests itself of foreign clothes and puts on a Japanese dress, it will never accomplish its object in this country. . . . As the result of thirty years' training and experience, there has risen in our churches a numerous race of capable men equal to any work of responsibility. There are even some among the foreign missionaries who, seeing this, have made up their minds to yield the principal positions to Japanese, remaining themselves mere advisers and helpers to the latter. . . . The time has now come for Japanese propagandists to form their own estimate of Christ, and to make it known to their fellow-countrymen. We must henceforth think independently, and construct without assistance, so as to build a Church of Japan. . . . We have only to believe in Christ as Japanese; only to study divinity as Japanese; only to preach as Japanese. What is now required to secure the complete success of evangelization in Japan is, that there should rise up preachers like Wesley, Beecher, Knox, Luther, and Paul. The time is ripe. Where are the men to take up this responsible task?"

The writer, Mr. Yokoi, is fully persuaded that Christianity is destined to prevail in Japan, and will be the dominant factor in moulding its future. Neither Shintoism nor Buddhism are formidable rivals. The former, a worship rather than a religion, a ritual without a theology, without sacred books, moral code, dogmas, or any real influence on the conduct of life, offers as little resistance now to its new foe as it did centuries ago to Buddhism; and that the latter is destined to lose, in the feeble struggle it is making against Christianity, there can be no manner of doubt. Confucianism, with its doctrines of obedience to rulers and parents, while eminently adapted to feudal Japan, cannot survive the decay of the dogma of the Mikado's divinity and the introduction of the new education, and is steadily falling into neglect. An educated native ministry has been the goal of all missionary effort. That end, with its inevitable corollary of independence, has been largely secured. The future of the foreign missionary must be more and more one of counsel and direction, and less and less that of absolute leadership. In religious as in secular affairs, the supremacy of the foreign adviser is drawing to a close. Doubtless there

is much of self-sufficiency in evangelical new Japan, as in other departments of the new order of things. Young men pass a few years abroad, and return with a smattering of science and philosophy picked up from various sources, Berlin, Paris, New England, to occupy positions of trust and responsibility. For this, as for so many other things, there seems to be no help; it is one of the factors of the situation. That Japanese Christians will make no mistakes is to assume them wiser than we have been. That they do not feel themselves the heirs to all the subtle controversies which have created the sectarian divisions of the West, to all the accretions which have proved stumbling-blocks to simple faith, is natural. That Christianity may develop a "finer growth" in the soil of Eastern civilization may be doubted, but not that it must and will adjust itself to a radically different environment of human need. No other religion has exhibited the same capacity for adjustment and development; no other possesses the same vital power of growth. The extinct dogmas which strew its path through the centuries are the evidence and proof of its superiority to human limitations, of its freedom and life. What the world owes to Christ is well known. What its debt is to his human interpreters we are more ready to admit for the past than the present. But the adaptiveness of his teaching to every race and time is only another form of the statement that in every age, and from every people born into his kingdom, a new light is shed upon his life and work.

Arthur Sherburne Hardy.

BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL CRITICISM.

IMMANUEL.—PROPHECY AND FULFILLMENT.

THE name Immanuel first occurs Isaiah vii. 14, in the familiar passage describing the interview between Ahaz and Isaiah. Ahaz and his kingdom were in peril. Rezin of Syria and Pekah of Israel had combined to overthrow him, and, according to the twenty-eighth chapter of 2 Chronicles, made considerable headway toward the accomplishment of their purpose. Ahaz was greatly alarmed. "His heart was moved, and the hearts of his people," says the record, "as the trees of the forest are swayed by the wind" (Isa. vii. 2). At this juncture Isaiah, by divine direction, sought an interview with the king and tried to encourage him to trust in Jehovah for deliverance. Later, in the name of Jehovah, he offered to produce any desired sign to help Ahaz to believe that the God of his people could and would help him. The king, with feigned piety, declined to "tempt Jehovah." He had already appealed, or at least decided to appeal, to Tiglath-pileser, who, during the last ten years, had restored Assyria to the first place among the nations of Western Asia; and he did not wish to have the wisdom of his course challenged. Isaiah, who perceived his hypocrisy, was prepared for this emergency. "Hear ye now, house

of David," he said, "is it too little for you to weary men, that ye must weary even my God?" Then he added the words touching Immanuel, which are translated in our English versions as follows:—

Authorized.

14. Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign : Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call (marg. or *Thou*, O virgin, shall call) his name Immanuel.

15. Butter and honey shall he eat, that he may know to refuse the evil, and choose the good.

16. For before the child shall know to refuse the evil, and choose the good, the land that thou abhorrest shall be forsaken of both her kings.

17. The Lord shall bring upon thee, and upon thy people, and upon thy father's house, days that have not come, from the day that Ephraim departed from Judah ; even the king of Assyria.

Revised.

Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign : Behold, a (marg. or *the*) virgin (marg. or *maiden*) shall conceive and bear (marg. or *is with child and beareth*) a son, and shall call his name Immanuel. Butter (marg. or *curds*) and honey shall he eat when he knoweth (marg. that he may know) to refuse the evil, and choose the good. For before the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good, the land whose two kings thou abhorrest shall be forsaken. The Lord shall bring upon thee, and upon thy people, and upon thy father's house, days that have not come, from the day that Ephraim departed from Judah ; even the king of Assyria.

The revisers have greatly improved upon the translation of their predecessors, and further assisted the reader by attaching verse 17 to this paragraph, instead of making it the beginning of a new one, as was done in the old version. The passage has been grossly misinterpreted, mainly, perhaps, because it has not been studied as a whole. Now it is perfectly clear from verse 13 that the prophet was indignant, and justly so, at Ahaz. Would his indignation most naturally vent itself in a promise, or a warning? The latter is, of course, to be expected. If, then, there is a part of the passage which, taken by itself, would seem encouraging, and another which would naturally inspire terror and anxiety, it is to be presumed that the former is, in some way, to be subordinated to the latter. These two elements are actually found, the former in verses 14 and 16, the latter in verses 15 and 17; but, as is often the case in Hebrew composition, the particles which would indicate their relations to each other are omitted. Supplying these, one gets some such translation as follows: "*Though* the young woman who now conceiveth, when she beareth [a son], may call his name Immanuel, curds and honey will he eat by the time when he knoweth enough to reject evil and choose good : for, before he knoweth enough to reject evil and choose good, the land, whose two kings thou loapest, will be deserted ; *but* Jehovah will bring upon thee, and upon thy people, and upon thy father's house, days such as have not come [upon them] since the time when Ephraim separated from Judah." This rendering may at first seem to make the warning element too prominent, but it harmonizes with the tone in which Isaiah must have spoken verse 13, and therefore must be substantially correct.

The conclusion based upon the relation of the passage to the context is confirmed by a study of its internal structure. It consists of two perfectly symmetrical parts. To the first belong verses 14 and 15 ; to the second, verses 16 and 17 : moreover, as has already been indicated, verse 16 corresponds to verse 14, and verse 17 to verse 15. The two parts are connected by the particle *for* (וְ), which is often

used to introduce an explanation, especially the application of an illustration. See Amos iii. 7, and Isaiah v. 7. It is here used in this sense. The second part, therefore, explains the first, and determines the main thought of the passage. Now it is only necessary to read verses 16 and 17 to see that, as was to be expected, it is not the overthrow of Syria and Samaria, but the subjugation of Judah, by foretelling which Isaiah wished to influence his sovereign.¹

The importance of the results thus far obtained appears upon applying them to verse 14, whose meaning is in question. Of course, if this verse is really to be subordinated to the next, the seeming promise contained in it cannot be of so great significance as it has sometimes been regarded; and, if it is to be explained by verse 16, it must have some reference to the fate of Rezin and Pekah. In other words, the sign given is in some sense a sign of the overthrow of these two kings. It will be necessary to examine the verse more closely to learn in just what sense the sign was to be understood. I need not dwell on the meaning of 'almah (*עֲלָמָה*), which the revisers render *virgin* in the text and *maiden* in the margin. Most scholars now admit that the word denotes simply a woman of marriageable age, whether married or single. In this passage, therefore, it may mean either a young wife or a young woman who was about to be married. The article (־) is variously understood. Some, like Professor Briggs (Messianic Prophecy, 195) take it to be a sign of the vocative; but as Dillmann suggests, if *ha'almah* (*הָעֳלָמָה*) were vocative, it would naturally be followed by *thou* (־*תְּ*) as the subject of the next word. Others maintain that the article is here used in the strict sense of a demonstrative, directing attention to a person well known. To this view it is objected that a reference to a particular person was unnecessary, since the emphasis is on the name of the child, and not on the character of his mother, and that those who insist on such a reference cannot agree on the person intended. There is a third view, that the article here is generic, which relieves one from the necessity of taking either side of a question which can never be decided, and assists one in reaching a consistent idea of the entire passage. I prefer therefore, with Ewald (Propheten i. 344) to regard the young woman as an indefinite person belonging to the class properly called *young women*. If, however, *ha'almah* is generic, the young woman may not only be any one of her class, but first one and then another of that class, that is, the prophecy concerning the young woman may meet with more than one fulfillment. This possibility would be more plainly suggested by rendering the word, not *the* or *a* *young woman*, but *young women*.²

There is nothing to indicate which form of the copula is to be supplied before *harah* (*הָרַחַת*), *pregnant*, the present or the future. One might translate, *The young woman is with child and shall bear*, etc., that is, *Young women now with child, when they bear*, etc. This would bring the fulfillment of the prophecy nearer than the use of the future, and

¹ If, as some maintain, the passage is a compilation, the introduction of verse 17 at the end of it shows that the compiler's view of Isaiah's meaning was that above stated.

² It has been suggested that the article may be but an accidental repetition of the last letter of the preceding word (*הָנֶגֶת*). Without it, the noun to which it is now prefixed would, of course, most naturally be interpreted as indefinite.

it would be authorized by the analogy of Genesis xvi. 11, but it would not be exact enough to suit the evident intention of the prophet. It is better to suppose even the conception of Immanuel yet future, and translate, *The young woman will conceive and bear, etc., that is, Young women, who now become pregnant, when they bear, etc.*

The form גַּרְתָּה is rendered as if it were *garatha* in the Greek versions, but unless, as Professor Toy (Quotations in the New Testament, p. 4) suggests, it is a mistake for the feminine participle, it is probably another form of the third sing. fem. of the perfect. In either case the sense is not affected: the mother *will call her son Immanuel*, that is, by the time she would name her son, the condition and prospects of the kingdom of Judah will be such that she will feel that Jehovah is directing its affairs, and give expression to this faith (or hope) by naming him Immanuel. I insist on the use of *will* instead of *shall* in this connection. *Shall* would seem to make the prophet teach that the temporary relief to Judah, which he foretold, was really an indication that God had interposed to save his people; but that is precisely what he does not wish to teach. What he means to say is, that, when the relief sought through Assyria comes, Ahaz and his people, in their blindness, will *think* that Jehovah has espoused their cause, and mothers' will be influenced by this belief in giving names to their children, but that the inference is mistaken, since the Assyrians will prove worse than their former enemies.

The name Immanuel, or, more exactly, Immanu-El, properly understood, sustains the view above stated. Literally rendered it is, *with us God*. This phrase taken by itself might be regarded as a description of the character of the child, and it has, in fact, been so regarded. The passage is still interpreted as a direct prophecy of the birth of Jesus, and the name as a distinct statement of his divinity. But, in the first place, *with us God* is not a correct translation of Immanuel. The name is formed after the analogy of, for example, Hephzibah, which means, not *my delight in her*, but *my delight is in her*. That the copula is to be supplied in the translation of Immanuel also is clear from Isaiah viii. 8, where the two words of which it is composed form a sentence not to be rendered into English without *is*. The revisers, therefore, have done well to translate this name, as they have in the margin, *God is with us*. But *God is with us* describes a state of things, not the nature of a person, as is shown by the use made of the expression in viii. 8. The name Immanuel, then, as Isaiah in this passage represents the future mother as applying it to her child, is a mistaken popular interpretation of her country's condition. Isaiah himself, in anticipation of the event which was to give occasion for the use of the name Immanuel, for the time being forgetting its effect upon Judah, named his own child Maher-shalal-hash-baz, because, before the child should know enough to cry *My father, and My mother, the riches of Damascus and the spoil of Samaria should be carried away before the king of Assyria*.

I have said that the name of the child, and not the title of his mother, is the important word in this prophecy, and also that Immanuel itself has merely a suggestive importance. Let me now make a further point, implied in the previous discussion, that Isaiah, when he uttered the prophecy concerning Immanuel, probably did not mean to predict that any child would actually bear this name, but that circumstances would be such as to suggest a name of this sort. If, therefore, any young mother, in her

gratitude to Jehovah for the deliverance of Judah from Syria and Israel, called her first-born (say) Jehoshua, *Jehovah is help*, or even if such a deliverance was wrought, whether the gratitude of the people expressed itself in this particular way or not, the prophecy was substantially fulfilled. Should one object to this view, let me remind him that, in the first place, no mention is made of any one in Isaiah's time called by this name, as there would have been had the name been of prime importance; and furthermore, that Matthew did not take the prophecy so literally, since he did not hesitate to say (i. 23) that the name Jesus was given to the son of Mary in fulfillment of this passage.

Isaiah foretold a speedy but temporary deliverance. If this prophecy was fulfilled, it was fulfilled soon after it was uttered. It is not certainly known when Ahaz came to the throne, but the date of his accession cannot be far from 735 b. c. It is probable that the attack upon him by Rezin and Pekah occurred at the beginning of his reign, and that, as soon as he found himself thus beset, he formed the alliance with Assyria which Isaiah sought to prevent. If the date given is correct, the Assyrian records furnish ample proof of the accuracy of Isaiah's prediction, for, according to the eponym canon, the principal event of the year 734 was an expedition to Gaza, of which Tiglath-pileser, in his annals, gives a detailed account. I translate what remains of this account from the text of Schrader (*Keilinschrifliche Bibliothek*, ii. 30).

The city Ga-al (probably the first syllable of Galad, that is, Gilead) . . . bi-il (probably a fragment of the name of the Abel-beth-maacah of 2 Kings xv. 29) above the land of Beth-Omri . . . the remote, I added, in its extent, to the territory of Assyria, placed my officers as governors over it. Hanno of Gaza, who fled before my arms, and escaped to Egypt, Gaza . . . his goods, gods . . . my . . . and my royal image . . . in Beth . . . the gods of their land I counted . . . like a bird . . . I removed him to his land, and . . . gold, silver, garments of birmi, wool (?) . . . great . . . I received. The land of Beth-Omri . . . the whole of his people, their goods I removed to Assyria, Pekah, their king, I slew, and I placed Hosea as king over them. Ten talents of gold, a thousand talents of silver . . . I received and brought them to Assyria.

It is not probable that the deposition of Pekah occurred in 734 b. c. It is here mentioned as the final result of the interference of the Assyrian monarch in the affairs of Samaria. The expedition of 734, however, must have practically defeated the conspiracy against Judah. The next year Tiglath-pileser attacked and routed Rezin, and the next he renewed the attack and finished the conquest and devastation of Syria; the land whose two kings had filled Ahaz with terror was deserted, and the first part of Isaiah's prophecy fulfilled.

It may be objected to such an interpretation as I have given to this passage that, if it is correct, no sign was, after all, given to Ahaz. I reply that, in the first place, this objection has tenfold more force against the interpretation which makes the passage a prediction concerning the birth of Jesus than against that which I have proposed. How could the birth of our Lord be called a sign to the king of Judah, who lived and reigned more than seven centuries before his advent? But the supposed objector overlooks two things. The first is the change of treatment required by the refusal of Ahaz to receive a sign calculated to strengthen his faith in Jehovah. Isaiah was ready to give any pledge that was required for the fulfillment of his predictions. The king would not be

convinced. A sign such as was given to Hezekiah, therefore, would have been wasted upon him, or, if it had influenced his conduct, would have violated his moral freedom. It should, also, in the second place, be remembered that the word *'oth* (־ֹת) means *sign*, not only in the sense of *pledge*, but in various other senses, for example, that of *proof*. There are several examples of this usage, but the one which best suits the purpose of an illustration is Exodus iii. 12, where Jehovah says to Moses, "I will surely be with thee, and this will be unto thee the sign that I myself sent thee; when thou bringest the people forth from Egypt, ye will serve God in this mountain." In this case, the sign is the worship of Jehovah in the holy mountain. The event is foretold, that, when it occurs, it may convince Moses that He who sent him on his mission to Egypt was none other than the God of his fathers. The sign actually given to Ahaz was of the same sort. It was, virtually, the relief from present danger. When it came, it would remind the king of his interview with Isaiah, and convince him that the prophet really came from God. This conviction would be reinforced by the fulfillment of the second part of the prophecy, when Ahaz saw that he had escaped his enemies only to be oppressed and devoured by his allies. Then and thereafter, any child born during the respite granted to Judah, whose name reflected the circumstances of his birth, would recall Isaiah's divinely inspired foresight and his own shortsighted obstinacy.

I need not dwell longer on this passage. The next in which the name Immanuel occurs is Isaiah viii. 8. This passage is even simpler than the preceding, yet so learned a commentator as Cheyne has thoroughly misunderstood it. He, like many others, regards *thy land* as denoting the lordship of Immanuel over Judah, and explains *O Immanuel* as "an ejaculatory prayer for the Deliverer's advent." One has only to glance at the context to see that both of these interpretations are mistaken. *O Immanuel* is not a prayer, but a warning. Isaiah, in the eighth chapter, begins by describing the birth of his son, Maher-shalal-hash-baz, to whom this name was given that he might be a sign of the forthcoming destruction of the northern kingdom. With the fifth verse he begins a repetition of this prophecy against Israel, to which he attaches a prediction of the invasion of Judah by the Assyrians. There, then, as in vii. 14-17, the gist of what he says is that Israel will first be destroyed, and Judah thus delivered, but that after a brief respite Judah in its turn will be invaded and oppressed by the Assyrians. Who, then, is Immanuel? Not a deliverer of high or low degree, but a child, any child, to whom his mother, in excess of faith, had given such a name as Immanuel, addressed as the representative of a generation to whom the promise of their birth was soon to be cruelly broken. It is as if the prophet had said, When Israel has been destroyed Judah's turn will come, and ye who began life when peace blessed your country will soon see it all but ruined by war.¹

All but, — for Israel did not expect that the Assyrian invasion would be the end of the kingdom of Judah. Perhaps he intended to hint at his hopes in verse 8, where he said that the flood, which typifies the Assyrians, would reach unto the neck, but not completely overwhelm the land and its inhabitants. Whether there is any intimation what was to follow the Assyrian invasion in that verse or not, there certainly is in the next

¹ It is taken for granted that *O Immanuel* belongs to the text. If, as some suppose, it is an exegetical addition, it is interesting as showing how early the prediction to which it evidently refers was misunderstood.

proof that he did not despair of the nation. He defies Assyria and all the rest of the peoples to do their worst, for he knows that, though they may be permitted to chastise, they will not be allowed to destroy it; that there will remain a remnant, who, in the midst of desolation and oppression, will have only not the faith but the right to say, *God is with us*; and that Jehovah will one day manifest himself as their deliverer.

Isaiah does not at first explain by what means Jehovah will accomplish his purpose, but in the ninth chapter he breaks forth into the joyful proclamation, *Unto us a child is born*, etc.

The question at once arises, What is the relation between this prophecy and those concerning Immanuel? Some have asserted that the two children are one, and, to the superficial reader, the form of expression used in the ninth chapter might seem to favor this opinion. This interpretation, however, cannot be defended. In the first place, as every Hebrew scholar knows, the tense used does not necessarily imply past time. The prophets constantly use the perfect when they wish to show their confidence in their predictions. It is so used in the preceding verses of this chapter. Nothing, therefore, would be more natural than its use in this exultant outburst. Moreover, in the eleventh chapter, where the advent of the same Prince is described, the imperfect, the proper tense for events yet future, is employed.

These considerations show that ix. 5 ff. refers to a child not yet born when the prophecy was uttered. If, now, it could be shown that this prophecy is a year or two later than vii. 14 ff., one could thus prove that Isaiah did not have the same child in mind in both passages. This method, for the present, seems impossible, but the same conclusion is forced upon one by a comparison of the two prophecies. If I have correctly interpreted vii. 14 ff., Immanuel has neither character nor mission; is, in fact, a mere name, the creation of a thoughtless and misguided people. The other child is a definite person, with a definite origin, a successor to Ahaz on the throne of David. He has miraculous if not divine attributes, as denoted by the names given to him. He has a career to fulfill, that of a restorer of the kingdom of his father David to more than its ancient glory and prosperity; for this root of Jesse, as he is called in the eleventh chapter,—*Unto him will the nations seek, and his resting place will be glory.* He is, in short, the ideal king, the manifestation of the power, wisdom, and goodness of Jehovah to and for Israel; the Messiah. Can these two be one and the same child? To me it seems impossible.

Two other questions suggest themselves, namely: How did Isaiah picture to himself the nature of the child of the ninth chapter? and, When did he expect him to appear? It would be very interesting to discuss these questions, but they lie beyond the limits of the present paper, and therefore must, for the time being, be ignored, while we pursue the proper object of our investigations; and since there are no other passages in the Old Testament that refer to Immanuel, we may proceed at once to the one in the New in which Matthew quotes the words of Isaiah to Ahaz. Matthew says (i. 22 f.): *All this has come to pass that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Lord through the prophet, saying, Behold, the virgin will conceive, and bring forth a son, and they shall call his name Immanuel, which being interpreted is, with us God.*

The first thing that strikes one upon reading this quotation is its variation from the original. There are at least two cases. One, the use of

καλεονται, they will call, where the Hebrew expression is, *she will call or thou wilt call*, is of no consequence, since it does not matter whether the prophet said that the name would be given to the child by his mother, the king, or some indefinite person or persons. The other case is that of *παρθενος*, by which the Evangelist renders the Hebrew word *'almah*. The word *παρθενος* is correctly translated in our version, for, though it is sometimes found in the sense of *young woman*, it here, and almost always elsewhere, has the signification *virgin*. This, however, is not the meaning of *'almah*, which, as already explained, is applied to virgin only as a species of young woman, and which must give way to *b'thulah* (בָּתְהוּלָה) when a virgin as such is meant. It must therefore be admitted that the quotation is incorrect, and that the error is a serious one, since it makes all the difference between a natural and a miraculous conception.

It does not help matters to say that, as is probably the case, the Seventy are responsible for the form of the quotation. The fact that *παρθενος* is found in their rendering of Isaiah vii. 14 does not prove that it is correct; it only shows that Matthew was not the first to use this incorrect translation.

I have thus far said nothing about the connection in which Matthew quotes the prophecy concerning Immanuel. He introduces it, as by Isaiah, into his account of the birth of Jesus, claiming that it was fulfilled when He was conceived by the Virgin Mary. But Isaiah did not use the words attributed to him, and those which he did use referred to the birth of a child in the near future. How, then, can the miraculous conception of Jesus be regarded as the fulfillment of the words of Isaiah?

A recent writer on the prophecies called Messianic replies as follows: —

"Matthew applies to the conception and birth of Jesus a prophecy recorded in Isaiah vii. 14, which, as he quotes it, reads as follows: 'Behold, a virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son, and they shall call his name Emmanuel, which, being interpreted, is, God with us.' (Matt. i. 22, 23.) The primary application of this language, as it occurs in Isaiah, does not appear to have been to the birth of Christ, and yet this does not exclude its application to that event, as declared by Matthew. It is well to bear in mind that Matthew was one of the apostles, to whom Jesus had pledged the plenary guidance of the Holy Ghost, and that, as such, he is good authority for this application of the language which he quotes from Isaiah. As between the critics who find fault with him for making the application and Matthew himself, it will be safe, at least for the unlearned, to follow the latter."

The writer is evidently a convert to the theory of a double sense. This theory is a pure invention, devised to support the assumption that the Biblical authors, because they are inspired, are virtually omniscient. Moreover, it robs prophecy of its reality, and debauches the conscience of the interpreter. Skepticism is better than a faith with such a foundation.

Must we, then, confess that the Evangelist both misquoted and misapplied the words of Isaiah? Shall we not thus destroy confidence in his ability if not in his integrity, and finally overthrow the doctrines of our religion?

This is not the only alternative. We must own that Matthew does not reproduce the words of Isaiah, but the fact that he does substantially reproduce the rendering of the Septuagint relieves him from the charge of tampering with the Scriptures. Does he not, however, apply the prophecy to an event of which the prophet could not have been thinking when it was uttered? Yes, and if one of us should do the same thing he

would justly be suspected of ignorance or dishonesty. A charge of this sort cannot be brought against Matthew. He was a Jew of the first Christian century. When he wrote, philosophy had not made much progress among his people. Consequently they were not accustomed to nice distinctions. They said, for example, that God hardened Pharaoh's heart, and many other things which we find it necessary to qualify. In the matter of prophecy they evidently neglected to distinguish between fulfillment and coincidence. When, therefore, they said that a given event fulfilled a given passage in their scriptures, they did not always mean that the passage quoted primarily referred to the event described. It made no difference to them whether it did or not. It was sufficient in their eyes if the event suggested the quotation. In any such case they applied the formula, "*This came to pass that,*" etc. Jewish literature abounds in examples of this practice. That Matthew followed the custom of his time, one who has studied his quotations can hardly doubt. Take, for example, the one found ii. 15. It is from Hosea xi. 1. The prophet used the words quoted of the Exodus, and Matthew must have known that they could not originally have referred to anything else; yet he says that Jesus was carried into Egypt that *it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Lord through the prophet, saying, Out of Egypt called I my son.* A still better illustration is his statement (ii. 23) that Jesus' home was fixed at Nazareth, *that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophets that he should be called a Nazarene.* In this case probably the only warrant for a reference to the prophets was the similarity in sound between the name Nazareth and *neser* (נֵסֶר), Branch, one of the words applied to the Messiah in Isaiah xi. 1. If, now, Matthew, like his contemporaries, made no distinction between fulfillment and coincidence, the use which he made of Isaiah vii. 14 was perfectly legitimate; for any one who was familiar with the prophecy in its Greek rendering could not but be reminded of it by his account of the birth of our Saviour, and those for whom he wrote would say, as he said, *all this has come to pass that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Lord through the prophet, saying, Behold, the virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and they shall call his name Immanuel.*

What then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? Briefly this: that Isaiah's prophecy refers to the immediate future; that therefore, if it was fulfilled in any proper sense, it must have been fulfilled toward the beginning of the reign of Ahaz; and that the birth of Jesus fulfilled it only in the *Jewish* sense.

H. G. Mitchell.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY.

SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY IN THREE PARTS.

PART III.¹ PAUPERISM.

TOPIC II. METHODS OF RELIEF UNDER THE ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS.

NOTE.—The distinction is to be observed, throughout the discussion, between Poverty and Pauperism.

Poverty is incidental to every social condition. It is inevitable. There is a constant truth in the saying of Christ: "The poor ye have with you always." Poverty is the necessary sequence, in many cases, of the death or disablement of the bread-winner of the family, and it follows in the wake of many calamities which are in themselves unavoidable. The "invalid corps," under the Socialistic régime, is none the less made up of the poor because of its formal classification in the social body.

Pauperism, on the other hand, is the product of certain types of civilization, or of false economic conditions, or, as is most frequently the case, of unwise and extravagant methods of relief. People may become poor, they do not *become paupers*: they are pauperized. There is no word to express the active side of poverty. It has no active side. Pauperism is a more active and personal term. We can draw from it immediately the verb,—to pauperize.

The art of pauperization was first developed in connection with the later history of the Roman people. It was carried to its highest development in modern times in the Poor Laws of England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

1. THE HEBREW METHOD OF RELIEF.

The Hebrew people represent in many ways the simplest problem in which poverty can present itself. They were homogeneous, intensely national, restricted in their intercourse with other nations, and were by derivation first a pastoral and then an agricultural people.

(1.) *The system of land tenure*,—a system of private holdings, modified by the national sentiment that the land was Jehovah's land (*Lev. xxv. 23*), and by the equally strong national sentiment that the people were Jehovah's people (*Lev. xxv. 35–55*).

See Ewald's "Jewish Antiquities," chapter on Property.

Kalisch's "Com. on Leviticus," chap. xxv.

For proof of operation in later times of Sabbatic law for relief of land, see Josephus's "Jewish War," book i., chap. 2, sec. 4; book ii., chap. 10, sec. 5; also, Schürer's "The Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ," div. i., vol. i., pp. 40–43.

(2.) *The general Sabbatic system*, which stood in its intention, and in the adjustment of some of its parts, to the economic life of the people as a means of protection against oppression and enslavement. *Deut. v. 12–15*; *xv. 1–2*; *Lev. xxv. 10*.

(3.) *Special statutes* enjoining consideration of the poor or helpless, or providing against possible abuses of laborers.

¹ For Parts I. and II. see "Review" for 1889, 1890. Part III. appears in alternate numbers of the "Review" for 1891.

The statute of the gleanings. Lev. xix. 9, 10.

The statute of the second or poor tithes. Deut. xxvi. 12.

Statute providing for daily payment of wages. Deut. xxiv. 14, 15.

Statute in regard to pledges. Deut. xxiv. 6, 10.

Statute against usury. Ex. xxii. 25.

Note that the call for usury, or interest, did not represent, as now, a method of doing business,—a business convenience,—but rather the necessity of the poor and distressed.

(4.) *The system of almsgiving*, to be estimated in its later development by the stress laid upon the *doctrine* in the Apocrypha. Book of Tobit, iv. 7-12; xii. 8, 9; xiv. 10, 11.

(5.) *The ameliorating enactments* relating to slaves are to be noted, but slavery was not a sufficient factor in the Hebrew economic life to require particular attention.

2. THE GREEK METHOD OF RELIEF.

(1.) *Colonization.*

Colonization was the characteristic and sufficient method of the Greek, and, though it was an indirect preventive of pauperism, it was more effective than any direct method could have been. The colonizing instinct of the Greek race is set forth by Seneca, in these words:—

"Greek towns have raised themselves in the borders of the most barbarous countries: the language of the Macedonian flourishes on the banks of the Indus, and in the extreme provinces of Persia. Seythia and its immense plains covered with hordes of savages behold Achean cities rule along the coasts of the Pontus Euxinus. Neither the severity of the climate, where eternal frosts reign, nor the ferocious manner of foreign nations, can place any check on their distant migrations. Asia is filled with Athenian colonies. Miletus alone has produced sixty-five. All the coast of Italy, which is washed by the Tuscan Sea, bears the name of Magna Græcia, and the people have found their way even into Gaul."

(2.) *Checks upon population.*

See Malthus on "Population," book i., chap. 13, on "The Checks to Population in Greece." Compare Mosaic legislation with laws of Solon.

(3.) *The remarkable cheapness of comfortable living.*

Boeckh calculates that a family of adults could have lived in the time of Socrates for \$65 a year, in the time of Demosthenes for \$80. The family of Demosthenes, including himself, sister, and mother, cost about \$120 a year, exclusive of rent, which could not have been large, as houses ranged from \$50 to \$2,000 in original cost. See Grote's "History of Greece;" Felton's "Lectures on Ancient and Modern Greece," "The Public Economy of the Athenians," by Augustus Boeckh, reviewed by Professor Harkness in "Bibliotheca Sacra," vol. xv. pp. 179-202.

(4.) *The number of citizens under the pay of the state* for attendance upon the Public Assembly, or for jury duty.

(5.) *State support of the orphaned children of soldiers*, and aid for all disabled classes, to which is to be added the relief afforded by private societies.

Ulhorn affirms "that in Athens we have the nearest approach to the relief of the poor which was to be found in the world at the coming of Christianity." Ulhorn's "Charity in the Ancient Church," chap. i.

(6.) *The pauperizing effect of slavery was largely relieved by colonization.*

3. THE ROMAN METHOD OF RELIEF.

The study of Roman poverty introduces us to pauperism. The history of the Roman Plebs is the history of the self-pauperization of a class. As the plebeian class rose to political power, it became a great political proletariat, living upon the subsidies of the state, and relying upon the state for amusement no less than for bread.

For the understanding of pauperism under the Empire, the study of the origin, growth, and rise to political power of the plebeian class is indispensable. The authorities are, any reliable history of early Rome, like Niebuhr's or Arnold's or Mommsen's, supplemented by De Coulanges's "The Ancient City." De Coulanges is invaluable in the study of the subject. See chapters on "The Plebeians," and on "The Plebs enter the City."

With the accession of the plebeian class to political power, its demands upon the state as a proletariat began, reaching in the time of Augustus the following proportion : The social analysis of the city at that period gives (exclusive of slaves) 10,000 senators, very rich ; 20,000 soldiers, paid ; 60,000 foreigners, chiefly traders ; and 320,000 to whom Augustus presented a constant bounty. The causes which at once allowed and necessitated this subsidy of so large a proportion of the population of the city were : —

(1.) *The succession of brilliant conquests under the late Republic.* Wealth poured in upon the city from all directions. Each successful general enriched the city with the spoils of his victories. Immense largesses were bestowed upon favorites, and equally large bounties in the aggregate upon the populace.

(2.) *The civil wars of the Republic,* which enlarged the range of public bribery, as each party made its bid for the favor of the masses.

(3.) *The growth of the city,* through the retirement of veterans, and through the influx of strangers, especially farmers from the neighboring country. Colonization never succeeded at Rome. Even war colonies failed. The farms apportioned to the veterans of the wars were bought up by the rich, and the amount of arable land around the city was gradually reduced.

(4.) *Slavery.* The Roman slave, who might be a man of more character, skill, or learning than his master, carried on all the industries of the city, many of the trades, and took part in the professions. Free labor was pauperized. The citizen without inherited or acquired wealth could gain his living only by his vote. We have seen the use which he made of this power.

The process of pauperization once thoroughly established, there was no release from it. A zealous effort was made under the Antonines to return to the simplicity of the earlier life of the state, but it was futile. The economic problem which the Roman state left to the Christian church was the relief of its pauperized poor, and the recovery of its debased and demoralized citizenship to character and industry.

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

NOTES FROM ENGLAND.

THE political ferment and excitement, which has resulted from the deposition of Mr. Parnell from the position of leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, has been noticeable for one thing, which affords a gauge of the religious elements in English life: from one quarter and another the Non-conformists have been abused for the way in which they at once spoke out on the need of purity in men of public life; the language has been enriched by a new phrase, which — a term of contempt on the part of those who coined it — has been accepted as a proud distinction by those against whom it was levied. The "Non-conformist Conscience" is now a recognized factor in the life of the nation; and if so, the existence and continuance of Non-conformity is amply justified. Mr. Gladstone, fifteen years ago, was surprised and deeply moved by finding that it was the Non-conformists who joined him in his protest against the Bulgarian atrocities; and to-day his sensitiveness as to the importance of public characters being men of moral standing is shared by the same section of the community.

Another moral question, which is now deeply agitating the public, is that of gambling. Ministers of all sects, the Convocation of the State Church, philanthropists and publicists, are joining in a protest, and the attention of Parliament is soon to be called to the subject. Doubtless (to take one form of gambling alone) the amount of money lost and squandered in betting on horse-races is enormous. Our laws recognize the principle that betting is an illegal transaction and a crime; but it is winked at, and even openly recognized. A saloon-keeper who allows betting or gambling on his premises may be heavily fined or imprisoned; but every newspaper publishes the odds offered and taken at Tattersall's, the resort of the racing men. Clubs kept for gambling purposes are being constantly suppressed, and the club-keepers are punished; but in a recent case two noble lords found gambling in such a club were allowed to go free, the magistrate declaring that the highest fine he could impose would be no punishment to them. Many cases in the criminal courts, suicides and bankruptcies, have proved — if proof were needed — that gambling is one of our national vices, and that it often ends in the ruin of its devotees.

At the present moment society is especially anxious about a story of gambling which will end in the law courts. With the history of the case we need not trouble ourselves. But the important part of it is, that a royal personage is mixed up in the affair; if this be so, and if it ends in the full daylight of the court of justice, the matter will draw universal attention to the extent of this evil. A healthy moral tone on the subject must be increasingly fostered; but sooner or later more stringent legislation must cope with the evil. Our law and its administration should know no favored places for the "book-maker" and the betting-man, like Tattersall's and the inclosure of a race-course. It is urged by some that playing for high stakes, whether in saloons, clubs, or private houses, should be equally prohibited as illegal; but it is always dangerous to interfere with an Englishman's liberty at home, for there is no maxim so sacred in his eyes as that which tells him that "every man's house is his castle." But above all, betting transactions, offers to bet, or to advise bettors, —

matters which at present form the staple of our numerous so-called "sporting newspapers," — must be treated as public libels, and their publication pursued with the same stringent process of fine or imprisonment with which immoral books or indecent pictures may be suppressed.

The death of Mr. Charles Bradlaugh takes from politics and from the lecture hall one of the best known figures of the day. The deceased member of Parliament began life as a solicitor's clerk and a Sunday-school teacher; he developed into the Secularist lecturer and the radical politician. Ten years ago he was elected member of Parliament for Northampton; for five years he was prevented from taking his seat, for his pronounced atheism tempted a mistaken majority of the House of Commons to keep him out of it: but a few days before his death, reparation was made, and the House by a unanimous vote rescinded the resolution declaring that he was incapable of sitting in Parliament. This was not only a triumph for the principle of religious equality, but also a tribute to Mr. Bradlaugh's energy and success as a member of Parliament. It is strange that, though the Conservatives ten years ago declared that they would not sit in the House with him, no Liberal has recently received so much applause and so many compliments from the Conservatives as he has done, partly because no one measured his audience better than he, or displayed such tact in giving up a great deal to obtain his end. But, besides, Mr. Bradlaugh, like most Secularists, was a strong individualist, and his political ideals were those of a man who wanted the largest measure of individual liberty attainable. Now our political Liberalism has been gradually relinquishing this ideal for the ideal of a social organism as well-balanced and prosperous as possible, and the old individualism is now often ill at ease in Liberal company. For some years Mr. Bradlaugh was the president of the Secular Society; his resignation of this post, followed by his death, marks the break between the old and the new Secularism. For in whatever towns Secularism still flourishes, there the Secularist lectures and programme are not wholly concerned with the criticism and negation of Christian creeds and practices, but are devoted to questions of political and social reform, or the discussion of moral and scientific subjects. Indeed, though the Secularist lecturers may not have changed their religious opinions, they have learned that positive views attract, while negative views repel; and their attitude confirms those who are of the opinion that the Christian religion in our country has more to fear from the indifference of its adherents and the contempt of the worldly than from the attacks of avowed opponents.

Among recent theological works, a little book on Biblical Inspiration, by Professor W. Sanday ("The Oracles of God," London, Longmans, 1891), may be noticed as a scholarly yet popular work, obviously written in the spirit of an *Eirenicon*, but yet an attempt to bring the issue into clearer light and within closer limits; coming from an Oxford professor, it significantly shows how the stream of thought runs. A more ambitious and elaborate work is Professor O. Pfleiderer's "Development of Theology." This volume forms a new number of the series, the Library of Philosophy (London, Sonnenschein; New York, Macmillan). It is very welcome, as there are no comprehensive and reliable English works on the various schools and movements of recent theology; moreover, is it not a mark that the different countries of Europe are becoming less

strangers to each other when a German professor writes an English handbook?

Several new appointments have been recently made in the episcopate of the Church of England, and two of the new bishops are scholars of eminence. Professor Creighton, the ecclesiastical historian, of Cambridge, and Dr. Perowne, late Dean of Peterborough. The number of good scholars who have become successful bishops is a significant fact, betokening that theological study is far from unfitting men for useful service in church and state.

Joseph King.

HAMPSTEAD, LONDON.

GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

Der Inhalt der Lehre Jesu, von Dr. H. H. Wendt, ord. Professor der Theologie in Heidelberg, Darstellender Theil des Werkes; "Die Lehre Jesu." Pp. xiv, 678. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht's Verlag., Göttingen. Mrk. 12. — In 1886 appeared "Die Evangelischen Quellenberichte über die Lehre Jesu," which not only prepared the way to the present volume, but made possible a unity and continuity undisturbed by digressions into textual criticism. Notwithstanding the vast literature on this subject, Dr. Wendt's work is in several respects unique, and certainly fills an evident gap in theological literature. This is the first significant attempt to bring the historical contents of the doctrine of Christ into systematic exposition, or "to give an actual historical statement of the doctrine of Jesus." The work comes at the close of a period of extraordinary activity in New Testament criticism, which has shown, among other things, "that a mere skeptical position over against the problems of a historical conception and judgment of Jesus has in our day no scientific right." The historical sources, in order of value, are Mark, Matthew, the sermons of Christ contained in the fourth Gospel, the letters of Paul, and the religious views of the Jewish people. But the entire outline of the doctrine of Jesus must be taken from Mark and Matthew. The method of historical statement is only so far the religious as is made necessary by the Jewish antecedents of Jesus. The effort is to discover the fundamental principles which both unify and account for the doctrine, rather than to place the expressions of doctrine in their chronological order, the objective point being to understand Christ's assertion and defense of his kingdom among men which he gave his labor and life to establish. Although Jesus left no systematic statement of his whole doctrine, we may assume as an hypothesis that his doctrine is capable of such arrangement. The main divisions of the work are: 1. Historical connections for the doctrine of Jesus; 2. External aspects of the doctrine of Jesus; 3. Christ's proclamation of the kingdom of God in general, pp. 130-427; 4. The witness of Jesus to his own Messiahship; and 5. The views of Jesus concerning the development of the kingdom of God. Dr. Wendt's work appears, in almost every respect, to be of the highest order of merit. He successfully guards himself against the common error of confusing the doctrine of Jesus with the doctrines of the apostles and of the

early development of Christianity. The foundation of the doctrine of Christ was the knowledge that God is universal Father with a Father's love. This was to Christ a revelation through his inner experience, and He found it supported by the Old Testament Scriptures. He felt and knew himself to be the Son of God, and He would be a pattern to all, that all men might be the same. He would found a kingdom of God, "an ideal, religious, communal relation between God and men." The teaching of Jesus forms a sum of doctrine, with internal harmony and clearly defined consequences. "It is purely religious; it is likewise thoroughly ethical." The relations between God and men, and between man and man, are all moral relations.

Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Altchristlichen Literatur, von Oscar von Gebhardt und Adolf Harnack. VI. Band. Heft 4. Die Aeltesten Quellen des Orientalischen Kirchenrechts. Erstes Buch, *Die Canones Hippolyti*, von Dr. Hans Achelis. Pp. v, 295. J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, Leipzig. 1891. Mrk. 9.50.—Although several translations of these Canons have been made, Dr. Achelis believes that in every feature, by the coöperation of learned specialists, he has given new and better renderings. The preservation of these Canons we owe to the Coptic Canonists of the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries. They were brought to European attention by the Dominican J. M. Wansleben about the year 1677. The work which has been done upon the text of the Canons is a very good illustration of the present condition of the art of *constructive criticism*. From a confused and conflicting mass, one third of which is clearly interpolation, Dr. Achelis is able to reach satisfactory results as to the unity and character of the Egyptian Liturgy, and to give a reliable account of the constitution and worship of this early community. The worship fell into three parts. First, reading and exposition, which brought the "Word" into prominence; second, the Eucharistic celebration, which gave expression to the idea of Sacrifice; and third, the offering and distribution of gifts, which represented Love. But the service was mystical, "shrouded by a cloud of superstition." "The theories are Christian, but the practice heathen. . . . And so arose the old Christian Liturgy." The author of the Canons is clearly the Roman Bishop Hippolytus, of whose life we have definite information in the "Refutatio omnium haeresium." The superscription of the Canons is very significant. "In nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti, Dei unici. Hi sunt canones ecclesiae et præcepta, quæ scripsit Hippolytus, princeps episcoporum Romanorum secundum mandata apostolorum, ex parte spiritus sancti, qui loquebatur per eum. Sunt autem hi canones numero triginta octo. In pace a domino. Amen." The time of the composition was between the years 222 and 235, and the place probably Rome, where ecclesiastical constitutions grew up much earlier than in the East. In the two appendices we have the *περὶ χαρισμάτων* of Hippolytus, and two fragments from his sermons.

Das Heidentum in der römischen Kirche. Bilder aus dem religösen und sittlichen Leben Süditaliens, von Th. Trede. Dritter Teil. Pp. iii, 426. F. A. Perthes, Gotha. Mrk. 5.—These volumes, of which the present is the most interesting, are made by one who knows not only the land and people of south Italy, but the social and religious character of ancient Greece and Rome. It is his conviction that Greco-Roman heathenism flourishes to-day with but slight modifications, and that the Christianity of south Italy is thoroughly heathenized. Trede's work is excluded

from the Russian Empire, and naturally meets the disapprobation of the Roman Church. Apart from polemics, the books are full of quaint and curious information concerning things new and old.

Unterricht im Christentum, von Prof. Dr. W. Bornemann. Pp. xvi, 301. Verlag von Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen. 1891. Mrk. 4.40.—This manual differs from the ordinary in a new arrangement of matter, and in an earnest effort to apply the doctrines of Christianity to practical life and problems. The author holds it to be a vicious practice to keep the young in ignorance of the living questions of the present,—questions which they must meet as soon as they enter the practical and theoretical world. The standpoint from which the subject is approached is evidently that of Ritschl, yet in most of the expositions there are evidences of independence. Dr. Bornemann does not write for past generations, but has the present future directly in view, and leans much more to the religious than to the philosophical view of Christianity. In this spirit the fields of the Old and New Testaments are systematically reviewed in sixteen chapters. Whatever may be one's judgment concerning such arrangements of matter as placing the doctrine of "Last Things" at the beginning, Christology before Theology, and treating Justification with Theology rather than with Christology, one will readily admit that Dr. Bornemann has written clearly and instructively on the principles of the Christian religion, and furnished a manual of much more than ordinary interest. For readers who are not acquainted with Latin and Greek expressions an appendix key is given.

Beiträge zur Jesaiakritik. Nebst einer Studie über Prophetische Schriftstellerei von Prof. Dr. Fried. Giesebricht. Pp. iv, 220. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen. Mrk. 5.—Dillmann's commentary on Isaiah is regarded as antiquated in textual criticism, and in error on the fundamental problems of the book of which it treats. The contents of the present work fall under three divisions: Isaiah, Deutero-Isaiah, and "concerning the change of threat and promise in the writings of the Prophets." According to chronology and content, the following order of Isaiah is held to be strictly correct: 1, chaps. 2–5; 2, chaps. 6–9, 11, 1–9; 3, chaps. 10, 14, 24–32, 17, 18, 20, 21, 11–17; 4, chaps. 28–31; 5, chaps. 1, 22, 37. The author agrees with Stade and Guthe that chapters 32 and 33 are spurious.

Gotttheit, Freiheit, und Unsterblichkeit, vom Standpunkte der Anthropologie, von Ludwig Feuerbach. Zweite Auflage. Pp. iv, 260. Verlag von Otto Wigand, Leipzig. Mrk. 5.—Feuerbach is personally and philosophically one of the most instructive commentaries on the vagaries of Hegelianism. He tells us, "God was my first thought, reason my second, man my third and last thought." The first two thoughts he abandoned for a thorough materialism and subjective atheism. The text of the present volume is, "Man is what he eats." The body is the Ego; the nature of man, the sole object of philosophy. Of this phase of thought Feuerbach is the most brilliant and representative expositor.

Studien zur vorgeschichtlichen Archäologie. Gesammelte Abhandlungen von Christian Hostmann. Mit einem Vorworte von Dr. L. Lindenschmidt. Pp. vi, 221. Verlag von Friedrich Vieweg und Sohn, Braunschweig. Mrk. 7.—These essays of the late Dr. Hostmann were first published in the "Archiv für Anthropolgie," and later, thoroughly revised and enriched with new matter. As the essays now stand, they constitute a systematic and destructive criticism of "the three-period

theory" and its consequences, as held by Thomsen, Nilsson, Lisch, and Hildebrand. An analysis of the celebrated work of Hildebrand is given as a starting point for the criticism. According to this theory, the chronological order is Stone, Bronze, and Iron, while the transition is made only by the introduction of a new people. Hostmann agrees with the Duke of Argyll: "They talk of an Old Stone Age and of a Newer Stone Age, and of a Bronze Age, and of an Iron Age. Now, there is no proof whatever that such ages ever existed in the world!" These three so-called ages are subjects for three critical essays, from which it appears that the three-period theory is quite artificial, and contradictory to the results of archaeology. "The step from a stone period into a bronze period is absolutely impossible." Under normal conditions, iron is the first metal that men learn to produce. In the essay on the Homeric *χαλκός*, the author finds that the oldest meaning of the term is *iron*. In Homer's time copper was imported, but iron was native and much in use. Iron is supposed to have been discovered on the Phrygian Ida 225 years before the taking of Troy, or 1432 b. c. Likewise, in his essay on the Sanscrit *ayas*, Hostmann concludes, against Zimmer and Schrader, that the term signifies *iron*. The priority of iron among the metals is with the author an established fact. A study of the metal work of Mitylene leads to the conclusion that we may speak "only of a metallic and pre-metallic age," but it is not shown that one can speak of a non-metallic age. Dr. Lindenschmidt seems to be justified in speaking particularly of the great learning and comprehensive judgment of Hostmann.

Die evangelische Theologie in ihrem Verhältnisse zu Wissenschaft und Frömmigkeit. Pp. 24. Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht's Verlag, Göttingen. 60 Pf.—Theology is a science of beliefs, not a belief about beliefs. In the elementary stages of natural religion there is neither actual science nor faith, yet the material for both. The beginnings of science, natural and speculative, were made by the priesthood. Here Religion becomes the mother of Science. Theological science is possible only in the prophetic religions, and here it may become scientific in the strictest sense, provided its content does not depend upon its form. Historical Christianity affords a scientific theology. This theology recognizes and demands the true Evangelical Christianity. But not every church called Christian can support such a theology, and not every theology can be supported or tolerated in the Christian Church. Only that theology can work among other sciences that casts aside every remnant of Scholasticism. "The Evangelical Church has room for a true theology, because she recognizes no other condition of salvation than personal faith in the gospel through the free grace of God in Christ."

Kanon und Text des Alten Testaments, dargestellt von Dr. Frantz Buhl, ord. Professor der Theologie zu Leipzig. Pp. vi, 262. Akademische Buchhandlung (W. Faber), Leipzig. 1891. Mrk. 6.—An enlargement and translation of a work published by the author in Sweden five years ago. It claims to give the results of the most recent investigations of the Old Testament Canon and Text. The expression, *κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς πίστεως*, is first found in the Grecian Fathers of the fourth century, but the idea was a living one with the early Christians, and with the Jews b. c. The work falls into the special sphere of pre-Christic Judaism, and deals mainly with the historical process as it is there exhibited, though not without attention to its reflex in Christianity. Thus, after the treatment of the Babylonian Canon and that of the Alexandrian Jews,

we have a valuable presentation of the Old Testament Canon as regarded by the New Testament Scriptures and the Christian Church. This prepares the way for a history of the Old Testament texts, pp. 79-197. The facts that simple and safe means to discover the original texts are entirely wanting, and that no text can be found to which the different existing texts can be referred, impose some degree of modesty on Old Testament critics. It is only by a careful study of the form and history of the different collections, with their literature and translations, that any safe method of procedure can be devised, or reliable results obtained. This is the idea which Dr. Buhl would carry out in his work. The results are elaborated under two divisions, the outer and the inner history of the Old Testament text. Among other conclusions we notice there is clear evidence that b. c., and even into the first century, a text existed, in the hands of the Pharisees, which we may regard as the original of such texts as we possess, and of which the Septuagint is the most faithful representative.

Die christliche Weltanschauung und Kant's sittlicher Glaube. Lie. Theol. Chr. Schrempf. Pp. xiv, 54. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen. 1891. Mrk. 1.20. — This essay is, strictly speaking, a philosophical study of the relation of Kant's system to the evident teaching of Jesus Christ. The author makes his discussion more subjective than is commonly done. This is probably due to the influence of his master, Sören Kierkegaard. He maintains that Christ is not understood by those who take an egoistic view of Christianity, nor can He be understood by those who take Kant's practical philosophy as a standpoint from which to consider the gospel. For Kant, freedom is the first principle; with Christ, God. The first is the ethics of autonomy; the second, of Theometry. By the one we have only a critical principle; by the other, a moral law. Thus Kant cannot lead to Christ, but he who accepts Kant's postulates and requirements must turn from Kant to Christ to find a law that obliges and enables him to give to his entire life moral contents.

Erkenntnisslehre. Von Dr. Al. Schmid, Professor an der Universität München. Erster Band, pp. vii, 498. Zweiter Band, pp. v, 428. Herdersche Verlagshandlung, Freiburg im Breisgau, und St. Louis, Mo. Mrk. 9. Geb. 12.60. — Dr. Schmid, holding that Epistemology is the subjective foundation of all the sciences, has endeavored to give a comprehensive historico-systematic view of this department. The first volume is concerned mainly with the history of the problem, beginning, after the introduction, with a critical history of Philosophic Doubt. The second chapter, pp. 111-243, is an elaborate discussion of the various theories concerning sense perceptions and intuitions. The third section is an historical exposition of the two great schools, Sensualism and Intellectualism, from their earliest to their latest representatives. The second volume is given to a systematic statement and solution of the problem from the standpoint of Intellectualism. Here follow in order Metaphysics (Psychology, Cosmology, and Ontology), Logic, Ethics, and Aesthetics. The final general division, pp. 283-418, is a critical examination of the sensual and the intellectual systems. Concerning the character or direction of the work, Dr. Schmidt takes what he regards as "the standpoint of a *philosophia perennis*, which, in the course of history, remains steadfast in character, yet is never antiquated, because it is ever renewing its youth and never outliving itself." Certainly, Epistemology is not in a position at the present time to ignore this system; nor is this system to be

condemned because it did not spring up yesterday ; nor is it to be judged, as is commonly done, by traditional prejudices. The shrug-and-smile method of dealing with systems of which one is ignorant is not in strict agreement with the philosophic spirit. We know of no work on Epistemology which is more interesting, and more clearly written. It not only acquaints us with an old and new standpoint, but shows us the entire history of the subject from this standpoint. If nothing more were offered, this would be sufficient to recommend it to students of philosophy, especially those who are interested in the history of philosophy.

Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi, von D. Emil Schürer. Professor der Theologie zu Kiel. Zweite neubearbeitete Auflage des Lehrbuchs der neutestamentlichen Zeitgeschichte. 2 Theile. 894 und 751 pages. 1886 u. 1890. J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, Leipzig. Mrk. 38. Geb. Mrk. 43.— With the appearance of the second half of the first volume, the second edition of Schürer's great work is complete. The extent of revision and addition is seen in the fact that there are in the present edition 940 pages more than in the first. This work is partly the cause, partly the result, of the recent and growing conviction that the entire New Testament Scriptures were written with a tacit consideration of the circumstances of the Jewish people in the first century, and that here we are to find perspective and background for early Christian institutions. Schürer's work has been so often and widely noticed that we need only indicate the outline of this newest part, which, after a general introduction to the whole, pp. 1-127, is concerned solely with Jewish political history in two parts : (a) from Antiochus Epiphanes to the overthrow of Jerusalem by Pompey (175-63 B. C.) ; (b) from the fall of Jerusalem to the Hadrianic wars (63 B. C.-135 A. D.). Pp. 593-751 are given to supplements and registers. The registers are noteworthy as belonging to the entire work, and also for their completeness. These are four in number : (a) Biblical texts ; (b) Hebrew words ; (c) Greek words ; and (d) names and subject-matter, pp. 667-741. It is needless to say that here the work is regarded as unrivaled. We also call attention to an interesting discourse, *Ueber den jüdischen Hintergrund im Neuen Testamente*, by Prof. Dr. Georg Schnedermann. Pp. 21. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 40 Pf.

Politik der konstitutionellen Staaten, von Dr. Karl Walcker. Pp. vii, 301. Macklot'sche Buchhandlung, Karlsruhe. Mrk. 8.— This work is an effort "to give a new and brief exposition of the present condition of investigations on scientific politics." . . . "My work discusses the physiology, pathology, and therapeutics of the political life of civilized states." In connection with this, the author aims to call attention to the most important literature on the subject at home and abroad, and to fit his book for reference by adding indices of names and matter. He points out likenesses and differences of various lands and peoples ; describes different forms of the state ; discusses constitutional and administrative politics ; finds the dangers of the modern state, not in anarchy and communism, but in Feudalism and Ultramontanism, yet concludes that "the progress of humanity is possible and probable." The work, on the whole, seems better adapted to Germany than to America, although it contains much of general interest.

Zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems. Von Bacon zu Hume. Von Eduard Grimm. Pp. xii, 596. Verlag von Wilhelm Friedrich. K. R. Hofbuchhändler, Leipzig. Mrk. 12.— The philosophers here

considered are Bacon, Hobbes (pp. 61-173), Locke, Berkeley (pp. 367-437), and Hume. This school is by no means purely empirical. It can be termed such only because it stands over against the older rationalism by emphasizing experience as a source of knowledge. The history of the problem of knowledge as presented in this school, says Grimm, may be regarded as a drama in five acts, which rises in interest and importance from Bacon to Locke, revolutionizes in Berkeley, and finds its catastrophe in Hume. This happy simile suggests not only the author's general view of the field, but also many corrections which he makes of current opinion concerning the philosophical relations of the members of this school. These philosophers are not to be regarded as depending one upon another, although all are at one in setting out from experience. Hume is the reversal of Locke, not a consequent. Hobbes and Locke endeavored to reach a knowledge the certainty of which is independent of experience. Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke are at one in putting science in the closest relation with life, and in holding that science has no other use or purpose than as it ministers to practical life. This differentiates the philosophies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The revolution in Berkeley was to attach value to theory as theory, and to place metaphysics in the chair. Had Berkeley not written, Hume's "Treatise" would have been impossible. Thus, while we have the two greatest, or at least most acute, modern metaphysicians in Berkeley and Hume, the revival of philosophy after Hume went back to Locke as a starting point. On the whole, Grimm's exposition is the best we have; and if one is to leave the study of the originals, or desires a helpful companion in the study, Grimm may be well recommended. He has avoided the most vicious errors of expositors, namely, of making a fragment or one work of an author represent his position, of ignoring the explicit advices of the philosophers themselves, and of presenting merely the negative side of a system to the exclusion or perversion of the positive or constructive. For instance, Hume tells us explicitly that he wishes to be represented by his latest work, "An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding," and not by his "Treatise of Human Nature," yet his expositors have used the "Treatise" almost solely, and, by their assumption of knowing Hume's position better than Hume himself knew it, have not only ignored the positive and constructive elements of his system, but given it a purely negative character, not even refusing to it the appellation of Nihilism. Grimm avoids this one-sidedness, not only in regard to Hume, but also in his exposition of Hobbes and Locke. The fact that Grimm is not a professor of philosophy may account for his successful exposition of these five great modern philosophers who were not professors.

Mattoon M. Curtis.

LEIPZIG, GERMANY.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Roberts Brothers, Boston. Positive Religion. Essays, Fragments, and Hints. By Joseph Henry Allen, author of "Hebrew Men and Times," "Christian History in its Three Great Periods," "Our Liberal Movement in Theology," etc. Pp. xii, 259. \$1.25.

Universalist Publishing House, Boston. Christian Types of Heroism: a Study of the Heroic Spirit under Christianity. By John Coleman Adams, D. D. Pp. 208. 1891. 75 cents.

The Students' Publishing Co., Hartford, Conn. The Epistle to the Galatians. Designed as a text-book for class-room use and for private study. By George B. Stevens, Ph. D., D. D., Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in Yale University. Pp. 240. 1890.

American Tract Society, New York. The Pastor Amidst his Flock. By Rev. G. P. Willecox, D. D., Professor in Chicago Theological Seminary. Pp. 186. 1890.

John Wiley & Sons, New York. Memorabilia of George B. Cheever, D. D., and of his wife, Elizabeth Wetmore Cheever. In Verse and Prose. Pp. 430. 1890.

E. P. Dutton & Co., New York. Christian Socialism, What and Why. What is Socialism? What are its Causes? What is its Relation to Christianity? How can the great Social and Economic Changes it involves be brought about by Just and Orderly Methods? By the Rev. Philo W. Sprague, Rector of St. John's Church, Charlestown, Mass. With Appendix: Address of the Bishop of Durham on Socialism. 16mo. Pp. vi, 204. 1891. Cloth, 75 cents; paper, 50 cents.

Funk & Wagnalls, New York. Frederick Douglass, the Colored Orator. By Frederie May Holland, author of "The Reign of the Stoies," "Stories from Robert Browning," "The Rise of Intellectual Liberty," etc. Pp. vi, 423. 1891. \$1.50.

David Nutt, London. A Full Account and Collation of the Greek Cursive Codex Evangelium 604 (with two facsimiles) [Egerton 2610 in the British Museum], together with Ten Appendices, containing (A.) The Collation of a Manuscript in his own possession. (B.) A Reprint, with corrections of Scrivener's list of differences between the editions of Stephen 1550 and Elzevir 1624, Beza 1565 and the Complutensian, together with fresh evidence gathered from an investigation of the support afforded to the various readings by the five editions of Esasmus, 1516, 1519, 1522, 1527, 1535, by the Aldine Bible 1518, by Colineus 1534, by the other editions of Stephen of 1546, 1549, 1551, and by the remaining three Bezan editions in folio of 1582, 1588-89, 1598, and the 8° editions of 1565, 1567, 1580, 1590, 1604. (C.) A full and exact comparison of the Elzevir editions of 1624 and 1633, doubling the number of the real variants hitherto known, and exhibiting the support given in the one case and in the other by the subsequent editions of 1641, 1656, 1662, 1670, and 1678. (D.) Facsimile of Codex Paul 247 (Cath. Eps. 210), with correction of previous descriptions. (E.) Report of a visit to the Phillips MSS., with corrections of and supplement to previous information concerning them, and collations of parts of some of them. (F.) Report of a visit to the Public Library at Bâle, with facsimile of Erasmus' second MS. Evan. 2, and a collation of Codex Apoc. No. 15. (G.) Report of a visit to the Public Library at Geneva, with corrections of Cellerier's collation of Evan. 75, as supplied to Scholz. (H.) Report of a visit to the Library of Harvard College, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A., with information concerning the sacred Greek codices there. (I.) Some further information concerning Codex 1^a, an Evangelistary at Andover, Mass., U. S. A. (J.) Note on 1 Tim. iii. 15. By Herman C. Hoskier. Pp. xxi, exvi, 140. MDCCXC.

The University Press, Cambridge, England ; C. J. Clay & Sons, London. Pitt Press Series. Les Précieuses Ridicules, par J. B. P. Molière. With Introduction and Notes by E. G. W. Braunholtz, M. A., Ph. D., University Lecturer in French. Abridged Edition. Edited for the Syndics of the University Press. Pp. xi, 84. 1890.—Wilhelm Tell. Schauspiel von Friedrich Schiller. Edited (with Introduction, English Notes, Map, etc.) by Karl Breul, M. A., Ph. D., University Lecturer in German. Abridged Edition. Edited for the Syndics of the University Press. Pp. xxviii, 208. 1890.—Les Plaideurs. Comédie par Jean Racine. With Introduction and Notes by E. G. W. Braunholtz, M. A., Ph. D., University Lecturer in French. Abridged Edition. Edited for the Syndics of the University Press. Pp. ix, 128. 1890.

T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh ; Scribner & Welford, New York. Clark's Foreign Theological Library. New Series. Vol. XLIII. Schürer's History of the Jewish People. Division I., Vol. II. Pp. viii, 407. 1890.